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Abstract 
 
The thesis undertakes an empirical analysis of the parallel market exchange rate behavior 
in the post-Bretton-Woods era based on monthly data spanning the period 1973m01 to 
1998 m12 for a heterogeneous group of 56 countries across the globe. The preliminary 
investigation regress a crash dummy on parallel market premium using a Binary Choice 
model. The main analysis is conducted by estimating the traditional and a parallel market 
variant of PPP using the Johansen Multivariate Cointegration method. Based upon the 
VEC models obtained the hypothesis of a weak-form and a strong-form PPP are tested in 
the form of identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vectors, respectively, whilst the 
joint hypothesis of a long-run strong from PPP for parallel rate as well as long-run 
informational efficiency in the parallel market is tested for the alternative model. The 
empirical results obtained suggest that: weak-form PPP models receive stronger support 
than the alternative model across the whole sample especially for the Latin American 
economies. The strong-form PPP is best received for African economies but mostly for the 
parallel exchange rate solely. The use of parallel market exchange rates and wholesale 
price indices has been shown to be more supportive of the PPP validity, especially for the 
strong-form PPP. The empirical findings emphasize the need to adopt more flexible 
exchange rate policies, while the liberalization of the capital flows and the global 
integration of the currency markets are in favour of the countries that avoid adopting 
restrictive macroeconomic policies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Subsequent to the demise of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg exchange rate system in the 
early 1970s , most of the large industrialized countries have undergone the shift from fixed 
to floating exchange rate regime (Sager & Taylor, 2006, Frankel & Rose, 1994) , arising  
intense concerns and extensive disputes upon the foreign exchange market amongst 
academic economists, policymakers and practitioners. The generalized floating exchange 
regime, as Frankel & Rose (1994) note, provided economists with required empirical data 
set for solving such academic disputes and meanwhile brought about more immediate 
policy issues. A large extent of ensuing literature focused on the development and 
estimation of empirical exchange rate models under floating exchange rate regime, among 
which the macro-fundamental based models of exchange rate determination dominated the 
others during the decade. This class of models range from the simple Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) model, the flexible monetary models of exchange rate and the sticky-price 
overshooting models to portfolio balance models.  
 
The PPP hypothesis has been the building block of international economics and underpins 
all the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks to exchange rate determination. The long-
run validity of PPP, especially, has been posited as a long-run equilibrium condition for 
many dynamic exchange rate models1. The PPP proposition has been subject to substantial 
empirical investigation. Thanks to the development of new econometric methods, such as 
cointegration and non-stationary panel methods, recent tests of PPP, as summarized by 
MacDonald (2007, p50), have concentrated on using cointegration methods to test the 
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and relative price differentials, as well as 
the unit root methods to determine if real exchange rates are mean-reverting processes.   
 
It is noteworthy that for most of the previous PPP studies, the focus is mainly on developed 
economies, with only minor coverage of developing economies. However,as we will 
discuss in the suceeding chapter, the PPP concept is quite important for less developed 
economies.2 As stated in Cerrato & Sanrantis (2007), many of these (developing or less 
developed) countries tend to have some form of a fixed exchange rate system combined 
                                                          
1
 Consult Abuaf and Jorion (1990), Dornbusch (1976)  and Mussa (1982) among many others in this strand 
of the literature. 
2
 The importance of PPP concepts is articulated in Balhmani – Oskooee and Hegerty (2009) and discussed in 
section 2.3 of the thesis. 
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with foreign trade and capital restrictions and often suffer from high inflation and large 
external deficits, some are even prone to financial crises. This feature of developing 
economies have led to the emergence and development of parallel (black) market for 
foreign exchang. The black market exchange rates are fully market determined whilst the 
official exchange rate are often controlled by the monetary authorities in these countries. It 
is arguable, therefore, the paralllel market rate might reflect the true value of currency as 
opposed to the potentially misleading official exchange rate. 
 
Similar arguments have been advocated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) who claims that : 
“Officially-reported exchange rate itself is often profoundly misleading. One often gets a 
false picture of the underlying monetary policy and the ability of the economy to adjust 
imbalances. Official rate can be meaningless and far removed from the rate at which 
transactions take place.” 
 
According to their research based on a comprehensive data set chronicling the exchange 
rate regime history spanning the period 1946-1998 for 153 countries, dual or multiple rates, 
and/or parallel markets were far more commonplace than it is commonly thought. Among 
industrialized economies: dual or multiple rates were the norm in the 1940s and 1950s, 
whist amongst developing countries the existence of parallel market remained relatively 
commonplace through the 1980s. Over the course of post-World WarⅡhistory, virtually 
every country has relied, at one time or another, on capital controls and/or multiple 
exchange rate systems.  
 
By comparing the evolution of both the official and parallel exchange rates, they find the 
history of exchange rate policy is interpreted very differently when market-determined 
rates are used instead of official rates. They believe that in comparison to the official 
exchange rates, the data on market-determined rates to be reliable and generally far better 
indicators of the underlying monetary policy. The findings of their empirical analysis are 
positive and consistent with the argument that the monetary policy stance is better reflected 
in market rates. 
 
Empirical evidence concerning the activeness of parallel (black) markets is abundant. Take 
the experience of Latin American for example. The chronic high inflation rates and 
corresponding current account deficits of these countries since 1970s has led to the 
11 
 
emergence of a strong black market for dollars, one that has become an integral part of the 
countries’ infrastructure. Illegal parallel market has been a norm in most of Africa and 
South Asia, as well in several Latin American countries, especially through the 1980.3 
Shachmurove & Yochanan (1999) has reported that there are only 17 countries whose 
currencies are free from an internal black market. More evidences for a broader coverage 
of countries have been documented by Ghei, Kiguel, and O’Connel (1996). 
 
Given the importance of the parallel markets in the history of most developing countries 
and also some developed countries, it is of great interest to study the behavior of parallel 
market exchange and as Reinhart & Rogoff proposed, to achieve better understandings of 
monetary and exchange rate policies and maybe shed light on the understanding of the 
official exchange rate market, especially in a period of increasing financial instability and 
greater integration of the world economies 
 
In prior to defining the central questions of study, it is necessary to provide a brief outline 
of some basic concepts and stylized facts concerning the parallel market exchange rate  
 
A parallel foreign exchange market system is one in which transactions are conducted at 
more than one exchange rate and at least one of the prevailing rates is freely floating, 
market-determined rate (Kiguel and O’Connell, 1995). The parallel exchange rate can 
emerge only when the government imposes exchange controls (on the volume of certain 
foreign exchange transactions or on the price at which such transactions are made) and 
such controls can affect the demand or supply for foreign currencies. As Kiguel and 
O’Connell summarise, although details vary from case to case, the development of parallel 
foreign markets normally follow two paths: the economy might start from a unified foreign 
exchange market and the authorities adopt an official dual exchange rate system in 
response to a balance of payments crisis. Alternatively, a parallel market might emerge 
gradually as the authorities impose restrictions on access to foreign exchange in an effort to 
maintain an overvalued exchange rate.  
 
The parallel rate markets can be classified in a simple way based on its legality. A common 
dichotomy is dual exchange rate and black market system. The former type of markets are 
                                                          
3
 More evidences concerning the activeness of the parallel market for foreign exchange can be found in 
Edwards (1989) and Montiel et al.(1993). 
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legal in which most current account transactions take place at a pegged commercial rate, 
capital account transactions, on the other hand, at a market-determined financial rate and 
the parallel market is used to insulate the rest of the economy from the shocks of short-
term capital flows. The latter case, an illegal, black market system normally emerges when 
private agents attempt to evade restrictions on the price or quantity of foreign exchange 
transactions. A black market system can coexist along with a dual exchange rate system but 
it is necessary to distinguish between these two types of parallel markets as the underlying 
monetary policies objectives are different in some aspects. It is obvious that the term 
parallel market is a broader definition encompassing the black market for foreign currency. 
 
The difference between the two types of markets is well illustrated in Kiguel and O’Conell 
(1995), an insightful exploration of empirical evidence on parallel systems based on a 
World Bank study of eight countries-Argentina, Ghana, Mexico, Sudan, Tanzania, Turkey, 
Venezuela, and Zambia. As summarized in this paper, governments adopt dual exchange 
rate system as a transitional effort to limit the inflationary effect of a devaluation (Flood 
1978, Lizondo 1987, Kiguel and Lizondo 1990), specifically, to deal with balance of 
payments crises, increase the effectiveness of monetary policy or to help unify the foreign 
exchange market, amongst which a balance of payment crisis is the most common case. On 
the long-term basis, some countries have adopted a dual exchange rate system using the 
parallel exchange rate to deal with short-term capital flows (Flood and Marison 1982). An 
official parallel market is also adopted aiming to unify the foreign exchange market as a 
transitional device. In most developing countries, black markets are commonplace due to 
the unanimously prevailing restrictions on capital account transactions in the official 
exchange market from the 1940s.  
It is commonly believed that, whilst a dual system temporarily installed normally serve as 
part of an overall policy adjustment, the emergence of a black market often reflects 
systematic bias against devaluation of the official exchange rate (Kiguel and O’Conell 
1995). By observing the black market evolution patterns of many developing countries, it 
is easy to notice that the expansionary monetary and fiscal policies is often associated with 
the rise of inflation rate, leading eventually to an overvalued exchange rate, the balance of 
payments gradually worsens. As well explained by Kiguel and O’Conell, in the occasions 
that the government is not capable of correcting this imbalance, it will then be forced to 
impose restrictions on the access to official foreign exchange which will in turn cause the 
expectations of maxi-devaluation or tightening foreign exchange controls in the market. 
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The demand for foreign exchange hence will increase as importers will be encouraged to 
accumulate inventory and the substitution behavior of domestic assets for foreign exchange 
will be promoted and hence the emergence of black market. 
The degree of influence of the parallel rate and their effects on overall economic 
performance depend largely on the size of the premium defined as: 
 =  − 1
 × 100                                                                                        (1.1) 
where PMP denotes parallel market premium, PE denotes parallel market exchange rate 
and OE denotes official exchange rate.4 
It has been advocated in numerous researches that the parallel market premium often 
serves as a reliable guide to the direction of future official exchange rate changes (Ghei and 
Kamin 1999). For instance, Kiguel and O’Conell (1995) suggest that a significant spread 
between black market and official rate may be a signal of macroeconomics misalignments. 
This is an interesting perspective to explore the dynamics and interactions between the 
official and parallel exchange rate markets. 
 
Having established the key definitions and facts of parallel market exchange rate, we 
proceed to define the central questions of this study as well as the methodology employed 
as follows: 
 
First of all, as a preliminary investigation, we regress a currency crash dummy on the 12-
month parallel market premium in line with Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) for 37 countries 
across the globe during the period 1973 M01 to 1998 M12 based on Monthly data. Our 
empirical analysis will help to clarify if the parallel market premium can be a good 
predictor of official exchange rate realignments.  
 
The main empirical analysis is concentrated on testing the long-run validity of PPP based 
on Johansen cointegration analysis. The monthly data is used for the nominal and official 
exchange rates, the domestic price indices (both wholesale and consumer price indices) 
during the sample period mentioned above. Two alternative models are investigated: the 
                                                          
4
 The definition adopted here is in line with Caporale and Cerrato ( 2006). 
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traditional weak-form and strong form PPP framework as well as a version of PPP model 
proposed by Diamandis (2003) accountable for the presence of both official and parallel 
exchange rate markets.  
 
The purpose of the study is twofold: while the main objective is focused on testing the 
validity of long-run PPP in the recent float for a heterogeneous group of countries and 
whether the market-determined parallel rates receives more support of the long run 
Purchasing Power Parity as opposed to the official rate, we also investigated the nexus 
between the two rates based on a parallel market version of PPP employing standard 
cointegration techniques. It needs to be mentioned that the original dataset we employed 
includes 56 countries but has been reduced to 37 countries for the preliminary investigation 
and 34 countries for the examination of PPP based on the two main models.5 
 
The structure of the thesis is outlined as below: 
The introductory chapter proposes the motivation of the study, outlines the key concepts 
involved mostly for parallel market exchange rate, as well as summarizes the main 
purposes of study. The second chapter conducts a selective survey of the extant literature of 
relevance. Whilst a brief summary of the macro-fundamentals is provided, more emphasis 
is placed on the PPP literature and the studies on parallel exchange rate and of course, the 
connection between these two classes of work which facilitates our empirical analysis. 
Chapter three presents the methodology employed in the thesis and more specifically, the 
theoretical framework for each stage of analysis as well as the corresponding econometric 
approaches having been used. Chapter four reports the results of our empirical analysis and 
analyzes the findings. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the empirical findings, concludes and 
attempts to discuss the policy implications yielded from the empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
5
 The details on the choice of countries for empirical analysis are discussed in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This thesis copes with the behaviour of the official and parallel market exchange rates, 
their interactions and, most importantly, whether the use of the black market rate is 
sensible, in order to obtain improved results, in the investigation of the role of exchange 
rates in economic life. As is obvious, in order to appreciate the necessity of using the black 
market rates, it is essential to provide an overview of the economic research that have been 
conducted, on the field of exchange rate economics, until now. Of course, as the literature 
in this area is quite vast, we are going to focus on the work that has been done in the most 
important model in exchange rate economies, the so-called Purchasing Power Parity (PPP, 
hereafter). This is the workhorse model, against which most of the other models are 
compared, especially models that have to do with estimation of the equilibrium exchange 
rate. Thus, in order to do that, a brief discussion of the most important fundamentals-based 
models of exchange rate determination is first provided. Then, the emphasis will be on PPP 
and the relevant empirical work on it. In the final section of this chapter, the parallel 
exchange rate advocators’ work is to be discussed, something that can provide more 
evidence, in favour of using the black market rates in our models, instead of the official 
exchange rate. 
 
2.1 Macro- Fundamental Based Models of Exchange Rate Determination 
 
Determining the value of a currency, in terms of the units of another currency is one of the 
most discussed and researched topics in economic profession. For many decades now, 
economists are in a strenuous effort to construct and empirically verify models that are able 
to spot the exchange rate, be it the nominal or the real or the effective one. Since modern 
world is much more integrated, the international trades determines, in great extent, the 
wealth of the countries around the world and the misalignments of the exchange rates in 
any region can affect more than the countries where this phenomenon takes place. The 
study of the exchange rate remains a very active research area. In this section, some of the 
most influential models of exchange rate determination are discussed. 
One of the earlier models in exchange rate determination is the so-called flexible price 
monetary model. It is widely used for the relevant empirical work, since its assumptions 
16 
 
and approach is fairly simple and straightforward. As is very well documented by 
MacDonald (2000), as well as Taylor (1995), the exchange rate here is determined by the 
interaction of the supply and the demand for two currencies. The level of the money 
demand is determined by the real income of the economy (y), the price level (p) and the 
nominal interest rate (i). So, denoting the foreign country’s variables with an asterisk, the 
equilibrium level of money is given by the following equations, 
* * * *
t t t t
t t t t
m p y i
m p y i
κ θ
κ θ
= + −
= + −
                      (2.1) 
where the money supply on the left hand side of the equations is equal to the demand (as it 
is determined by the previously mentioned variables). It should be noted that this model 
assumes that the PPP principle always holds6. Since, PPP is represented by the following 
(logarithmic) equation 
*
t t ts p p= −                     (2.2) 
and, by using the previous three equations, it can be easily shown that the exchange rate, 
according to the flexible price monetary model is as follows: 
* * * *
t t t t t t ts m m y y i iκ κ θ θ= − − + + − .                 (2.3) 
As it can be seen, the domestic money supply increase can lead to domestic currency 
depreciation (since the exchange rate is defined as the units of domestic currency for a unit 
of the foreign one), while the relative increase of domestic income has the opposite effect. 
Finally, the domestic interest rate resembles the behavior of money supply. Due to its 
simplicity, the flexible price monetary model was extensively used in empirical economic 
research but, due to the PPP assumption which is considered quite strong and restrictive, its 
popularity and success as a tool of economic research has declined. 
Another important model, which has attempted to be more realistic, is the sticky price 
monetary model, as developed by Dornbusch (1976). The basic idea behind this model is 
that, since there is evidently a lag of responsiveness of the goods markets adjustment to 
changes in the money market, and then the overshooting phenomenon can occur in 
exchange rate market. If we assume a case of credit growth (that is, an increase in the 
                                                          
6
 Since we briefly present the major exchange rate determination theories, most of which are based on the 
PPP existence, we will not discuss PPP properties in details, until the relevant section of this chapter will 
arise. 
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supply of money), then there will be an overshooting behaviour of the short-term exchange 
rate, in order for the markets to equilibrate. Due to the fact that the financial assets market 
immediately reacts in such an effect, this can lead to higher prices in the good markets, 
while the excessive money supply would force interest rates to decrease. This would cause 
an outflow of capital from the domestic economy, forcing the national currency to 
depreciate (something that is equal to an increase in the price of foreign exchange). Of 
course, this would be a short-term event and, eventually, the long-term exchange rate will 
be lower than the one prevailing now. Thus, the case of overshooting, which is nothing 
more than the higher initial value of the exchange rate, compared to the long-run one. 
Another strand of the exchange rate literature is the type of models, where the exchange 
rate is determined by economic agents, who follow a utility maximization behaviour. In 
this kind of models, inter-temporal budget constraints are used, while the agents are 
optimizers. In their implications, these models are similar to the flexible price monetary 
model, with the major difference of assuming the existence of representative agents’ 
behaviour. Moreover, in brief, we should mention the so-called portfolio balance model, 
which, as is stated by Taylor (1995), their main feature is the lack of perfect substitutability 
of domestic and foreign assets. So, according to the policy decisions made by the monetary 
authorities, there would be the respective reaction by the economic agents, which in turn 
affects the level of exchange rate. As it has been shown in the literature, the empirical work 
on this type of models is rather limited and, mostly, unsuccessful. 
Turning our interest to models which are extensively used in the relevant empirical work, it 
should be noted that there exist a battery of empirical models that are used to infer, 
regarding exchange rate behaviour. MacDonald (2000) provides an exhaustive exposition 
of these approaches. One of those is the capital-enhanced exchange rate (CHEER) model. 
Combining the concepts of uncovered interest parity (UIP) and the PPP, it can be said that 
this approach focuses mostly on the real exchange rate – capital account relation, while it 
neglects any effects stemming from any other determinants (such as output or net foreign 
assets). This approach can be useful, especially in the current economic framework, where 
the free floating exchange rates are followed by intensive financial and fiscal imbalances. 
Since, as is emphasized by MacDonald (2000), exchange rate misalignments coexist with 
such imbalances, the finance of these imbalances from the capital account seems to be a 
way to return to equilibrium. 
18 
 
A very popular approach for estimating equilibrium exchange rates is the Behavioral 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) model, developed by Clark and MacDonald (1999). 
As previously, the UIP condition is the main building block of this approach, augmented 
with a risk premium factor. That is, 
*( )et k t t tq r r λ+∆ = − − +                  (2.4) 
where tλ is the aforementioned risk premium factor. As is documented by MacDonald 
(2000), the BEER model is quite convenient in specifying the determinants of the real 
exchange rate and, usually, the real effective exchange rate is used in the relevant empirical 
literature. Based on the previously stated parity condition, the real exchange rate, 
according to BEER, should be 
*( )et t k t t tq q r r λ+= + − −                    (2.5) 
where et kq + represents the long-run part of the real exchange rate. It is assumed that the most 
important determinants of this part of the exchange rate are the net foreign assets, the terms 
of trade and a factor representing the Balassa-Samuelson effect. A relevant modelling 
approach produces the Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER) model. It is nothing 
more that the decomposition of the real exchange rate into its permanent and transitory 
parts: 
P T
t t tq q q= +                     (2.6) 
with the two factors at the right hand side of the equation representing the aforementioned 
exchange rate parts. The permanent component is, then, considered to represent the long 
run equilibrium level of the exchange rate. In modeling this approach, several econometric 
techniques have been used, including decomposition techniques (like univariate and 
multivariate Beveridge – Nelson decomposition), structural VARs and cointegration 
approach. 
The last two approaches are based on the notion of the internal and external balance, which 
is nothing more than the level of equilibrium exchange rate on which the economy 
achieves a level of output in accordance to a low level of inflation and unemployment, 
while the amount of net savings is capable of covering the current account imbalances. In 
this line of thought, Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) model is one of the 
most heavily used, especially from international organizations and governments. In order 
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to implement this approach, the most usual approach is to impose the necessary condition 
for internal and external balance on a calibrated macroeconomic model and extract from it 
the real exchange rate that is consistent with them. This would be the FEER. Another 
popular approach here is to set the current account equation equal to the one, with the 
relevant variables calibrated in these values that can verify the validity of the internal and 
external balance. Thus, once more, the real exchange rate that is computed in this way is 
the FEER. Although this modeling approach seems to have useful features for the policy 
makers, its implementation is not that simple or straightforward, since different types of 
problems can arise when it is applied (the most important of them the validity of the 
calibrations used to determined FEER). Also, speculative capital flows are not considered, 
rendering the model less realistic. 
The last approach, using the concept of the internal – external balance, is the Natural Real 
Exchange Rate (NATREX) model. Again, this model assumes that the capital account 
imbalances should be covered by the net savings of an economy. In mathematical form, it 
is: 
( , ) ( , , ) ( , , )S tp nfa I w q k CA q k nfa− =
                 (2.7) 
with S representing savings, which are dependent on the rate of time preference and the net 
foreign assets. Additionally, investments are a function of  productivity (w), capital stock 
(k) and the real exchange rate (q). NATREX is considered as a model producing both 
medium – term and long – term equilibrium, based on the behavior of the respective 
variables of the model. 
Having completed this brief discussion of the major models and approaches for exchange 
rate determination, we are going to proceed to the analysis of PPP, which is the most 
important and most analyzed concept in international macroeconomics and finance. 
 
2.2 Purchasing Power Parity 
 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory has been the cornerstone of exchange rate models in 
international economics and also one of the simplest macro fundamental exchange rate 
models．It has been widely used to measure the equilibrium values of currencies and is 
often turned to by professions when it comes to measuring the misalignment of an 
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equilibrium exchange rate (MacDonald, 2007). Especially, the long-run validity of PPP has 
been posited as a long-run equilibrium condition for many dynamic exchange rate models7. 
PPP is so influential in exchange rate literature, that Dornbusch and Krugman(1976) has 
remarked: “Under the skin of any international economist lies a deep-seated belief in some 
variant of the PPP theory of the exchange rate”. 
The PPP exchange rate corresponds to the nominal exchange rate level such that the 
purchasing power of a unit of currency is exactly the same in the foreign country as in the 
domestic country, as long as it is converted into foreign currency at that rate (Taylor, 
2003). The principle is built upon the Law of One Price (LOOP) which stipulates that the 
homogeneous good should cost the same worldwide once the currencies are converted at 
the market exchange rate (Bahmani-Oskooee and Hegerty, 2009). In its absolute version, 
LOOP may be formalized as: 
*
, ,
       1, 2, ,i t t i tP S P i N= = K                  (2.8) 
where ,i tP denotes the price of the homogeneous good I expressed as the home currency at 
time t, the asterisks denote the corresponding foreign magnitude, tS  is the nominal spot 
exchange rate8 at time t. 
The mechanism that forces the absolute LOOP condition is based on the idea of frictionless 
goods arbitrage (Sarno & Taylor, 2002) which assumes that goods produced internationally 
are perfect substitutes, and there is no tariffs, trade costs, trade barriers such that 
transaction costs are negligible. In this case, the condition of no profitable arbitrage would 
ensure the equality of prices for homogeneous goods across countries. 
Under this assumption, if there are n goods produced in each country, and each of these 
goods has as its counterpart a homogeneous equivalent in the foreign country, then by 
summing across the n goods a measure of the overall price level in each country may be 
obtained as: 
* *
, ,
1 1
    and  
n n
t i i t t i i t
i i
P P P Pα α
= =
= =∑ ∑                  (2.9) 
                                                          
7
 Consult Abuaf and Jorion (1990),  Dornbusch (1976)  and Mussa (1982) among many others in this strand 
of the literature. 
8
 The nominal exchange rate is expressed as home currency price of one unit of foreign currency hereby 
unless specified otherwise. 
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Where α denotes the weight used to aggregate the individual prices, 
1
1
n
i
i
α
=
=∑  and the 
weights are assumed to be identical across countries. 
Based on the previous analysis, the absolute version of PPP can be derived as: 
*
t
t
t
PS
P
=
                              (2.10) 
Alternatively, taking the natural logarithms of the above mentioned variables, we end up 
with the following: 
*
t t ts p p= − .                               (2.11) 
Combining the absolute PPP with the real exchange rate definition as mentioned before: 
*
t t t tq s p p= + −                  (2.12) 
Therefore, if the absolute PPP holds for a currency, the log of the real exchange rate would 
be independent of the nominal exchange rate and remain invariant.  
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the presumptions made by the absolute PPP are rather 
unrealistic. First of all, the notion of perfect substitutability for most of the traded goods 
does not exist due to product differentiation across countries. Besides, the industry 
structure and development level vary across countries, therefore, it would be unreasonable 
for different countries to use the same weights for each specific good in constructing the 
aggregate price index. The absence of transaction costs also violates reality where we have 
tariffs, non-tariff trade impediments, customs duties, transportation costs and so on. 
Apart from the absolute version of PPP, there is the relative version of it, presenting 
weaker conditions: 
*
t t ts p p∆ = ∆ − ∆                  (2.13) 
where ∆ represents a first difference operator . 
A long-lasting debate in economic profession is about the type of the price index that is 
most suitable for usage in PPP empirical work. Some of the earlier proponents of absolute 
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PPP argue for the use of only traded goods price in constructing PPP9, whilst others 
support the use of a broader range of commodities in measuring the price level, with both 
traded and non-traded goods included10. Frenkel (1976) summarizes that using only traded 
good prices for PPP computation reflects an emphasis of the role commodity arbitrage 
plays, whereas the advocators of a broader price measure underpin the asset approach of 
exchange rate determination. In this light of thoughts, the wholesale price index (WPI) has 
been considered to be optimal for studies of PPP because of its higher proportion of traded 
goods. For instance, McNown and Wallace (1989) and Liu (1992) have shown using the 
CPI rather than the WPI causes PPP to be rejected. However, Wu and Chen (1999) arrive 
at the opposite result that PPP holds using CPI instead WPI. In our study therefore, both 
the consumer and wholesale price indices are used in the interest of clarifying the debate. 
Similar evidence has also been reported by MacDonald (1995). 
The rapid development and advancement of the cointegration techniques, initially 
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), has enabled the recent cointegration and unit root-
based test of the PPP hypothesis which has concentrated on the application of cointegration 
methods to an equation such as 
*
1 2t t t ts p pα β β ε= + + +                                 (2.14) 
where , as mentioned before, denotes the nominal exchange rate whilst  and ,the 
home and foreign price level respectively, all measured in natural logarithms. Also,  
denotes a constant term and  a random error term. In particular, weak-form PPP 
(MacDonald,1993)  exists if ,  and  are I(1) series , and  is found to be I(0) ,i.e., 
stationary. Furthermore, if the joint symmetry/proportionality condition holds for the 
coefficients, which requires , then the so-called strong form PPP can be 
found existent with the specification: 
*
t t t ts p pα ε= + − +                               (2.15)  
The strong-form PPP is often assumed implicitly for the unit root test based test of PPP to 
examine the existence of unit root in the real exchange. The real exchange rate has been 
defined in equation (2.12): 
*
t t t tq s p p= − +                                (2.16) 
                                                          
9
 See, inter alia, Angell (1922) and Viner (1937). 
10
 Cassel (1928), Samuelson (1964) 
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A number of researchers11 have applied different variants of unit root tests to examine the 
properties of the real exchange rate. If a unit root is found for real exchange rate, then the 
strong-form PPP is rejected. An excellent summary of the empirical evidence on the weak 
and strong form PPP is provided by MacDonald (2007). In there, the author presents 
findings in favour of the weak-form PPP. Nevertheless, it seems that the implied mean 
reversion of real exchange rate is painfully low. Despite the potential short-run variation, 
an important condition for long – run validity of PPP is the real exchange rate to be 
stationary over time. If the opposite holds, the nominal exchange rate and the price 
differential will permanently tend to deviate from each another. Based on these ideas, it is 
reasonable to apply stationarity tests to real exchange rate data, in order to examine them 
for long-run purchasing power parity. 
In this section a set of basic concepts and definitions of the PPP proposition have been 
illustrated and the next section proceeds to discuss a selective of recent empirical 
evidences, researching the validity of PPP and the emphasis is placed on the long-run 
perspective. 
 
2.3 PPP – Empirical Evidence for Official Exchange Rate 
 
Since PPP proposition is so influential in the construction of models in international 
macroeconomics and finance, it is reasonable to find out that the relevant empirical work 
on this topic is voluminous. Many economists coped and still work on topics that include 
the econometric analysis of PPP, as one of their major research area. A wide range of 
econometric techniques have been used, while the framework has followed the evolution 
of the advances in econometric tools and the computational abilities of modern economists. 
Since it is a laborious task to include every piece of research conducted on PPP here, we 
will try to remain selective and discuss some of the most important papers, with special 
emphasis given to the long run implications of the PPP model. 
 
Much of the PPP literature has been summarized well by Sarno and Taylor (2002) and 
Taylor and Taylor (2004), who concentrate on specific issues, highlighted by the wide 
range of previous analyses performed, mainly for industrial countries. Of course, the PPP 
                                                          
11
 see, for instance, Roll (1979); Darby (1980); MacDonald (1985); Enders (1988); Mark (1990). 
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research was not limited to industrial countries. It, rather, covers almost every country in 
the world, depending on the focus of each piece of research. 
 
In order to facilitate the analysis, we first consider the so-called “early evidence” on PPP. 
That is, empirical estimates conducted, mostly, in the 1960s through to the 1980s, and then 
proceed to consider more recent empirical tests that largely, but not exclusively, rely on 
unit root and cointegration testing. 
 
The initial efforts to empirically challenge the hypotheses of PPP focused on estimations of 
models that follow similar specifications to the equation (2.14), above. Additionally, some 
of these papers have imposed restrictions in the model, of similar fashion as those 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter. Regarding the relative version of PPP, the 
models that were used were of similar type, with the major difference to be in the use of 
differenced variables and not variables in levels. One major drawback of these studies was 
the neglect from the economists of any possibility of dynamic behavior in these models. 
Thus, the first studies had a static representation. Probably, this was one of the main 
reasons that these works failed to support the PPP hypothesis. Moreover, it should be also 
noted the ignorance of the very important issue of stationarity from the researchers, which 
was also a major problem with these pieces of work. 
 
As is evident, the next natural step in the empirical work on PPP involved the usage of the 
newly developed approaches for testing the existence of unit roots in the series under 
consideration. Most of the papers, in this case, used to test the real exchange rate for its 
stationary properties. If they were I(0), this would be a clear evidence of long-run validity 
of PPP. Here, the models were similar to the equation (2.12), described right above. The 
most popular tests employed here are the well know ADF test and the Phillips – Perron one. 
In their paper, Sarno and Taylor (2002), another popular means of examining the 
stationarity properties of the series was the variance ratio test, calculated as below: 
1
( )1( ) ( )
t t k
t t
Var q q
z k
k Var q q
−
−
−
=
−
                 (2.16) 
 where k is a positive integer and Var stands for variance of the difference between the 
current value of the real exchange rate from its lag. It is assumed that whenever this ratio is 
equal to one, then the real exchange rate follows a random walk process. Whenever its 
value is below one and above zero, then it should have a unit root. A final approach here 
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was the examination for fractionally integrated series, a technique allowing for the series to 
be able to follow many different processes (ARMA etc.), according to the respective 
specification. Even though the econometric modeling was increasingly sophisticated, the 
econometric results remained poor and against the PPP hypothesis. Especially for the case 
of long-run PPP, the mean – reversion concept for the exchange rate was strongly rejected, 
in particular, for developed economies. 
 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the use of cointegration for PPP testing, it should be 
noted that the unit root testing discussed above was conducted in, mainly, time series 
dimension. This could be a disadvantage and, for this reason, many researchers extended 
their research portfolio to the usage of pane unit root tests. In this way, they aimed in 
increasing the power of their test and, thus, the possibility for favourable results. One of 
the most important studies here was conducted by Abuaf and Jorion (1990). But, again, 
even though the results were improved, still there is no unanimous acceptance of the PPP 
proposition. Nevertheless, the aforementioned authors indicate that the results might fail to 
work in favour of purchasing power parity, but this should probably be mainly attributed to 
the inability of the econometric tools to verify their existence and not that much to the 
inaccuracy of the assumptions underlying them. 
 
Finally, cointegration techniques are widely employed in studying PPP, especially the 
Johansen methodology. In general, their results are again discouraging, especially in the 
case of the long run validity of the strong-form PPP. On the other hand, these studies of the 
long run relation between the real exchange rates and the price levels revealed some 
interesting aspects, for the international financial arrangements. First of all, the results 
were in accordance to the PPP existence for specific historical periods, namely the interwar 
period, while it seems to hold in the case of countries with high inflation. Additionally, it 
was found that in periods where fixed exchange rate regimes prevail, it is common to reject 
the case of cointegration. What is very important here and of special interest for this thesis 
is the fact that there is strong evidence in favour of PPP, in these cases where the wholesale 
price index (WPI) is used as a proxy of the price level, compared to the usual consumer 
price index (CPI). In the econometric analysis that follows in the next chapters, our 
analysis is implemented by using both price indices. This is done for reasons of 
comparability, as well as for robustness check. 
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A final strand of the empirical literature on PPP involves the use of data for very long time 
periods, the so-called long span studies. The logic behind this is that in order to capture the 
mean reverting properties of the real exchange rates, it is necessary to study periods 
involving data for many years, since the whole process of long rung adjustment is a slow 
one. On the other hand, there is intensive criticism on these kind of studies, since the 
investigation of data for such long periods involves many imperilments, such as the 
existence of structural breaks on the series, stemming from any kind of macroeconomic or 
financial shock, or because of the frequent changes in the exchange rate arrangements of 
many countries (especially less developed countries, which have gone through tough 
periods of financial instabilities and currency and balance of payment crises). 
 
It is interesting to note here that for most of the PPP studies, the focus is on developed 
economies, with only minor coverage of developing economies. But, as Balhmani – 
Oskooee and Hegerty (2009) emphasize, the PPP concept is quite important for less 
developed economies, for a number of reasons. Above all, it provides a better indicator for 
living standards comparison, especially in poor , labour-endowed countries, than 
measuring it in monetary terms (for instance, in dollars). But even in this case, the 
effectiveness of the econometric techniques that we analysed before, is limited in the case 
of these countries. Only in African countries, it seems to have encouraging results. The 
authors discuss a number of reasons where this failure can be attributed, some of which 
have to do with the analysis per se (similar justification as the one previously provided) 
and the data quality. Nonetheless, it is useful to examine the relevant studies, concerning 
developing countries, in order to ascertain whether PPP can actually contribute to a better 
understanding of these economies. 
Moreover, a common characteristic of the aforementioned empirical studies is that they 
have all employed official exchange rates in testing the PPP. In the introduction chapter we 
have documented the existence, activeness and even prevalence of the black (parallel) 
market for foreign exchange in most developing countries during the recent float. The data 
availability of the black market exchange rate has intrigued yet another group of studies 
which holds the viewpoint that PPP receives relatively more support when parallel market 
exchange rates are used in testing the theory as opposed to official rates. The rationale 
behind this class of studies rests on the belief that while the official exchange rates suffer 
from the influence of various non-market driven factors such as the central bank 
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intervention and is often fixed by the monetary authorities, black market rates can be closer 
proxies of the floating exchange rate since they are market determined so that the band of 
fluctuations is much wider. Such flexibility in black market could yield empirical support 
for PPP due to the fact that PPP hinges on such flexibility to facilitate the spatial arbitrage 
process which is the fundamental building block of LOOP. The empirical work conducted 
for this purpose can be traced back to Culbertson (1975) and Phillip (1988) while recent 
studies are Luintel (2000), Kouretas and Zarangas (2001), Nagayasu (2000), Bahmani-
Oskooee and Goswami (2005) among others. Further discussion on parallel market 
exchange rate fuelled study for PPP is provided in the following section, where a selective 
survey of recent literature on the behaviour of parallel market exchange rate is conducted. 
 
2.4 A Selective Survey of Literature on Parallel Market Exchange Rate 
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, we will examine the extant literature concerning 
the parallel market exchange rate based test for PPP but our survey does not limit to this 
scope. Rather, we would like to provide a full account of the extant literature concerning 
the behavior of parallel market to exploit broader perspectives that the studies of parallel 
market exchange rate can offer. 
 
The studies are presented and discussed, according to their main focus. For this reason, this 
section is divided to further subsections, in order to facilitate the presentation of the 
relevant literature. First, some theoretical work is discussed, while applications concerning 
parallel market rates follow. 
 
 2.4.1 Theoretical Models 
 
One of the core issues being largely concerned in the theoretical literature is to address the 
determination of the black market exchange rate and more importantly, its premium. 
Diamandis and Drakos (2005) have conducted a comprehensive survey of the alternative 
models on this topic and have divided them into three categories. 
 
According to the previously mentioned authors, the first class of models is the so-called 
real trade models. It emphasizes the transactions demand for foreign currencies. The 
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demand for foreign currency is determined from a number of different activities. These are 
the purchase of illegal imports, the supply of foreign currency derived from illegal sources 
such as smuggling and under-invoicing of exports. The aforementioned determine the 
formulation of the black market for foreign currencies.12 The second strand of models is 
built upon the monetary approach to the determination of exchange rate. This class of 
models assumes that the official foreign exchange market satisfies the demand of foreign 
currencies stemming from the international purchases of goods while the demand of black 
currencies is generated by the agents’ needs to alter the portfolio composition. It pays 
particular attention to the importance of the monetary factors on the behaviour of the 
parallel market.13   
 
The final set of models, namely, the portfolio balance models combines the features of both 
theoretical literature strands, mentioned above. They are considered as the foundations of 
the recent theoretical models on the determination of black market exchange rate. This type 
of model was initially developed by Dornbusch et al. (1983) and subsequently extended by 
Phylaktis (1991). In Dornbusch et al. (1983), the black market is treated in a partial-
equilibrium stock and flow framework. Specifically, the stock demand for black dollars 
arises as the result of portfolio diversification of agents and the flow market arises as the 
result of international trade ,both reported and unreported. 
 
The portfolio balance models consider that at any point in time, the black market rate is 
determined by the effects of foreign exchange rate restrictions conditions in the asset 
markets whilst both the black market and official exchange rates are affected by the current 
account. It also claims that in the long-run, the black market exchange rate depreciates in 
the same proportion as the official rate which will give a constant or stationary black 
market premium eventually. Regarding to the determination of the premium, they suggest 
that the current level of black market premium is influenced by the expectation of future 
exchange rates when rational expectations are presumed whilst in general, the level of the 
black market premium is determined by the official real exchange rate, the official, 
depreciation-adjusted interest differential, as well as seasonal factors associated with 
tourism. It is noteworthy that in the Dornbusch et al. (1983) model, portfolio preferences 
are assumed to be constant, it is however conceivable that the preferences might shift over 
                                                          
12
  See Sheikh (1976, 1989) and Pitt (1984) for example. 
13
  Studies of this type includes Blejer (1978); Gupta (1980); Van den Berg and Jayanetti (1993); Kouretas 
and Zarangas, (1998); Kouretas and Zarangas, (2001) among others. 
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time, which would widen the premium. 
 
In Phylaktis (1991) paper, the previously analysed stock flow model is extended, taking 
into account restrictions on foreign exchange for the international trade and capital 
transactions. Here, the black market exchange rate is considered as part of a portfolio, 
which is determined by the fixed local and international interest rates, the official exchange 
rate, the foreign restrictions on global transactions and the local currency value of non-
dollar assets. Changes in the financial markets induce a jump in the premium and a 
following adjustment for the stock of dollars and the premium, respectively. As a case 
study here, Chilean exchange rate market is studied and an error correction model is fitted 
to the previously described theoretical framework. 
 
A modified version of the Dornbusch et al. (1983) model, in order to examine the 
behaviour of the black market rate in a wide number of countries, is formulated by 
Fishelson (1988). The modifications consist of a substitution of black market rate of 
change from the official rate, as a potential devaluation expectations’ formulator. Moreover, 
the Fisher equation is used, so that the domestic interest rate is calculated according to the 
former. In this way, the author suggests that black market premium is negatively affected 
by the real official rate while, on the same time, there is a positive effect from expected 
profits from taking long positions in the foreign exchange market. The empirical approach 
of Fishelson’s model to nineteen (developed and developing) economies, indicate that the 
black market exchange rate behaviour can be uniform, irrespective to the distinctive 
(economic, political, social) characteristics of each economy. 
 
A model, where the parallel market rate is preferable for the formation of monetary 
policies, compared to the official exchange rate, is presented by Ghei and Kamin (1996). 
The authors support the view that, in countries where black market has a prevalent size on 
the transactions volume, it could be in the interest of the local governments to employ the 
black market rates in their monetary framework, compared to the official one. In their work, 
the researchers provide a narrative approach in this concept, providing definitions and 
descriptive statistics for the prevailing conditions in the economies with strong black 
markets. As expected, most of them are developing economies from Latin America, Africa 
and Asia. The parallel market premium ranges quite a while, from as small as around 5% to 
Venezuela, up until almost 270% to countries like Algeria and Zambia. Getting to their 
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model details, it is a simple small open economy model, with two goods produced (one 
domestic and one non domestic), with fixed prices equal to unity. There is also a non-
traded good, the output and price of which are also fixed. There are no distortions to 
international trade (like trade barriers or tariffs) and the monetary and fiscal policies are at 
their long run sustainable levels. It is also assumed that the official exchange rate is 
overvalued, compared to the equilibrium rate. Hence, the flow demand for dollars (it is 
Thetaken as the only international currency in this model) is higher than the flow supply. 
The model is of the usual stock-flow framework, where the parallel rate is the one covering 
the excessive demand for the international currency. For any value of the official exchange 
rate e, a specific parallel market rate ep would equate the demand and supply of dollars in 
the market’s equilibrium. In functional form, this would be: 
( ) ( )pD e X OS OXφ= +
           (2.17) 
 
The left hand side of this equation depicts the demand for dollars, while the right is the 
supply. The latter is determined by the share of exports (X) proceeding through the parallel 
market, while OS is the official dollar sales to importers. Since the aforementioned is a 
function of the official exchange rate (e), the central bank’s decision on the official 
exchange rate setting would affect the equilibrium value of the parallel market exchange 
rate. 
 
A study that is not explicitly theoretical but is interesting for the analysis of the black 
market exchange rates is the one by Akgiray et al. (1989). In this paper, the authors use 
statistical techniques, in order to examine the distributional properties of the parallel 
market exchange rates. The examination takes place for twelve Latin American economies, 
for the period April 1973 to April 1983. Using regression techniques, the authors estimate 
the values of stable Paretian parameters for the countries’ exchange rates under 
examination. Based on these results, the authors indicate that, for most of the cases, the 
black market exchange rates means and variances may be undefined. Moreover, half of the 
series examined are positively skewed14. 
 
                                                          
14
 In line with the analysis here, Grosse (1992) analyze the black market exchange rate market of Colombia. 
In his paper, the author provide a well rounded account of the basic features and the reasons for which, in 
most of the Latin American countries, black markets of foreign currencies exist. 
31 
 
2.4.2 The Nexus between Parallel Market Premiums and Official Exchange Rate 
Policies 
 
Given the wide acceptance in the literature of the linkage between the parallel market 
premium and expected currency devaluation, it is natural to explore the nexus between the 
parallel market premiums with the fluctuations of official exchange rates. 
 
It has been documented in numerous studies that the parallel market premium often serves 
as a reliable guide to the direction of future official exchange rate changes (Ghei and 
Kamin, 1999). For instance, Kiguel and O’Conell (1995) advocates that a significant 
spread between black market and official rate may be a signal of macroeconomics 
misalignments. 
 
In the extant literature, the most comprehensive dataset to date and explore the history of 
parallel markets and exchange rate policies is employed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) .Their monthly data for official and market-determined exchange rates covers the 
period 1946 to 1998 and their sample consists of 153 countries. They hold a belief that the 
data on market-determined rates are reliable and, generally, far better indicators of the 
underlying monetary policy than the official exchange rates. In order to illustrate this 
argument, they regress a currency crash dummy on the parallel market premium for each of 
the developing countries in their sample. Their results indicate that the coefficient on the 
parallel premium is positive and in accordance to the viewpoint that the monetary policy 
stance is better reflected in market rates. The estimated coefficients on the market-
determined exchange rate are positive and consistent with the argument that the monetary 
policy stance is better reflected in market rates in almost all cases. In the thesis, we conduct 
a preliminary analysis using the same approach and obtained very similar findings to 
Reinhart and Roggoff (2004). They will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
A somehow related piece of research is the one by Blejer (1978). Here, the author studies 
whether the governmental interventions to the black market exchange rate market can have 
undesirable effects to the implemented macroeconomic stabilization policies. The 
empirical study is conducted for three Latin American Economies (namely, Brazil, Chile 
and Colombia). More precisely, the effects on the demand for money are estimated. 
According to the results, the money demand is negatively affected by increasing 
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expectations of black market rate depreciation, while the inflation rate effect on money 
demand is overestimated (when the black market proxy is not included in the model). 
 
2.4.3 Empirical Investigation of Basic Stock – Flow Model 
 
A plethora of empirical work examines the theoretical framework, developed by 
Dornbusch et al. (1983). Some of the most important papers are discussed here. 
 
To begin with, Caporale and Cerrato (2008) examine the potential factors of the formulated 
black market premium for a number of developing economies. The authors suggest that the 
cointegrating coefficient would change over time and drift away from the unit value 
implied by standard portfolio balance models. They test the proportionality restriction 
using a panel Wald test to examine the unity restrictions imposed on the cointegrating 
coefficients. Furthermore, they have investigated the short-run dynamic adjustment 
between the two types of exchange rate by the means of estimating impulse response 
functions using bootstrap methods. 
 
They employ monthly data from January 1973 to January 1998 on both black market and 
official exchange rates for six emerging market economies, namely, Iran, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Pakistan and Thailand. 
 
The risk premium is modelled as a function of inflation (I) ,expected devaluation(E) (10-
year bond yield differential between the domestic country and the United States , and 
dummy variables to account for capital controls (D),which takes the value of one when 
markets are not unified and zero otherwise .The back market premium is formalised as 
below:  
 =  +  + 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 	                                      (2.18) 
 
They have obtained statistically significant coefficients for the lags of inflation and 
expected devaluation with the latter correctly signed (i.e., positive, implying that an 
expected devaluation leads to a rise in the premium). Overall, their empirical analysis 
suggests that there exists a long-run linkage between the black market and official rates. 
But the proportionality restriction is rejected, indicating that the adjustment towards 
equilibrium in response to short-run shocks is incomplete. The short-run analysis has 
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confirmed the partial reversion to the long-run equilibrium and demonstrates that the initial 
overshooting does not totally fade away. It is also concluded by the authors that capital 
controls and expected currency devaluation have a positive impact on the size of the 
premium, whilst the impact of inflation receives weaker evidence. 
 
Using monthly data, from 1985 to 1989, for seventeen developing economies, 
Shachmurove (1999) aims to provide evidence for the potential economic factors, 
determining the black market exchange rate premium. The model for this research is 
estimated, using pooled OLS regressions, including dummies able to capture the effect of 
tourism on these economies, as well as seasonality of this effect. The obtained results are in 
strong accordance with the theoretical framework. The premium is positively affected by 
the interest rate differentials, as well as from the assets value. On the other hand, the 
dummies are not significant. 
 
2.4.4 Modeling Cointegrating and Causal Relationships between the Official and 
the Parallel markets exchange rates 
 
By means of cointegration and error-correction modeling techniques, several recent studies 
have attempted to determine the convergence of the black market exchange rate and the 
official exchange rate. Additionally, the potential causal interconnections are examined. 
For instance, Akgiray et al. (1989) use monthly data and the simple Granger and Sims test 
to find that the two rates Granger cause each other in the short-run. According to the 
Granger Representation theorem15, if two non stationary variables are cointegrated, then 
their vector autoregressive representation can be expressed as an error correction 
mechanism. Therefore , if the causality runs from the official exchange rate to the parallel 
market exchange rate, it implies that past information on the official exchange rate can be 
used to systematically forecast the black market exchange rate and vice versa. 
 
In this light of thoughts, empirical work on the joint dynamics of the official and parallel 
market exchange rates has paid particular attention of the issue of market efficiency, or 
alternatively, whether agents are able to use information from one exchange market to 
predict the future path of exchange rate in the other market. There is a growing amount of 
studies conducted, using this approach (for instance, Booth and Mustafa 1991, Agenor and 
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 See Engle and Granger(1987) for details. 
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Taylor 1993). 
  
Moore and Phylaktis (2000) examine the efficiency of black and official exchange markets 
in seven Pacific Basin countries for the period January 1974 to June 1993. They suggest 
that, for the existence of information efficiency in the black market exchange rate, the 
black market and official exchange rate must be cointegrated with a cointegrating 
parameter one. Otherwise, the two rates would drift arbitrarily far apart so that position 
takers would be able to attain arbitrage profits without any obvious upper bound. 
 
On the other hand, Baghestani and Noer (1993) investigate the case of India, using the 
Engle–Granger cointegration technique. Their dataset consists of quarterly data over the 
years 1973–1990. According to their findings, the black market exchange rate and the 
official rate between the Indian rupee and the U.S. dollar are cointegrated. Whilst their 
study focus solely on the long-run relationship between the two rates, Agenor and Taylor 
(1993) use monthly data over the period 1974–1986, in order to examine the case of 
nineteen developing countries. The Johansen’s cointegration technique is employed to 
establish cointegration between the two exchange rates. Also, an error-correction model is 
used to detect short-run causality between the two rates. Although they manage to establish 
cointegration in 14 out of 19 countries, no clear pattern, concerning the direction of 
causality between the two rates, has been demonstrated. The authors argue that the lack of 
such a systematic pattern among countries might be due to the divergent nature of 
exchange rate policies, pursued by the different countries. Similar results were obtained 
between the parallel and official rates in seven Asian countries by Phylaktis and Kassimatis 
(1994), in four East European countries by Dockery and Taylor (1997), and in four Latin 
American countries by Kanas and Kouretas (2002). 
 
Kouretas and Zarangas (2001) examine the case of the Greek black market rate and 
whether PPP holds for the Greek drahma – US dollar exchange rate. In order to complete 
their analysis, they use a number of cointegrating and stationarity techniques. More 
precisely, the Johansen - Juselius approach in cointegration is their workhorse model. The 
authors identify a long run relationship between the official and the black market rates, as 
well as between the parallel market rate and the respective price levels. This is an 
indication that PPP holds in the long run. Moreover, the error-correction representation 
reveals that the black market rate is more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks and adjusts 
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fast to the long-run level. Of course, it should be mentioned here that these conclusions are 
robust and evident of the period, prior to the adoption of the common currency and, even 
more important, before the establishment of the EMU. 
 
Diamandis (2003) has also attempted to address the informational efficiency issue based on 
monthly data of four Latin American countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico. They employed Johansen’s full information maximum likelihood multivariate 
cointegration technique to test the hypothesis of a joint structure implying both long-run 
strong-form PPP for parallel market rate and the long-run informational market efficiency. 
The hypothesis cannot be rejected for all 4 countries under examination, validating long 
run informational efficiencies for the countries of interest. It is noteworthy that they have 
used the parallel market exchange rate in testing the PPP proposition. The variant of PPP 
formulation they provide has incorporated the presence of both official and parallel market. 
It has been employed in the thesis as an alternative of the traditional cointegration-based 
test PPP. Since the theoretical framework has been described in detail for their work, the 
details of this work will not be reviewed here. 
 
Diamandis (2003) falls into the group of literature which relies on parallel or black market 
exchange rate in testing the PPP proposition. As mentioned in section 2.3, proponents of 
this approach believed amongst researchers of parallel market exchange rate that PPP 
receives relatively more support when parallel market exchange rates are used in testing 
the theory as opposed to official rates. The official exchange rate is often fixed by the 
monetary authorities whilst the parallel exchange rates price of foreign currency in the 
black market is expected to be determined mainly by ‘market forces’,  so it can be closer 
proxies of the floating exchange rate16. 
 
The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is empirically tested, using black market exchange 
rates, by Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2006). The empirical work is conducted for three 
countries (namely, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica) and it is one of the first papers 
employing parallel market rates to examine the productivity bias hypothesis. They argue 
that, in these cases where strong black markets exist, it makes sense to use these rates in 
such empirical examinations. The main reason is the much faster adjustment of these rates 
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 Studies examining similar issues are those from El-Sakka and McNabb (1994), Baghestani (1997), Sanchez-
Fung (1999), Cerrato and Santantis (2007). 
36 
 
to foreign exchange adjustments, compared to the official ones. The cointegration 
modeling results indicate the usefulness of this approach, in the cases underlined before. 
 
In their effort to provide further evidence in favour of the existence of cointegrating 
relationship, between the official and the parallel exchange rates, Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Goswami (2004) employ the Johansen modelling framework. Their dataset is quite large, 
covering 31 developing economies, for a period of forty years (1955 – 1995). Beyond this, 
they also proceed to an investigation of weak exogeneity of the above mentioned rates. 
According to these authors’ work, the existence of long run relationship between the two 
exchange rates is verified, for most of the cases examined. On top of that, they also 
managed to pinpoint the fact that black market rates are weakly exogenous to the official 
rate (for eight out of fifteen cases examined). Based on this outcome, their argument is that 
black market rate is actually the rate leading the exchange rate market and, as a 
consequence, the adjustment policies followed by central banks in the exchange rate 
market. 
 
Two other papers, aiming to provide an answer on the formulation of the money demand 
function of countries with parallel exchange rate markets, are those from Bahmani – 
Oskooee and Tanku (2006) and Bahmani – Oskooee (1996). In the latter, the author 
examines the case of the Iranian economy, using the Johansen – Juselius cointegration 
analysis and the exclusion test. Annual data, for the period 1959 – 1990, are employed for 
the money supply, the real GDP, the price level and the exchange rate (official or black 
market, depending on the specification) of the Iranian currency vis-à-vis US dollar. The 
outcome of this work is the suitability of the parallel market rate, as the exchange rate to be 
used in such empirical applications. 
 
In Bahmani – Oskooee and Tanku (2006), the previous estimation is conducted for 25 
countries. This time, the bounds testing approach to cointegration and error correction 
modelling is used. The analysis is completed for countries from different regions (Latin 
American, African and Asian economies). Based on this work, a general conclusion cannot 
be reached. The use of the official or the black market rate is a country – specific feature, 
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while there are cases where the parallel market premium is the most useful proxy for the 
estimation of the money demand function. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Econometric Approach 
 
 
The thesis presents an empirical analysis of the parallel market exchange rate behavior in 
the post-Bretton-Woods era in 56 countries across the globe. The purpose of the study is 
twofold: while the main objective is focused on testing whether the market-determined 
parallel rates is more supportive of the long run  Purchasing Power Parity proposition than 
the official rate, we also investigated the nexus between the two rates based on a parallel 
market version of PPP employing standard cointegration techniques.  
Monthly data spanning the period 1973m01 to 1998 m12 have been employed in the 
analysis. The variables of interest, as suggested by standard PPP formulations, include the 
official and parallel nominal exchange rates, the price indices of domestic countries and 
those of the United States as U.S dollar is used as the numeraire currency. For the price 
indices we employ both Consumer Price index (CPI) and Wholesale Price index (WPI). As 
is well known, the building block of PPP is the Law of One Price which relies crucially on 
the activity of goods arbitrage. It is more natural for wholesalers to take advantage of price 
differences across countries hence are more capable to engage in the goods arbitrage 
process (MacDonald, 2007). Therefore, it has been advocated in the literature that in 
comparison with CPI, WPI gives a more accurate measure of the prices of traded goods 
(see Sánchez-Fung 1999 for example). We want to use both indices to test the PPP 
hypothesis to provide a more comprehensive coverage of results and for countries where 
the WPI are not available; we use CPI solely in the investigation. 
The consumer price indices are abstracted from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS); 
line 64 whilst the wholesale price indices for most countries are obtained from Datastream. 
The nominal exchange rates are accessible from IFS, line rf. The monthly data on parallel 
market exchange rate are sourced from Pick’s Currency Yearbook (various editions) and 
provided by my thesis supervisors17. This was an annual outlook of the macroeconomic 
conditions of several countries around the world. It also included monthly data on the 
black market exchange rates of these economies. Moreover, the parallel market premium 
(vis-à-vis the official exchange rate) of the economies’ currencies towards US dollar is also 
incorporated in this yearbook. This edition ceased to get published on 1998. As is obvious, 
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 Later, it was renamed to World Currency Yearbook but is still well known as Pick’s. 
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this is a serious obstacle, in order to extend the empirical analysis beyond the end of 1998. 
Apart from this, it is reasonable to assume that the importance of the parallel exchange rate 
markets becomes less and less crucial, with the global economic and financial integration. 
Additionally, the wide range of sources and the ability of economic agents to absorb the 
necessary funds from official channels and the increasing reforms and tighter monitoring 
and regulation of the exchange rate markets render such illegal activities obsolete (at least 
for the majority of the economies around the globe). 
The data on parallel rate from the first month of 1973 to the last month of 1998 are 
available for the 56 countries under examination, however, due to the lack of consistent 
price indices and inactivity of parallel market, a number of countries are precluded and a 
subset of 34 countries have been employed for the estimation of the two variants of PPP 
models we aim to investigate and assess. According to their geographical distribution, 
these countries are divided into 4 groups, namely, African economies (6 countries), Asian 
Economies (13 countries), the Western-developed economies (1 country) and Latin 
American economies (14 countries). 
 
3.1 The currency crash dummy model 
 
3.1.1 The theoretical framework 
 
Prior to illustrating and testing the two PPP model specifications briefly introduced in 
Chapter 1, we intend to provide some extra evidence in favor of the importance of the 
parallel market exchange rate, as a tool to evaluate monetary and exchange rate policy 
implications for a country. In order to do that, the model suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) is employed. In what follows, a brief discussion of the model is provided, while the 
econometric approach on estimating it for our sample of countries is presented afterwards. 
In their effort to develop a system of historical exchange rate classification regimes, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) use a dataset consisting of parallel or black market exchange 
rates for a wide number of countries, both developed and developing. They emphasize the 
importance of distinguishing between the official exchange rate and the unofficial one, 
providing evidence that the parallel rate is beneficial, when it comes to use it as a 
benchmark of the followed monetary policy from the governments. Indeed, as they 
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support, it offers interesting insights in the forthcoming state of the monetary stance, as 
well as it can work as a kind of leading indicator for the transformations of this policy. 
Moreover, using the market-determined exchange rates, the authors justify that the 
classification of the different monetary regimes that were followed by different countries 
are not really the ones declared, when the economic profession uses the official rates for 
this classification. Results are substantially different, when the black market exchange rate 
is in use. In brief, it can be said that, according to the authors, the most popular exchange 
rate regimes are the pegged one, together with the crawling peg one. They also formalize a 
new kind of exchange rate regime, the so-called freely falling, which is the case for the 
countries for very high annual inflation level. 
In this line of thought and, based on the modeling approach of the previously mentioned 
authors, we intend to empirically examine the importance of studying the market exchange 
rates. In this way, it can be justifiable the use of these rates, both for policy implications 
analysis, as well as for the examination of the linkages and relation between these two 
rates. Their approach is rather straightforward and involved the estimation of a simple 
model, where the parallel exchange rate acts as a potential predictor of the official rate’s 
realignments. In order to do it, the following model is employed:  
ot t i tD P uα β −= + ∆ + .                                                                                                    (3.1) 
Here, the independent variable is the 12-month change of the parallel exchange rate 
premium (that is, the market exchange rate, α is the intercept of the model, while otD  is a 
dummy variable, created based on the official exchange rate. What this dummy represents 
is the cases of currency crashes in each country. According to the definition we use, a 
currency crash takes place when the value of the official rate depreciates, at least, by 
15%18. The choice of the cut-off point for the currency crash dummy is based on the vast 
literature of early warning indicators of currency crises and, more specifically, on the 
literature of indicators of sudden changes in exchange rates. Since the choice of the 
depreciation that indicates a currency crash is rather arbitrary [for instance, Frankel and 
Rose (1996) opt for 25% change, while Kraay (2003) for 5% to OECD and 10% 
otherwise], we believe a value somewhere in the middle can work in the current 
framework. Hence, the currency crash dummy takes up the value of 1, in case of 
                                                          
18
 In their paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) use a slightly different definition of the currency crash, where 
they distinct between severe and mild currency crashes. In any case, for our empirical investigation, the 
adopted definition of 15% depreciation suffices. 
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depreciation higher than 15% and zero, otherwise. Based on this model, it can be said that, 
if we expect to find a significant relationship between the parallel exchange rate returns 
and the official rate, then the beta in the aforementioned model should be significant and 
positive. Otherwise, we do not really validate a connection between the two rates. If our 
results will be in line with those of the authors, then we should expect the results to be in 
favor of the existence of the relation between the two exchange rates. Hence, it is fruitful 
and interesting to approach the modeling framework, by using the parallel market rate, 
which is the one influencing the formation and future development of the official exchange 
rates. This is the value added of providing the potentially favorable evidence from the 
currency crash model. 
 
3.1.2 The Econometric Approach 
 
A binary probit model is implemented for the investigation and the econometric approach 
employed is illustrated in the following subsection. As is well established, it is, first of all, 
necessary to check the stochastic properties of the time series data we employed. In order 
to conduct the econometric analysis without the potential risk of spurious regression, the 
order of integration of the series is assessed using the conventional Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller (ADF) test. 
In brief, this is an extension of the original Dickey-Fuller test, for taking into account 
cases, where the series under examination follows an autoregressive process of higher 
order than one. Thus, the regression for the test is 
 
'
1 1 1 2 2t t t t t t ty y x y y yρ ρα δ β β β υ− − − −∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ +K               (3.2) 
where α is the coefficient of interest, determining whether the series is an explosive one or 
not. The hypothesis testing procedure involves the following null and alternative 
hypothesis: H0: α = 0 (non – stationarity) again H1: α < 0 (stationarity). As it has been 
noted above, in order to use the series in the econometric analysis, the series should be 
I(0). That is, they should be stationary, so that the results from the estimations to be 
reasonable and meaningful. ADF test is sensitive to the number of lagged difference terms; 
therefore it is crucial to select the appropriate lag length for ADF test to ensure 
uncorrelated residuals. We run the test with the maximum lag 12, which is usually 
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appropriate for monthly data, and pares down the model using information criterion SIC as 
in practice, SIC will choose a more parsimonious model than AIC. The other issue 
concerning the test is to choose exogenous regressors. We have the choice of including a 
constant, a constant and linear trend or neither. For all the level variables, we start to run 
the test with both constant and a linear trend, since the latter two cases are just special case 
for this more general specification. The trend is removed if the t-statistics in the test results 
suggests it is significant. We present the unit root test results for this model in table A.1 to 
A.4 in the appendix. 
Having verified that the series are stationary, we proceed to the implementation of the 
econometric approach that is suitable for the previously presented and discussed model. 
Given that the dependent variable of our model is a binary one, the most efficient way to 
estimate the model is by following a binary choice model. More specifically, the 
econometric methodology used in this case is the one called probit model. This kind of 
models are suitable for these cases, a simple linear regression is not the proper way to 
approach this estimation. In general, the binary choice models are based on the following 
model  
{ }1 ( , )i i iP y x G x β= =M                  (3.3) 
where depending on the distribution function, we get a different type of binary choice 
model. In the case of probit model, this should be the standard normal distribution 
function. That is,  
' 21 1( , ) ( , ) ( ) exp
22
w
i iG x F x w t dtβ β
pi−∞
 
= = Φ = − 
 ∫              (3.4) 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The 
most suitable estimator for such a model is the maximum likelihood estimator. Regarding 
the interpretation of the resulted estimations, it is well known the peculiarity of the 
estimated coefficients produced by a probit model. In any case, due to the nature of our 
empirical investigation with this model and, since, our focus is mainly set on specifying the 
interrelation of the two exchange rates, the produced significance and signs of the 
respective coefficients are more than enough for our empirical investigation. 
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3. 2. Testing the weak-form and strong-form PPP 
 
3.2.1 Model 1 Specification 
 
As mentioned earlier, we intend to apply both official and parallel market exchange rates 
to examine the long-run validity of the PPP proposition and in this section we briefly 
discuss about the PPP framework we investigate with. A weak-form PPP might be 
formalized as: 
 =  +   +  ∗ + "                                                                                      (3.5) 
where  , as mentioned before, denotes the nominal exchange rate whilst    and  ∗ ,the 
home and foreign price level respectively, all measured in natural logarithms.	 denotes a 
constant term and " a random error term. 
In particular, weak-form PPP (MacDonald, 1993)  exists if ,	  and  ∗ are I(1) series , 
and " is found to be I(0) ,i.e., stationary. 
In addition to the above mentioned conditions, if a restriction is imposed on the 
coefficients so that		 = −, i.e., the estimated coefficients are equal but of opposite sign, 
which implies that the relative prices affect the exchange rate in a symmetric fashion, then 
the trivariate PPP framework in (1.1) can be written as a bivariate relationship: 
 =  + (  −  ∗) + "                                                                                         (3.6) 
Furthermore, if the joint symmetry/proportionality condition holds for the coefficients 
which requires		 = − = 1	, and	 = 0  then the so-called strong form PPP can be 
found existent with the specification: 
 =   −  ∗ 	+ "                                                                                                      (3.7)  
The strong form PPP is often assumed implicitly for the class of literature which examines 
the existence of unit root in the real exchange in order to test PPP. The real exchange rate, 
as mentioned previously, is formalized as: 
% =  −   +  ∗	                                                                                                      (3.8) 
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Cerrato and Sarantis (2007) claims that, since the unit root based test of PPP often rely on 
the precondition of the symmetry and proportionality restriction, a failure of these tests to 
find evidence in favour of mean reversion in the real exchange rate might be caused by a 
failure of such a restriction. Various explanations have been cited for the distinction 
between the strong-form and weak-form PPP. Patel (1990) has relaxed some of the 
unrealistic assumptions made by earlier empirical work and interpreted PPP doctrine as a 
cointegration relation between the spot exchange rate and a constructed cost-of-living 
index: 
& =  & −   + &                                                                                       (3.9) 
Whilst the formulation of the relation is similar to the PPP framework in equation (3.4), the 
betas will be different from utility. According to Patel, “there are no hypotheses regarding 
the specific values of  and, except that they are positive”. 
MacDonald (2007) has interpreted the potential causes that relative prices level need not 
have an equiproportionate effect on exchange rate. One of them is the transaction cost 
effect, empirical evidences favouring this explanation have been provided by Davutyan 
and Pippenger (1990) and Obstfeld and Taylor (1997). Sarno and Taylor (2002)  has 
surveyed a comprehensive range of literature and advocates the dominant role that 
transport costs, tariffs and nontariff  barriers play in the violation of strong-form PPP . 
In our investigation, we will firstly use Johansen cointegration techniques to examine the 
weak-form PPP and with equation (3.5) holding, i.e., there exists a cointegrating 
relationship between the exchange rate, the domestic price level and the U.S. price level. 
Both official and parallel exchange rate are used in estimating equation  
e(),+ =  +   +  ∗ + "                 (3.10) 
where e(),+  replaces the nominal exchange rate term in equation (3.5) and denotes the 
choice between official and parallel (black) market exchange rate. If the cointegrating 
relationship is validated amongst the variables of interest, we then further test two sets of 
hypothesis by imposing restrictions on the cointegrating vectors: 
(1)	 = − 
(2)			 = − = 1, ,-		 = 0 
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Our findings will be able to verify first of all, if there exists systematic long-run 
equilibrium among the exchange rate and the price levels in home and foreign magnitude. 
Besides, by observing the signs of coefficients of the estimated cointegrating vectors, we 
will be able to validate the governing economic theory. In equation (3.10), specifically, 
is expected to be positive whilst  to be negative. 
Furthermore, upon the existence of cointegrating relationships as mentioned above, if we 
cannot reject the restrictions imposed on the cointegrating vectors, then the joint symmetry 
condition holds and the strong-form PPP is supported. By comparing the results from 
official and parallel exchange rate market we will also be able to understand if the market-
determined exchange rate can better validate the PPP proposition advocated in the previous 
literature. 
 
3.2.2 Multivariate Cointegration Analysis 
 
The econometric methodology employed for the estimation the weak-form PPP model as 
in equation (3.3) is the multivariate cointegration technique by Johansen (1995).  
As has been done for the two aforementioned series for the estimation of the probit model, 
we need to first test the order of integration of the series under examination for the PPP 
model before proceeding to the cointegration analysis. We apply the same unit root test 
introduced in section 3.1.2, the conventional ADF test. Nevertheless, due to the large scale 
of sample coverage and the importance we assign to this part of analysis, extra caution is 
taken in determining the stationarity of the series.  The DF-GLS test proposed by Elliot et 
al. (1996) therefore is also employed here to confirm the results from ADF tests.  
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test has already been presented previously. Thus, a short 
discussion of the DF-GLS test is provided here. As illustrated by Fernandez et al. (2001), 
the DF-GLS test uses a regression similar to the ADF test only that in this test the series 
under consideration is de-trended and de-meaned. Thus, the regression equation is the 
following 
1
1
k
d d d
t t t i t
i
y y yρ ε
− −
=
∆ = + ∆ +∑               (3.11)
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Where 
 
∆/0 = / −  − 12   is the transformed series of interest that is tested for its 
stationarity. Again, a t-test is computed with which the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
against the alternative of stationarity is examined. For the case of a model with constant, 
the test statistic is the same with the one from the ADF test, while for the case of the 
existence of a constant and a trend, Elliot et al. (1996) provide the necessary critical values. 
The results of unit root tests for all the additional variables are presented in table A.9 to 
A.12 in the appendix. As expected, the official and parallel exchange rates, as well as the 
home and U.S price indices are integrated of order 1, i.e., I(1) series for most of the 
countries in our sample. The results will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
Having established the non-stationarity of most variables, we proceed to perform the 
cointegration analysis procedure proposed by Johansen (1995).The approach starts from a 
vector autoregressive representation of the form: 
/ = 3 + ∑ 56/768 + "                                                                                         (3.12) 
where		μ represents a (n × 1) vector of deterministic terms, k is the lag length,	y( denotes a 
(n × 1) vector of the n variables of interest, " represents a (n × 1) vector of white noise 
residuals. Expression (3.7) can be reparameterised into an vector-error correction 
mechanism (VECM) as: 
∆/ = Π/ + ∑ Γ>?/6768 + 3 + "                                                                   (3.13) 
where	Π denotes a (n × n) coefficient matrix that contains information regarding the long-
run relationships among the variables. The rank of matrix  Π determines the number of 
cointegrating relationships. 
If the matrix  Π has reduced rank	r	(0 < B < ,), it can be factorized into the product of 
two matrices  α	and	β such that Π = αβG, where  α represents a  (n x r) matrix of loading 
coefficients α, and  βG represents a (n x r) matrix of cointegrating vectors. α includes the 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium coefficients while βG contains information for long run 
equilibrium.  
As a first step, the number of cointegrating vectors among the variables contained in / is 
decided based on the trace test proposed by Johansen (1995).The procedure begins with 
estimating the vector autoregression (VAR) model in the form of equation (3.7). It is 
crucial to specify appropriate lag length in the VAR model in order to get uncorrelated 
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residuals. We start running the model with the longest plausible lags 12 and use a series of 
VAR lag order selection information criteria ( mainly based on SIC and AIC) as an initial 
guide to find out a most selected lag length p and then estimate the VAR model again with 
p lag intervals included. Run the VAR lag exclusion Wald test on this new model, p is 
chosen if it passes the wald test, otherwise, smaller order of lags will be chosen to pare 
down the model until the model with selected lag length can pass the lag exclusion test. As 
suggested by Johansen (1995, page 84), 11 centred (orthogonalized) seasonal dummy 
variables have been included as exogenous terms which are necessary to account for short-
run effects that could otherwise violate the Gaussian assumption (Diamandis,2003). 
There has been a growing consensus that the trace statistics used in the cointegration test 
suffer from a small-sample bias, tending to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
too often (Diamandis, 2003). A common approach to rectify the bias is to adjust the 
computed trace statistics with the factor (T-nk)/T as proposed by Reimers (1991), where T 
denotes the total number of observations while n and k as defined in equation (3.7).The 
significance of cointegrating vectors for the weak-form PPP model is reported in table 
A.13 to A.16. 
The residuals from the estimated VAR model have been examined for autocorrelation. The 
Portmanteau autocorrelation test computes the multivariate Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box Q-
statistics for residual serial correlation up to the specified order. According to the test, there 
has been no indication of serial autocorrelation. Similar to Diamandis (2003), 
nonnormality is detected in the residuals but as the aforementioned author has explained, it 
might be due to the fact that the official exchange rate has been set by the Central bank of 
each country and was not freely-determined throughout the period under investigation.  
Besides, Gonzalo (1994) has shown that the performance of the maximum likelihood 
estimator is little affected by the nonnormality of the error terms. 
Following the determination of the cointegration rank, we have estimated the VECM for 
each country. The estimates of the normalized cointegrating vectors are presented in table 
4.5-4.8 and the significance of the coefficients is indicated for the cointegrating equations. 
Based upon the significance of cointegrating vectors, we have imposed two sets of 
identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vectors as below: 
 (1)	 = − 
(2)			 = − = 1, ,-		 = 0 
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A likelihood ratio statistic with asymptotic χ distribution is used to test the binding of 
restrictions. We reject the imposed restrictions if the reported probability for the LR 
statistics is of small value and cannot reject the restrictions if otherwise. The latter case 
implies the acceptance of the strong-form PPP. 
 
3.3 A PPP model in the presence of dual markets for foreign currency 
 
In this section we provide the description of a PPP variant incorporating the presence of 
both official and parallel markets followed by a discussion of the econometric approach 
employed. 
 
3.3.1 Formulation of the model 
 
Diamandis (2003) has examined the PPP doctrine from a long-run perspective for four 
Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. In line with 
Kouretas and Zarangas (1998) and Phylaktis (1996), he has formalized a variant of PPP 
model for exchange rate determination that takes into account the presence of both an 
official and a parallel market for U.S dollars in these countries. 
He considers the black (parallel) market exchange rate to be a weighted average of the 
official exchange rate and the price differential, the latter of which essentially is the PPP 
exchange rate. The model is formalized on basis of the demand-supply analysis for foreign 
currency in the parallel market as below: 
According to Diamandis, the demand of foreign currency depends positively on the return 
from holding the foreign currency while the return is a function of the expected rate of 
appreciation of the foreign currency in the parallel market. It is further assumed that 
economic agents form their expectations by comparing the movements of the exchange 
rate with the movements of the relative prices between domestic and foreign countries. 
Under this setting, the demand for foreign currency is described as follows: 
I =  + ( −  ∗ − JI),					 > 0                                                                  (3.14) 
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Where I  denotes the demand for foreign currency, 	JI denotes the parallel market 
exchange rate, p and  ∗ denote the domestic and foreign price levels, respectively, all in 
natural logarithm.	 should be positive since if p increases faster than  ∗and meanwhile, 
there is no corresponding rise in JI, the economic agents would expect a depreciation of 
the parallel exchange rate by a percentage equal to the observed inflation rate differential  
The supply of foreign currency, as suggested by the author, is mainly provided via the 
receipts from the overinvoicing of imports and underinvoicing of exports as well as 
receipts from tourism, shipping, and immigrants’s remittances. The model considers these 
activities to be positively related to the differential between the official and parallel market 
exchange rates, therefore the supply can be written as:  
LI = 1 + 1(JI − J) 	1 > 0                                                                              (3.15)                
Both JI and Jare defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. 
By Equating the demand and supply function  
JI = MN + MJN + M + M ∗																																																																																									(3.16) 
where M = 1/(1 + ) ,M = /(1 + ), M > 0, M > 0. M > 0.and M < 0. 
This formulation enables the official exchange rate to converge to the PPP rate in the long 
run in the absence of capital controls and the official rate will eventually be equal to the 
parallel market rate, leading to a gradual elimination of the parallel market for foreign 
currency. Nevertheless, the official exchange rate will be different from the PPP rate in 
case intervention of some form exists, and the parallel rate will be a function of the official 
rate and the equilibrium rate implied by PPP. We have adopted this framework to identify 
the linkage between the parallel market rate with the official rate and the price differentials 
which are in essence the PPP equilibrium rate. Consistent with the second model, we 
continue to employ the Johansen procedure in the analysis. In the next section, we proceed 
to illustrate the econometric methodology being employed in the empirical analysis. 
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3.3.2 The econometric methodology 
 
In terms of econometric approach, we adhere to the Johansen cointegration analysis and 
follow the same procedure illustrated in section 3.2.2.It is notable that Diamandis (2003) 
has detected 2 cointegrating vectors for all of the 4 Latin American countries they 
examined, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Similar results are obtained in 
our analysis in the sense that 2 cointegrating vectors have been found for 19 out of 34 
countries including Argentina, Chile and Mexico.  
Since two statistically significant cointegrating vectors were found, Diamandis continues 
with the identification of the system. In light of Johansen (1995b) and Johansen and 
Juselius(1994), the author has imposed independent zero and homogenous restrictions 
implied by economic theory with the first vector to identify the long-run PPP relationship 
amongst the parallel market exchange rate and the two prices , as well as a long run 
relationship between the two exchange rate with the second cointegrating vector. 
Specifically, Let X=SJI , JN ,  ,  ∗T, be the set of variables under investigation as defined in 
equation (3.11), the full set of identifying restrictions is given in the cointegrating 
coefficient matrix as below: 
  = U1		0		 − 1		1		1	 − 1		0		0		0 V 
where the first vector of  with two linear homogeneous restrictions and a zero assumes 
the proportionality hypothesis between the parallel market exchange rate and the two price 
levels whist the constant term  is allowed to vary.  
The second vector indicates a long run relationship between the two exchange rates. The 
proportionality hypothesis between the parallel and the official rate is imposed. In addition, 
the coefficients for the two price indices as well as the constant term are restricted to zero. 
According to Moore and Phylaktis (2000), the long run market efficiency in the parallel 
market requires that in the equation(3.11): 
JI = MN + MJN + M + M ∗																																																																																																						 
M = 0, M = 1, and M = M = 0 
Therefore this setup provides a direct test of long-run informational efficiency. As 
explained by Diamandis(2003), both vectors are overidentified with the imposition of the 
51 
 
above restrictions and the overidentifying restrictions are tested using the likelihood ratio 
statistic with asymptotic χ distribution as explained in the preceding section. The results 
of the estimated restricted vectors along with the likelihood ratio for the acceptance of the 
overidentifying restrictions are displayed and discussed in Chapter 4. As regard to the 15 
countries for which 1 cointegrating vector is found, we provide the normalized 
cointegrating vectors following the same approach illustrated in section 3.2.2. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Empirical Results 
  
Based on the theoretical framework and the econometric methodology we have explained 
in chapter 3, in this section we present the empirical results obtained and analyze our 
findings. Before proceeding to the discussion of the proper empirical results, we first 
provide a brief discussion of the countries’ exchange rate behavior through time. In this 
respect, we are able to have initial insights on their currency markets, potential divergences 
between the two exchange rates and commentary on how these could have affected their 
macroeconomic conditions is provided. Then, section 4.2 presents and assesses the 
econometric outcome from the currency crash model. Here, the strong link between the 
official and parallel exchange rates is established, especially for countries more vulnerable 
to adverse macroeconomic conditions. Additionally, it provides further justification for the 
employment of the black market rates to the empirical modeling of equilibrium exchange 
rates for the countries where the black market rate prevails. Finally, the empirical results 
are presented and some policy implications from these results are discussed. 
 
4.1 A Narrative Investigation of the Two Exchange Rates 
 
The two exchange rates (official and parallel) for each one of the countries inspected are 
depicted in the graphs A.1 to A.10 in the appendix. Through this process, some 
commonalities in these countries exchange rate performance and behavior can be 
underlined, while such patterns are evident from countries with the same or similar 
economic structure and performance. 
A common problem in exchange rate economics is the divergence between the official (de 
jure) and prevailing (de facto) exchange rate regime. Such an issue can have major effects 
on the macroeconomic performance of the countries, their international economic position 
and the potential instabilities in their exchange rate regime. Such a situation is evident 
from the countries of the sample. Since the 1970’s and the collapse of the Breton Woods 
system, most developed economies do not fix their exchange rate. In this respect, the 
gradual elimination of the governmental interventions and any restrictions on the capital 
mobility, led to the high correlation between the official and the black market exchange 
rates. This is a strong element, underlining the declining importance of the parallel markets 
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in these economies. On the other hand, some countries (like Portugal, Greece and Ireland) 
represent a different behavior between the two rates. This can be justified as an evidence of 
uncertainty and instability in their open market operations, especially for countries with 
less robust macroeconomic conditions. 
In contrast to the above situation, the picture is rather different for some other sets of 
countries. For instance, oil producing countries, which tend to fix their exchange rates vis-
à-vis US dollar, face a very different situation with the parallel market rates. Countries, 
like Iran, Iraq and Algeria artificially keep their currencies undervalued. This is evident 
from the much higher price of US dollar (compared to their currencies), when it comes to 
the black market rates. 
There is no significant difference between the two exchange rates, when the focus turns to 
countries with long history of repeated financial crises. Especially, for the case of the 
South American countries of the sample, this holds true. On the other hand, Asian 
countries that faced periods of serious crises episodes behave differently. In their case, the 
distinction between the official exchange rate and the parallel market’s one is quite evident. 
Countries of this type include Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia as well. Philippines is also 
part of this general picture for the Asian economies. 
From the above analysis, it can be easily inferred the crucial role parallel market behavior 
can have for a number of important economies around the world. When it comes to the 
case of oil producing economies, as well as countries that are more prone to currency crises 
outbreaks, it is of utmost importance to take into account and model the most relevant 
version of the exchange rate (official or parallel one). This general picture, regarding the 
macroeconomic performance of these economies and their exchange rate modeling can be 
further discussed later, when the econometric results will be presented. The previous 
discussion provides a useful taxonomy of the economies under investigation, in the sense 
that it turns the interest towards the countries for which this distinction between the two 
rates makes more sense. 
 
4.2 Findings from a preliminary investigation 
 
As illustrated in the preceding chapter, a simple regression of a currency crash dummy on 
the parallel market premium proposed by Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) is employed as a 
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preliminary investigation on the linkage between the official and parallel exchange rate 
market and the indicative power of the parallel market rate over the official rate 
realignment.  
The Binary Probit model discussed in section 3.1.2  is adopted for the estimation of the 
model .Cautions have to be paid to the time series properties of ∆P(>, as the regressors for 
the Probit model must be stationary. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test is 
implemented to investigate the stationarity of the 12 month parallel market premium for 56 
countries categorized into 4 groups geographically. The sample spans from January 1973 
to December 1998 on a monthly frequency. The author performed the test both including 
only a constant and including a constant and a linear trend, whilst the length of lags is 
jointly determined upon both Schwarz (SIC) and Akaike (AIC) information Criteria. Under 
this setting, ADF test overwhelmingly report stationarity of the 12-month parallel premium 
for the majority of the countries across the sample. 
The results from ADF tests are displayed in Tables A.1 to A.4 in the Appendix. In these 
tables, the results are grouped in different categories, according to the geographical regions 
examined. In this way, we have four groups of economies, namely: Developed economies, 
Asian, Latin American and African countries. According to the test, ∆P(> for merely 3 out 
of 56 countries are indicated as nonstationary, i.e., contains a unit root. 
In more details, the null hypothesis that a unit root exists in the series cannot be rejected 
for three countries, including one Latin American country (Colombia) and two Developed 
economies: Finland and France. The results are consistent for these countries whether only 
a constant or both a constant and a linear trend are included in testing the unit root. 
Consensus has also been achieved, on both occasions, for 46 out of 56 economies. 
Nonetheless, in these cases, the null hypothesis of unit root is strongly rejected. As 
presented in the tables at the appendix, for these countries, evidences of stationarity for 
∆P(> are reported when only a constant as well as both a constant and a linear trend are 
regressed in the ADF test. However, contradictory results from the different choice of 
exogenous regressors appear for 7 countries, namely, Belgium, Benin, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Mexico, New Zealand and Uganda. In any case, since there is 
evidence of these series being stationary, we are going to use them for this econometric 
investigation. 
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Having clarified the stationarity of each individual series, the next step is focused on 
studying the linkage between the market determined-exchange rate and the realignments in 
the official exchange rate (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). The three countries with 
nonstarionary ∆P(> are removed from the original sample for further analysis. Within the 
reduced sample, however, there are a few economies where no occurrences of the currency 
crashes are detected during the observation period including: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherland, Norway, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland. The above-mentioned countries are eliminated from 
the sample as well, since a Probit model cannot be estimated for dependant variables 
without variances. 
The final sample encompasses a group of 37 countries with high heterogeneity in the sense 
that it features a fairly wide geographical coverage, development level diversities as well 
as industry structure variations. As summarized below in Table 4.1, a currency crash 
dummy XYZ is regressed on a constant [ and the 12-month parallel market premium \]^ 
(i=12) as defined earlier, while _] represents a random disturbance. According to Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004), the coefficient ` should be positive and statistically significant if the 
market determined rate consistently predicts devaluations of the official rate. If, in turn, the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged market exchange rate is negative, implying that the 
official rate does not validate the market rate, then the parallel market cannot serve as a 
good anticipator of currency crashes and exchange rate realignment. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Binary Dependent Variable Model 
Binary Probit Model: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
Number of countries for which: In percentage 
(%) 
β >0 33 89.19 
β >0 and 
significant 
24 64.86 
β <0 4 10.81 
β <0 and 
significant 
1 2.70 
Total number of 
countries 
37 100 
 
Notes: XYZ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when there is a realignment in the official 
exchange rate according to our definition in the methodology section and 0 otherwise, α and β denote a 
constant term and a slope coefficient, respectively.∆\]^ is the lagged 12-month premium in the parallel 
exchange rate. The value of i is chosen in light of Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) and _] is a random disturbance. 
The term currency crash employed here refers to a 15% or higher monthly depreciation in accordance with its 
conventional definitions in extant literature (consult methodology section for details). 
 
Whilst the details for the country-specific models including the estimated coefficients, z-
statistics and standard errors for [ and ` are presented in table A.5 to A.8, Table 4.1 offers 
a brief summary on the results obtained from the country-specific regressions. The 
coefficients on the parallel premium are positive for 33 countries and negative for 4 
countries, namely, Algeria, Ghana, Nepal and Iran respectively. In about 89 percent of the 
cases, the sign on the coefficient is positive whilst 65 percent both positive and significant. 
There are 9 countries whose coefficients are positive but insignificant, including Egypt, 
Korea, Malaysia, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka and Uganda. It is noteworthy that 
for most Latin American countries in our sample apart from Paraguay, the coefficients 
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estimated are both positive and significant. The results, for each group of countries, are 
summarized in the following tables, where short discussion is also provided. 
In table 4.2, the results for the so-called developed countries are provided. As it can be 
easily inferred, the sample is quite small (only four countries) after the nonstationary series 
are precluded based on ADF test. 
 
Table 4.2: Probit Model for Developed Economies 
Binary Probit Model: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
Number of countries for which: 
In percentage 
(%) 
β >0 4 100 
β >0 and 
significant 
1 25 
β <0 0 0 
β <0 and 
significant 
0 0 
Total number of 
countries 
4 100 
 
Notes: XYZ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when there is a realignment in the official 
exchange rate according to our definition in the methodology section and 0 otherwise, α and β denote a 
constant term and a slope coefficient, respectively.∆\]^ is the lagged 12-month premium in the parallel 
exchange rate. The value of i is chosen in light of Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) and _] is a random disturbance. 
The term currency crash employed here refers to a 15% or higher monthly depreciation in accordance with its 
conventional definitions in extant literature (consult methodology section for details). 
 
Despite the limited size of sample, it is easily observable that the model holds only for 
Greece, while for the other three countries, namely New Zealand, Portugal and Spain, do 
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not. It seems that the parallel market exchange rate premium does not really work as a 
leading indicator of abrupt changes in the official exchange rates, for most of the countries 
of the developed world. 
 
Table 4.3: Probit Model for Asian Economies 
Binary Probit Model: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
Number of countries for which: 
In percentage 
(%) 
β >0 9 82 
β >0 and 
significant 
6 55 
β <0 2 18 
β <0 and 
significant 
0 0 
Total number of 
countries 
11 100 
 
Notes: XYZ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when there is a realignment in the official 
exchange rate according to our definition in the methodology section and 0 otherwise, α and β denote a 
constant term and a slope coefficient, respectively.∆\]^ is the lagged 12-month premium in the parallel 
exchange rate. The value of i is chosen in light of Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) and _] is a random disturbance. 
The term currency crash employed here refers to a 15% or higher monthly depreciation in accordance with its 
conventional definitions in extant literature (consult methodology section for details). 
 
Turning now to the Asian countries, the first interesting thing here is the number of 
countries in the sample. In contrast to the number of developed economies, here, we deal 
with a total of 11 countries, some of which are quite important, in economic terms, not 
only for the Asian region but for the world economy as well. As far as the results 
concerned, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) model has good results, since 82% of the countries 
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present one of the desirable properties. That is, a positive coefficient. Then, 55% of them 
have a significant and positive coefficient for the parallel market exchange rate returns. 
This percentage corresponds to six countries (India, Indonesia, Israel, Philippines, Thailand 
and Turkey), with the strongest relationship to be evident for Thailand and India and less 
for the rest. None the less, the results are in accordance to the proposed model and the 
percentages of it. 
 
Table 4.4: Probit Model for Latin American Economies 
Binary Probit Model: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
Number of countries for which: 
In percentage 
(%) 
β >0 14 100 
β >0 and 
significant 
13 93 
β <0 0 0 
β <0 and 
significant 
0 0 
Total number of 
countries 
14 100 
 
Notes: XYZ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when there is a realignment in the official 
exchange rate according to our definition in the methodology section and 0 otherwise, α and β denote a 
constant term and a slope coefficient, respectively.∆\]^ is the lagged 12-month premium in the parallel 
exchange rate. The value of i is chosen in light of Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) and _] is a random disturbance. 
The term currency crash employed here refers to a 15% or higher monthly depreciation in accordance with its 
conventional definitions in extant literature (consult methodology section for details). 
 
Table 4.4 briefly summarizes the situation that holds for the South American countries. It 
is surprising the number of countries, for which the model is meaningful, since only for 
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Paraguay the coefficient is not significant. It is also interesting to notice how strongly 
significant the results are, for all cases, since that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% 
level of significance, in all cases. Moreover, even though the results are in favour of the 
estimated model, the coefficients’ values are rather small, with the minor exception of 
countries, like El Salvador and Dominican Republic. In any case, this is not of our main 
concern, since the goal here is to simply establish the connection between the two 
exchange rates. 
Finally, in table 4.5, the situation in the African economies sample is discussed. Here, from 
the eight countries of the sample, six have a positive parallel market premium coefficient 
and, at the end, four of them significant as well. On the other hand, only two countries are 
against our expectations, with negative coefficients and, among them, only Ghana has also 
a significant coefficient. Once again, the results present desirable behaviour, in line with 
the model’s prospects. 
 
Table 4.5: Probit Model for African Economies 
Binary Probit Model: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
Number of countries for which: In percentage (%) 
β >0 6 75 
β >0 and significant 4 50 
β <0 2 25 
β <0 and significant 1 13 
Total number of 
countries 
8 100 
 
Notes: XYZ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when there is a realignment in the official 
exchange rate according to our definition in the methodology section and 0 otherwise, α and β denote a 
constant term and a slope coefficient, respectively.∆\]^ is the lagged 12-month premium in the parallel 
exchange rate. The value of i is chosen in light of Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) and _] is a random disturbance. 
The term currency crash employed here refers to a 15% or higher monthly depreciation in accordance with its 
conventional definitions in extant literature (consult methodology section for details). 
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To sum up, the findings are consistent with Reinhart& Rogoff (2004), who report 97 
percent cases of positive coefficient and 81 percent both positive and significant, especially 
in the case of Latin American economies. On the other hand, the weakest results come 
from the developed world, while the results for the African and Asian region are, in 
general, consistent. This econometric investigation can also find empirical support in 
Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2002), who conclude that in the long run, the official exchange 
rate will systematically adjust to the market-determined rate. Their work is based on a 
panel cointegration approach, using annual data from 1973 to 1990 for a group of 49 
countries. The overall findings validate the hypothesis that the parallel market premium is 
indicative of the currency crashes hence might systematically predict official rate 
realignment in the long run. 
 
4.3   The stationarity of the variables under examination  
 
In chapter 3, it has been illustrated that testing the stationarity of variables of interest is an 
initial step in the procedure of time series data analysis. This is true for both the 
preliminary analysis using the crash dummy model and the two main PPP models to be 
investigated. Economic theory suggests that the variables under examination to be 
integrated of the same order 1 and if true, this would be the most desirable case for the 
multivariate cointegration analysis we conduct. 
In the methodology part, two unit root tests were briefly described, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) test and the GLS-detrended Dickey-Fuller (DF-GLS) test19  . 
These two tests are applied to the official and parallel exchange rate, the CPI and WPI 
indices of the countries under examination as well as those of United States, all of which 
are measured in natural logarithm. The foregoing discussion will be focused on the 
findings from the unit root tests we carried out as displayed in Table A.9 –A.11 in the 
appendix. 
The first column of these tables presents the specific country name and its sample period 
coverage under investigation.  The ADF test statistics with different choice of exogenous 
                                                          
19
 the DF-GLS test is proposed by  (Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996)  
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regressors are presented (C denotes a constant, C,T denotes a constant and a linear trend) . 
The leads/lags are chosen based on both SIC and AIC but with more weight on SIC. For 
each variable, in the occasion that the level is found to contain a unit root, the differenced 
term is then tested again for stationary . Apart from the test statistics, Mackinnon (1996) 
one-sided p-values are also reported for the ADF test. The last two columns of each table 
display the DF-GLS test results to confirm the findings from ADF test.  
We presented 4 separate tables from A.9 –A.11, each of them reports the unit root test 
results for one group of countries and overall, the results are consistent across groups. For 
a majority of countries in the sample, all the variables for our two main PPP models 
including the two exchange rates and all price indices are found to be I(1) series, i.e., 
integrated of order 1. For those series, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected in 
level but can be rejected in first difference. What’s more, the ADF test and DF-GLS test 
provide consistent and unambiguous results, indicating these series contain one unit root. 
This is true for 31 out of 40 countries we examined.  
For the 4 western developed countries we examined (Belgium, Portugal, Spain and United 
States), the exception is Portugal, for whom the domestic CPI is suggested as I(2) by ADF 
test whilst the DF-GLS test indicates it as I(1).  
In the Asian group, inconsistent findings are obtained for 6 out of 15 countries. 
Specifically, the domestic CPI for Japan is found to be I(2) by both unit root tests. 
Contradictory result has been found for the domestic CPI of Korea by ADF test, suggesting 
its stationarity in level but nonstationarity in first difference. Nevertheless, DF-GLS test 
provides positive results showing that the price level is I(1) whilst the differenced CPI is 
stationary. The domestic price level of Indonesia, as well as the parallel market exchange 
rates of Malaysia are found to be I(1) by ADF test and I(2) by DF-GLS test. For these 2 
countries, we suspect that the acceptance of unit root in first difference by DF-GL test 
might be due to the inclusion of too many lags (12) in both cases. The parallel market rate 
for Kuwait is indicated to be stationary by ADF test and I (1) by DF-GLS test. Finally, 
both the parallel market rate and the wholesale price index for Pakistan are suggested to be 
I(1) by ADF test but I(2) by DF-GLS test. 
The results for the Latin American group are less ambiguous as opposed to the Asian 
group. Only the domestic price of Mexico receives different result from the two unit root 
tests. The ADF test suggests it to be I (1) while the DF-GLS test indicates it as I(2). 
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As regard to the 7African countries we examined, the domestic CPI of Algeria is indicated 
as I(2) by ADF test and I(1) by DF-GLS test. Besides, the domestic WPI is found to be I(1) 
by ADF test and  I(2) by DF-GLS test. 
Overall, the two exchange rates and price indices for most countries are found to be 
integrated of order 1 and even for the exceptions reported above, either DF-GLS or ADF 
test are supportive of the integration order as 1. The only case that has been strongly 
suggested as I(2) by both unit root tests is Japan. Although it is not compulsory that all the 
variables entering into the VEC models to be I(1), the presence of a mixture of I(0), I(1) 
and I(2) variables can  massively affect the estimation results. Therefore, Japan is removed 
from the sample. Having established the non-stationarity and the same order of integration 
amongst the chosen variables, the next section moves forward to present the estimates of 
the two PPP models of interest. 
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4.4 Empirical Results for Model One 
 
4.4.1 Results of Cointegration test 
 
In this section we describe and analyse the findings obtained from the weak-form PPP 
model (hereafter denoted as model 1) estimation as defined in equation (3.5). As explained 
in section 3.2.2, the analysis encompasses two stages: the determination of cointegration 
rank and the estimation of VEC model. 
The cointegration test results for model 1 are displayed in table A.13-A.16.We report the 
trace statistics provided by Johansen, the adjusted trace statistics mentioned before to 
rectify small-sample bias, as well as the critical value of trace statistics at 5% significance 
level. The results are again presented on basis of the 4 groups we categorized only that for 
the developed economies Belgium solely is kept for the PPP estimation whilst the price 
indices of United States are used as foreign country price level entering the PPP equation. 
For the other two developed countries, Portugal and Spain, the parallel markets were rather 
inactive during the examination period while a dual currency market was in presence for 
Belgium throughout the observation period. The results will be discussed based on 
geographical groups as follows. 
Above all, the existence of at least one cointegrating vector is found for almost all the 
estimated VAR models with only few exceptions. Specifically, there is no cointegrating 
relationships amongst the nominal exchange rate (both official and parallel), the domestic 
price and the U.S. price when the wholesale price index is used as the price measure for 
Malaysia. Besides, no cointegrating relationship is found for Turkey amongst the official 
exchange rate, the domestic price level and the U.S price level when again, the wholesale 
price index is included in the estimation. These findings are encouraging for our further 
analysis as for most countries; the evidences of long run relationship within the variable set 
are supported, which enables us to test the PPP framework as established in the former 
chapter. 
In order to have a deeper understanding of the results, we first take a closer look at the 
Latin American group of 14 countries. At least 1 cointegrating vector is found for all 
economies within the group, regardless of the choice between official and parallel 
exchange rate or the wholesale price index or consumer price index. However, the initial 
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cointegration test results for several economies are somehow confusing. Abnormal result 
has been reported for Bolivia that 3 cointegrating vectors are detected using both parallel 
and official exchange rate. This might be explained when looking into the evolvement of 
exchange rate regime during the observation period. The currency underwent a “hyperfloat” 
period from April 1984 to September 1985 and the two exchange rate markets were 
temporarily unified from August 29 1985–December 1986. If cointegration test is 
performed for a revised sample period from January 1987 to December 1998, the 
cointegration test indicates the existence of 1 cointegrating vector .This is true using both 
parallel and official exchange rates.  
Similar revision has been made to Mexico for which the parallel market is absent from 
September 1976 to February 1982, the initial test covering the full sample indicates 2 
cointegrating vectors for official exchange rates, the domestic price and the U.S price whist 
3 cointegrating vectors amongst the parallel rate and the two price levels. We therefore 
revised the sample and test cointegration again amongst the variables of interest from 
March 1982 to December 1998. The cointegration rank is then found to be 1 using both 
exchange rates. 
It is interesting to compare the evidence from using the official and parallel exchange rate 
for the nominal exchange rate variable in testing cointegration. In general, similar findings 
are produced by using either exchange rate apart from 4 countries, namely, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Peru and Chile. 2 cointegrating vectors are found for both Ecuador and Peru, 
using both wholesale and consumer price index for official exchange rate while 1 
cointegrating vector is found for parallel market exchange rate. The opposite results are 
found for El Salvador and Chile. There is no clear evidence which exchange rate is more in 
favour of validating the PPP theory so far and the results using different price indices are 
similar. 
As regard to the African group of 6 countries, similar to the Latin American countries, 
evidences of cointegration have been reported for all the countries and 1 cointegrating 
vector is indicated for all but 2 countries. Specifically, the cointegration rank is 2 for 
Morocco using both exchange rate when wholesale price index is employed but 1 when the 
consumer price index is included. For Nigeria, the official exchange rate model suggests 2 
cointegrating relationships but the parallel rate model suggests 1.   
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The western developed economy group contains Belgium only as most of the western 
developed countries in our original sample have been precluded due to reasons such as 
price index data unavailability and the inactivity (absence) of parallel market during the 
period under examination. Both the parallel and official exchange rate model are found to 
contain 1 cointegrating vector for Belgium and it is noteworthy, the trace statistics reports 
for 2 cointegrating equations while the adjusted trace statistics rectified it as 1. 
Earlier we have discussed two cases where cointegration relationship is absent and both are 
from the Asian economies. Differing results have been reported more frequently in the 
Asian group when the magnitude of price and exchange rate vary. Whilst a majority of 
VAR models we estimated for the 13 economies in this group are found to contain one 
cointegrating vector, the parallel rate model for India and Nepal are suggested to contain 1 
cointegrating vector using wholesale and consumer price index respectively. For Sri Lanka, 
2 cointegrating relationships are suggested using both exchange rates when the wholesale 
price index is in place but 1 when the consumer price index is employed. Different results 
(1 or 2 cointegrating relationships) have also been obtained for Korea, Pakistan and 
Philippines from the two price indices but there is no definite pattern shown which price 
index is more supportive and the results from estimating the weak-form PPP models might 
be able to shed light on this. 
 
4.4.2 VECM estimation  
 
Section 4.4.1 has established that 1 cointegrating vector is found for most countries and we 
estimated the VEC models based on the estimated VAR models. The findings from our 
estimation are discussed in this section and presented in table 4.6-4.9 
The long-run VEC model estimations for the African economies are displayed in table 4.6. 
The normalised cointegrating coefficients as well as their significance levels are indicated 
in the left panel of the table while in the right panel we present the likelihood ratio 
statistics and the corresponding probability for binding restrictions, the first hypothesis 
tests if the domestic and foreign prices have an effect on the exchange rate in an symmetric 
way while the second hypothesis tests if the strong-form PPP holds for the countries under 
examination. The PPP theory suggests that the exchange rate would depreciate i.e, 
s(	increase under our setting when the domestic price rises or the foreign price decreases. 
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Therefore the coefficient for domestic price   is expected to be positive whilst the 
coefficient for foreign price  is supposed to be negative. In the African group, we have 
obtained significant and correctly signed coefficients of reasonable magnitude for: Algeria 
using official exchange rate, Egypt using parallel exchange rate, Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa using both exchange rates. For Morocco, however, the estimated coefficients are 
wrongly signed and insignificant. For the remaining models we estimate, the parallel 
exchange rate model coefficients for Algeria is correctly signed but the coefficient for 
foreign price is insignificant. Similar findings are reported for the parallel exchange rate 
model of Egypt where the coefficients are correctly signed but insignificant for the 
domestic price level when consumer price index is used. It is noteworthy, however, using 
the wholesale price index and for parallel exchange rate, the coefficients are significant and 
correctly signed. 
In sum, weak-form PPP holds for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa using both parallel and 
official exchange rates. Positive but less strong evidences are discovered for Algeria and 
Egypt, for whom the weak-form PPP holds only when official exchange rate and parallel 
exchange rate are opted for estimation, respectively. Having found significant and 
meaningful long-run relationships for these countries, we further test the restrictions 
imposed to identify the joint symmetry/ proportionality hypothesis. 
By observing the probability of likelihood ratio statistics, we cannot reject the joint 
proportionality (strong-form PPP) hypothesis for Algeria when the official rate is 
employed, Egypt when the parallel rate and wholesale price index are used, Kenya when 
both rates are used (the symmetry of home and domestic price coefficients is validated but 
the joint symmetry in the second set of hypothesis is rejected), Nigeria for both exchange 
rates and finally, South Africa when the official exchange rate and wholesale price index 
are under consideration. It seems that for the African group of economies, the wholesale 
price index is slightly more favourable in supporting the joint proportionality hypothesis 
when the weak-form PPP is already in place. 
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Table 4.6: VECM Estimation for African Economies 
 
 =  +   +  ∗ + " Hypothesis tests 
 Normalized cointegrating coefficients   chi-square statistics , probability in [ ]  
 standard error in ( )   = −  = − = 1 
	 = 0 
Algeria s=LEO     
p(*)=LC
PI(*) 
 1.706  -2.614  7.916  14.471  3.642  
  (-0.11377) (-0.31377)  [0.0142] [0.1618] 
  *** ***    
 s=LEB 0.908  -0.192  1.602  2.005  1.416  
  (-0.14583) (-0.39282)  [0.1568] [0.4926] 
  ***     
Egypt       
p(*)=LC
PI(*) 
s=LEO 0.9811 2.0300 -10.6518  5.3537  26.3510  
  (0.6205) (1.6537)  [0.0207]  [0.0000 ] 
       
 s=LEB 0.9468 -2.2526  6.7229 6.2170  16.0553  
  (0.2442) (0.6516)  [0.0127] [0.0003] 
  *** ***    
p(*)=LW
PI(*) 
s=LEO 0.6272 3.7509 -17.0654  22.3501  33.7338  
  (0.3381) (1.1197)  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
   **    
 s=LEB 1.1867 -3.9031  13.0965 21.8510  8.0336  
  (0.2124) (0.7001)  [0.0000]  [0.0180] 
 
      
Kenya       
p(*)=LC
PI(*) 
s=LEO 0.9178 -0.9191  4.3280 0.0001  3.7125  
  (0.0680) (0.1797)  [0.9925]  [0.1563] 
  *** ***    
 s=LEB 0.9296 -1.1071  5.1842 0.5837  9.5908  
  (0.1136) (0.2962)  [0.4449] [0.0083]  
  *** ***    
Morocc
o 
      
p(*)=LC
PI(*) 
s=LEO -1.0638  1.5136 0.0075 0.9377  40.5300  
  (0.7688) (1.0302)  [0.3329]  [0.0000]  
       
 s=LEB -1.2468  1.7588 -0.2188  1.5617  39.1805  
  (0.7476) (0.9983)  [0.2114]  [0.0000]  
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p(*)=LW
PI(*) 
s=LEO 0.5454 -0.9990  3.5748 [1.1384] [38.0323] 
  (0.2988) (0.5463)  [0.2860]  [0.0000]  
       
 s=LEB 0.5609 -1.1158  4.3282 2.5390  34.1544  
  (0.3162) (0.5761)  [0.1111]  [0.0000 ] 
   *    
Nigeria       
p(*)=LC
PI(*) 
s=LEO 1.6213 -51.7538  56.7924 4.6881  8.0418  
  (5.5059) (22.9395)  [0.0304]  [0.0179]  
  *** ***    
 s=LEB 1.0320 -2.1783  (9.4642) 1.6319  8.9625  
  (0.2289) (0.9382)  [0.2014]  [0.0113]  
  *** ***    
South 
Africa 
      
s=LEO 1.3387 -1.8514  3.9900 7.7781  14.5596  
p(*)=LC
PI(*) 
 
 
(0.1077) (0.2529) 
 
[0.0053]  [0.0007]  
 *** ***    
 s=LEB 1.3452 -2.0370  4.7917 10.6413  9.9592  
  
(0.1331) (0.3092) 
 
[0.0011]  [0.0069]  
  *** ***    
p(*)=LW
PI(*) 
s=LEO 1.5172 -4.7795  16.0616 0.5744  20.7479  
  
(0.1910) (1.1971) 
 
[0.4485]  [0.0000]  
  *** ***    
 s=LEB 1.2030 -1.8353  4.6607 0.0521  17.5006  
  
(0.1626) (1.0149) 
 
[0.8195 ] [0.0002]  
  *** **    
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
 
The next set of counties to examine is the Latin American ones, for which the results are 
summarized in table 4.7. A majority of countries in the group have received positive results 
in favour of the weak-form PPP validity. The cointegrating coefficients are significant and 
of the correct sign for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela regardless of the choice 
between official and parallel exchange rates. For the remaining two countries, the 
coefficients for Costa Rica are significant but wrongly signed except for the estimation 
amongst the official exchange rate and wholesale price indices, where significant and 
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correctly signed coefficients are obtained. As regard to Mexico, only when the official 
exchange rate, the domestic and U.S consumer price indices are 
 
Table 4.7: VECM Estimation for Latin American Economies 
  =  +   +  ∗ + " Hypothesis tests 
 Normalized cointegrating coefficients  chi-square statistics ,probability in [] 
 standard error in (  ) 
 
  = −  = − = 1, 
 = 0 
Argentina     
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.960364 -0.760463 0.609336 0.273492 23.70653 
  (-0.01588) (-0.36572) [0.600999] [0.000007] 
  *** *** 
 s=LEB 1.00772 -2.614411 7.29461 9.561265 25.42375 
  
-0.02176 -0.50236 [0.001987] [0.000003] 
  
*** *** 
Bolivia  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.039 -1.406 3.197 8.477  33.800  
  (0.009) (0.122) [0.004] [0.000]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.986 -1.031  1.871 0.039  29.886  
  (0.015) (0.210)   [0.844]  [0.000]  
  
*** *** 
Brazil  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.067 -6.428  -23.7458 8.5006  26.4726  
  (0.031 (1.574) [0.0036]  [0.0000]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 1.0088 -4.2075  -14.2987 1.8451  30.9442  
  (0.0316) (1.6187) [0.1743]  [0.0000]  
  
*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 0.9793 -1.8975  -4.6464 5.9547  14.0468  
  (0.0073) (0.2888) [0.0147]  [0.0009]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.9620 -1.2657  -2.0799 0.6365  18.1659  
  (0.0066) (0.2569) [0.4250]  [0.0001]  
  
*** *** 
Chile  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 2.5305 -4.6834  17.1445 0.4493  37.9358  
  (0.2226) (1.1356) [0.5027]  [0.0000]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.4520  -2.8056 -5.5417  4.3678  39.5676  
  (0.1962) (0.9795) 0.0366  0.0000  
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*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.4964 -2.5444  11.6322 0.0359  34.0034  
  (0.1127) (0.8946) [0.8498]  [0.0000]  
  
*** ** 
 s=LEB 9.6474  -5.3695 1.668763 0.0447  42.1161  
  (2.3791) (17.4311) [0.8325]  [0.0000] 
  
*** 
Colombia  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO No Cointegrating relations  
 s=LEB 1.3896 -3.5033  16.9106  0.0644 0.5797  
  (0.2273) (0.9220) [0.7996] [0.7484]  
  
*** ** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.2962 -4.3747  20.8224 7.8482 9.4601  
  (0.1615) (0.8627) [0.0051] [0.0088]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 1.3234 -5.9727  27.3792 12.9319  14.0945  
  (0.2367) (1.2413) [0.0003]  [0.0009]  
  
*** *** 
Costa Rica  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.6232 0.6289 0.1980 14.6964 34.5176 
  (0.0675) (0.2423) [0.0001] [0.0000] 
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.0524 2.5837 -4.1427 25.1915 32.8526  
  (0.1087) (0.3889) [0.0000] [0.0000]  
  
*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.0709 -1.1799  -6.6099 0.2275  9.3333 
  (0.0279) (0.1288) [0.6334] [0.0094] 
  
*** ** 
 s=LEB 0.8226 0.3462 0.9799 5.3978  19.2946  
  (0.1125) (0.5254) [0.0202]  [0.0001]  
  
*** *** 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
s=LEO 1.1813 -2.2190  7.8247 5.2172  13.8027  
p(*)=LCPI(*)  (0.1600) (0.5332) [0.0224]  [0.0010]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.9676 -0.7831  3.5688 1.4705  12.3827  
  (0.0471) (0.1540) [0.2253]  [0.0020]  
  
*** *** 
Ecuador s=LEO 1.1456 -1.9780  13.8545 17.6728  2.3593  
  (0.0398) (0.2214) [0.0000]  [0.3074]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.9855 -1.0942  10.4544 0.2318  3.7223  
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  (0.0369) (0.2025) [0.6302]  [0.1555]  
  
*** *** 
El Salvador  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.9685 -1.4522  4.4544 1.6247  5.1705  
  (0.0769) (0.2192) [0.2024]  [0.0754]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.5884 -0.1831  2.6173 5.5513  7.1733  
  (0.0895) (0.0894) [0.0185] [0.0277]  
  
* 
Honduras  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.16237 -1.782479 5.507646 14.86285 7.665919 
  (-0.11346) (-0.23068) [0.000116] [0.021645] 
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 9.3305 -20.9523  74.0433 17.4528  13.3319  
  (0.6527) (3.0436) [0.0000] [0.0013]  
  
*** *** 
Mexico  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.1090 -1.3813  3.9743 1.8520  27.1392  
  (0.0296) (0.1995) [0.1736]  [0.0000]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 1.0068 -1.1009  2.9860 0.2082  23.2313  
  (0.0327) (0.2204) [0.6482]  [0.0000]  
  
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 0.9898 0.3211 -3.0231  2.6665  21.9678  
  (0.0348) (0.7823) [0.1025]  [0.0000] 
  
*** 
 s=LEB 0.9332 0.7449 -4.6069  1.9209  16.3970  
  (0.0497) (1.1153) [0.1658]  [0.0003]  
  
*** 
Peru  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.8653 4.1024 -5.3241  16.7823  17.6289  
  (0.0503) (1.0679) [0.0000]  [0.0001]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.9133 -1.5775  3.5862  1.5344  22.3978  
  (0.0214) (0.4569) [0.2155]  [0.0000]  
  
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.0068 -1.7278  4.0027 0.9038  26.1395  
  (0.0163) (0.5784) [0.3418]  [0.0000]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 1.1091 -11.1284  44.7463 4.7379  4.7682  
  (0.0545) (3.6453) [0.0295]  [0.0922]  
  
*** *** 
Suriname  
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p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.3332 -1.5028  -9.7917 0.0328  9.0080  
  (0.0976) (0.5526) [0.8562]  [0.0111]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.7837 -0.8954  7.4243 0.0738 14.3581 
  (0.0730) (0.4036) [0.7859] [0.0008] 
  
*** *** 
Venezuela  
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.7823 -1.7849  10.4650  6.1393  5.1725  
  (0.0877) (0.4096) [0.0132]  [0.0753]  
  
*** *** 
 s=LEB 0.5459 -1.0744  7.7339 1.0296  1.8856  
  (0.1034) (0.4753) [0.3103] [0.3895] 
  
*** *** 
 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
 
included for estimation, significant and correctly signed cointegrating coefficients can be 
obtained. 
Based upon the existence of significant and meaningful long-run cointegrating 
relationships, the two aforementioned sets of restrictions are tested. The likelihood ratio 
test statistics indicate that the symmetry between the coefficients for domestic and foreign 
prices ( = −)	cannot be rejected for Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Peru, Suriname and Venezuela for both exchange rates. Differing results due to the choice 
of exchange rates have been obtained for Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Mexico. Specifically, the symmetry condition holds for the official exchange 
rates of Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico as well as the parallel exchange rates of Bolivia, 
Colombia and Ecuador. A similar pattern having been observed in the African economies 
has demonstrated itself that the use of wholesale price index validates the symmetry 
hypothesis when the use of consumer price index leads to the rejection of the hypothesis 
sometimes. The evidences can be detected from the results obtained for Brazil, Costa Rica 
and Peru.  
In addition to the positive results we obtained on the symmetry hypothesis test, the strong-
form PPP is also supported for a few countries. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have received 
positive result when the parallel market rate is under examination. As for Suriname and 
Venezuela, strong-form PPP is confirmed by using both exchange rates. In the Latin 
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American group, the parallel market exchange rate seems to be favoring the strong-form 
PPP hypothesis more than the official exchange rate. 
The remaining part of analysis will be focused on the Asian economies based on the results 
displayed in table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8: VECM Estimation for Asian Economies 
 =  +   +  ∗ + " Hypothesis tests 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients chi-square statistics ,probability in [] 
standard error in ( ) 
  = − 
 = − =
1,	 = 0 
India    
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.7316 −0.7472 (10.3851) 1.4171 4.8582 
(0.1161) (0.1761) [0.2339] [0.0881] 
s=LEB 1.0757 −1.1459 (3.2691) 0.0023 8.5049 
(0.2596) (0.4023) [0.9620] [0.0142] 
*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.4935 −2.4968 2.6670 [6.7075 1.8808 
(0.2304) (0.4636) [0.0096] [0.3905] 
** 
s=LEB 1.3809 −2.8362 9.7895 5.3196 5.1318 
(0.3365) (0.6682) [0.0211] [0.0769] 
*** *** 
Indonesia 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.4199 1.3953 −1.6133 32.9663 43.3673 
(0.1162) (0.0907) [0.0000] [0.0000] 
*** 
s=LEB -0.5044 3.0473 -3.6598 21.2984 28.2756 
(0.4428) (0.8347) [0.0000] [0.0000] 
*** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.1010 0.2035 6.7593 1.7066 26.6617 
(0.2741) (0.8160) [0.1914] [0.0000] 
*** 
s=LEB 0.9652 6.2323 -20.5477 1.7296 20.3922 
(1.7265) (5.0015) [0.1885] [0.0000] 
Iran 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.2454 -6.8097 32.6388 5.7579 1.0181 
(0.8337) (2.8298) [0.0164] [0.6011] 
** 
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s=LEB 0.4792 -9.4589 42.6706 0.3484 1.0122 
(1.9783) (6.7024) [0.5550] [0.6028] 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 2.8879 162.6057 -660.4582 15.7979 1.7523 
(9.0854) (45.8736) [0.0001] [0.4164] 
*** 
s=LEB 0.8136 -6.5015 31.8550 2.7757 0.7131 
(0.4020) (1.9730) [0.0957] [0.7001] 
** *** 
Korea 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.0242 -1.6991 9.5586 2.1091 19.1087 
(0.6422) (1.0712) [0.1464] [0.0001] 
s=LEB 0.9977 -1.7539 9.8930 1.6729 17.0325 
(0.7756) (1.2924) [0.1959] [0.0002] 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO -0.7123 0.8449 5.8337 0.0252 30.1872 
(0.8997) (1.5979) [0.8740] [0.0000] 
s=LEB 2.0678 -2.3862 8.3050 
0.0002 
 
14.9533 
(0.6682) (1.1677) [0.9899] [0.0006] 
*** ** 
Kuwait 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO -0.0966 -0.0700 -0.5628 4.0442 27.9055 
(0.1044) (0.0563) [0.0443] [0.0000] 
s=LEB -0.1093 -0.0224 -0.6903 3.7516 28.3182 
(0.0885) (0.0474) [0.0528] [0.0000] 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 0.2018 -0.2999 -0.8484 10.0167 48.9908 
(0.0631) (0.0609) [0.0016 ] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
s=LEB 0.1732 -0.3141 -0.6686 10.6523 44.9822 
(0.0879) (0.0844) [0.0011] [0.0000 
* *** 
Malaysia 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 12.4568 -5.1984 -28.8818 7.5862 25.1097 
(5.6750) (4.0000) [0.0059] [0.0000] 
*** 
s=LEB -20.4324 10.0843 43.6430 11.8949 20.5705 
(7.4527) (5.2183) [0.0006] [0.0000] 
*** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO No Cointegrating relations 
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s=LEB No Cointegrating relations 
Nepal 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.0823 -1.9774 7.4615 0.8984 
 
1.609166 
 
(0.5148) (0.9139) [0.3432] [0.4473] 
** ** 
s=LEB 0.9831 -2.5760 4.0799 0.8883 9.9910 
(0.8277) (1.4599) [0.3459] [0.0068] 
** ** 
Pakistan 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.9965 -0.3083 0.8594 14.8905 3.5347 
(0.1420) (0.2293) [0.0001] [0.1708] 
*** 
s=LEB 1.0969 -0.5594 1.6601 25.6588 20.3952 
(0.1133) (0.1800) [0.0000] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 0.9089 0.8996 -3.6337 16.3227 4.0272 
(0.2436) (0.5783) [0.0001] [0.1335] 
*** 
s=LEB 0.9424 -0.3776 1.6188 23.8077 18.2489 
(0.0718) (0.1650) [0.0000] [0.0001] 
*** *** 
Philippines 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.6401 -0.9713 4.6134 0.4272 22.9011 
(0.3428) (0.7723) [0.5134] [0.0000] 
s=LEB 0.9320 -1.1008 4.3175 0.5024 21.8543 
(0.1690) (0.3792) [0.4785] 0.0000] 
*** *** 
Singapore 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO -10.4261 4.9856 25.7498 0.0207 48.3892 
(1.3849) (0.7733) [0.8857] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
s=LEB -9.5304 4.4097 -24.2299 0.0449 18.3066 
(1.9594) (1.0150) [0.8321] [0.0001] 
*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 0.8156 -1.1865 1.9182 5.9165 36.2246 
(0.1619) (0.0942) [0.0150] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
s=LEB 0.7831 -1.1726 2.0078 6.0438 35.4924 
(0.1681) (0.0972) [0.0140] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
Sri Lanka 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.0993 1.8358 -4.2983 0.7895 6.9853 
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(0.0946) (0.1940) [0.3743] [0.0304] 
*** 
s=LEB 0.2885 2.2417 -6.1686 5.2017 9.3235 
(0.4218) (0.8695) [0.0226] [0.0095] 
*** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 0.6662 1.5182 -5.0045 4.4663 13.3288 
(0.2192) (0.7457) [0.0346] [0.0013] 
*** * 
s=LEB 0.6748 0.3708 -1.2027 6.0382 9.0098 
(0.1446) (0.4846) 0.0140 0.0111 
*** 
Thailand 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 1.2596 -1.4986 4.2769 2.2656 12.0884 
(0.6952) (0.7672) [0.1323] [0.0024] 
* * 
s=LEB 1.2621) -1.4684 4.1441 1.6509 10.5414 
(0.7311) (0.8029) [0.1988] [0.0051] 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.1516 -1.6973 5.7443 9.9508 15.2905 
(0.4282) (0.5346) [0.0016] [0.0005] 
*** *** 
s=LEB 1.2842 -1.7946 5.6356 8.7406 15.0714 
(0.4489) (0.5543) [0.0031] [0.0005] 
Turkey *** *** 
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 0.7381 -2.9597 21.0752 3.0145 37.0344 
(0.1556) (1.2285) [0.0825] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
s=LEB 0.7810 -2.3222 18.7534 1.6427 21.2948 
(0.1088) (0.8929) [0.2000] [0.0000] 
*** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) s=LEO 1.0770 -4.0550 27.5777 3.5741 5.6908 
(0.0334) (0.8579) [0.0587] [0.0581] 
*** *** 
s=LEB 1.0982 -2.3222 28.8316 14.4706 3.4123 
(0.1088) (0.8929) [0.0001] [0.1816] 
*** *** 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
 
The findings from the Asian group, generally speaking, are less supportive of the long-run 
PPP validity comparing to the two former groups. Out of the 14 countries examined, the 
cointegrating coefficients for Nepal and Turkey solely are reported to be both significant 
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and correctly signed. For the remaining countries, the results display a relatively clearer 
pattern comparing to the formerly discussed groups that the parallel market rate and 
wholesale price index are more favorable in validating the weak-form PPP. The use of 
parallel market, instead of the official rate, provides significant and meaningful 
cointegrating coefficients for India, Iran, Korea, Kuwait, and Philippines. Besides, while 
using the consumer price index produces insignificant or (and) wrongly signed coefficients, 
positive estimations have been obtained for Kuwait, Singapore and Thailand when the 
wholesale price index are employed instead. This finding has also been advocated in the 
literature we reviewed in the second chapter. 
The test results for the binding restrictions are again, not as positive as the African and 
Latin American groups. Evidences of strong PPP are reported under the combination of 
parallel exchange rate and wholesale price index for India and Iran whilst only the official 
exchange rates of Iran receives support in the validity of strong-form PPP. The symmetry 
condition for the domestic and foreign prices holds for more cases. Specifically, the 
parallel rate for Korea, Philippines, and Singapore, as well as the official exchange rate for 
Thailand and Turkey are found to support the symmetry condition. 
 
Table 4.9: VECM Estimation for Western Developed Economies 
  =  +   +  ∗ + " Hypothesis tests 
 Normalized cointegrating coefficients   chi-square statistics ,probability in 
[ ] 
 standard error in ( ) 
 
  = −  = − =
1,	 = 0 
Belgium      
p(*)=LCPI(*) s=LEO 13.194 -8.369 -17.139 33.725 30.625 
 
-3.114 -2.592 [0] [0] 
 *** *** 
 s=LEB 9.667 -6.576 -9.825 3.595  32.496 
 
-1.989 -1.657 [0.058]  [0] 
 *** *** 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
 
The last group and also the last country to be discussed for this model is Belgium. As 
shown in table 4.9, the coefficients are significant and correctly signed for both exchange 
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rates while the symmetry condition holds for the parallel exchange rate only. It is also 
evident that the strong-form PPP does not hold for Belgium. 
 
4.5. Empirical Results Analysis for Model Two 
 
In the preceding section we have discussed the findings from estimating the traditional PPP 
model and the following section presents the analysis of an alternative PPP model which 
incorporates the dynamic interaction between the official and parallel exchange rate 
markets. The formulation of this model was explained in section 3.3. 
 
4.5.1 Cointegration test 
 
In accordance to the procedure we undertook for analyzing model one, we initiate the 
analysis by investigating the stochastic properties of the variables concerned. Since the 
same range of series used in model 1 are employed in this model, we move forward to 
present the cointegrating rank of the VAR models estimated for each country. 
The results from cointegration test are displayed in table A.17 to A.20 in the appendix. At 
least 1 cointegrating vector is detected for all of the estimates and around half of the 
countries have been reported to contain 2 cointegrating vectors. This finding is consistent 
with Diamandis (2003) who reports 2 cointegrating vectors for Argentina, Bolivia and 
Chile. 
The details are discussed on basis of regional categories as before. Table A.17 presents the 
cointegration ranks for Latin American economies. Two cointegrating vectors have been 
reported for 5 countries, namely, Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Suriname 
regardless of the price index choices. One cointegrating vector is indicated for Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Venezuela no matter which price index is employed. 
Differing results appear for Peru and Chile in the sense that two cointegrating vectors are 
suggested using the consumer price index and 1 cointegrating vector is found using the 
wholesale price index. It is noteworthy that the adjusted trace statistics we have evidently 
rectified the cointegration ranks for 2 countries. Specifically, the trace statistics has 
reported 4 cointegrating vectors for Costa Rica and El Salvador which obviously cannot 
hold as there should not be more than 3 cointegrationg relationships amongst 4 
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nonstationary series. The adjusted trace statistics, however, has reported 2 and 
cointegrating vectors for Costa Rica and El Salvador, respectively, leading to improvement 
of the test results.  
Turning to the African group as illustrated in table A.18, the VAR models for 4 out of 6 
countries are found to contain 2 cointegrating vectors, namely, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and 
South Africa whilst 1 cointegrating vector is indicated for Algeria and Nigeria. The choice 
between wholesale and consumer price indices has caused no difference in the 
determination of the cointegration ranks. Table A.19 indicates that the cointegration rank 
for Belgium is 2. 
When it comes to the findings for the Asian economies as displayed in table A.20, around 
half of the economies are suggested to contain one cointegrating vector and 2 for the 
remaining one. Inconsistent results obtained when differential price index is in use for Sri 
Lanka and Turkey. For both countries, the model using consumer price index displays 2 
cointegrating vectors whilst 1 cointegrating vector while using wholesale price index. It is 
interesting that similar findings have been observed for the Latin American group as we 
discussed earlier. 
Based on the cointegration rank we have determined, the long-run VEC models are 
obtained for countries containing one cointegrating vector with the cointegrating 
coefficients presented. For the 2 cointegrating vectors case we follow the methodology of 
Diamandis (2003) by imposing identification restrictions as discussed in section 3.3.2 and 
test the validity of the restrictions. Our investigation limits to the hypothesis testing of the 
restrictions instead of the estimates of the models when 2 cointegration relationships are 
present. The main reason for this is that in the two cointegration equations case, most of 
the tentative estimates of the VEC models tend to report the 2 cointegration vectors as the 
two PPP relationships for the parallel exchange rate and official exchange rate respectively, 
which will be a repetition of our investigation in model 1. Our results will shed light on 
both the validity of the parallel PPP relationship as well as the long run relationship 
between the two exchange rates. 
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Table 4.10: Model 2 VECM Estimation for African Economies (a) 
Countries 
JI = M + MJN + M	 + M ∗ 
Expected sign of coefficients:	M>0, M>0, M > 0, and M<0. 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients 
(standard error in parentheses) 
M M M M 
Algeria p(*)=LCPI(*) -4.104 14.654 -48.989 170.639 
(-3.50408) (-5.5685) (-9.28506) 
*** ** *** 
Nigeria p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.3459 0.7919 -1.3062 5.8918 
(0.1303) (0.1733) (0.4921) 
*** *** *** 
 
 
Table 4.10: Model 2 VECM Estimation for African Economies (b) 
Tests for overidentifying restrictions of Countries with 2 cointegrating vectors 
Restrictions on cointegrating vectors 
 
Restrictions on cointegrating vectors 
 = U1		0		 − 1		1		1	 − 1		0		0		0 V  = U
1		0		 − 1		1		
1	 − 1		0		0		0 V 
Countries  
Likelihood Ratio Test 
statistics (p-value in 
brackets) Countries  
Likelihood Ratio Test 
statistics (p-value in 
brackets) 
Egypt  Kenya  
p(*)=LCPI(*) -4.4031  27.7468 (0.0000)  p(*)=LCPI(*) -4.5961 6.2163(0.1836) 
p(*)=LWPI(*) -1.7523 41.8702 (0.0000)    
Morocco South Africa   
p(*)=LCPI(*) -2.0700 18.1039(0.0012) p(*)=LCPI(*) -1.7311  22.2153(0.0002) 
p(*)=LWPI(*) -2.1145 21.4717 (0.0003)  p(*)=LWPI(*) -1.7888  17.2609(0.0017 )  
   
 
Table 4.10 (a) and (b) demonstrate the VEC model estimation and test results of 
overidentifying restrictions for the African economies. As shown in 4.10 (a), for the 
countries with 1 cointegrating relationship, the cointegrating coefficients are significant 
and correctly signed for Nigeria. Statistically significant coefficients have also been 
obtained for Algeria but the coefficient for the official exchange rate is wrongly signed. 
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As regard to countries for which one cointegrating vector exists, only the restrictions for 
Kenya cannot be rejected. 
The results for Asian Economies are displayed in table 4.11(a) and (b). Amongst the 
countries with 1 cointegrating vector, the estimated coefficients for Korea, Malaysia and 
Turkey are significant and correctly signed. Indonesia, Iran and Kuwait have also 
received significant estimates but wrongly signed. It is worth mentioning that for Korea, 
the significant and meaningful coefficients can only be obtained when the wholesale 
instead of consumer price index is in use. For the countries with 2 
 
Table 4.11: Model 2 VECM Estimation for Asian Economies (a) 
Countries 
JI = M + MJN + M	 + M ∗ 
Expected sign of coefficients:	M>0, M>0, M > 0, and M<0. 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients 
(standard error in parentheses) 
M M M M 
Indonesia p(*)=LCPI(*) 1.9335 -0.4576  -1.1202  -0.9442  
(0.1501) (0.3394) (0.5628) 
*** ** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 4.3158 -7.7193 11.9386 -57.5245 
(0.72694) (1.64484) (2.81342) 
*** *** *** 
Iran p(*)=LCPI(*) -0.9839  2.3598 -6.5484  34.2703 
(0.5035) (1.1689) (3.1607) 
*** *** *** 
Korea p(*)=LCPI(*) 1.2434 0.0316 -0.0815  -1.3910 
(0.1137) (0.2212) (0.4565) 
*** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0.8924 0.7476 -1.0258  2.0415 
(0.1557) (0.2286) (0.3517) 
*** *** *** 
Kuwait p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.9841 -0.1048  0.0362 0.2794 
(0.0804) (0.0270) (0.0138) 
*** *** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 2.3433 -0.3579  0.4292 1.3967 
(0.3003) (0.1059) (0.0971) 
*** *** *** 
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Malaysia p(*)=LCPI(*) 1.5111 1.8488 -0.6542  -4.4838  
(0.2034) (0.3503) (0.1846) 
*** *** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 1.0507 0.1696 -0.2567  0.3599 
(0.0498) (0.1137) (0.1690) 
*** 
Sri Lanka p(*)=LWPI(*) 0.0443 0.6473 0.7814 -1.8541  
(0.4323) (0.3312) (0.7488) 
*** 
Turkey p(*)=LWPI(*) 0.9215 0.0867 -0.6879  3.8094 
(0.1282) (0.1402) (0.5381) 
*** *** *** 
 
 
 
Table 4.11: Model 2 VECM Estimation for Asian Economies (b) 
Tests for overidentifying restrictions of Countries with 2 cointegrating vectors 
Countries Restrictions on cointegrating vectors Countries Restrictions on cointegrating vectors   
 = U1		0		 − 1		1		1	 − 1		0		0		0 V  = U
1		0		 − 1		1		
1	 − 1		0		0		0 V 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
statistics (p-value in 
brackets) 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
statistics (p-value in 
brackets) 
India  Nepal  
p(*)=LCPI(*) -0.3456 15.08193(0.0045) p(*)=LCPI(*) -4.0664 4.1743(0.3829) 
p(*)=LWPI(*) -3.5555 18.8292(0.0008)    
Pakistan   Philippines   
p(*)=LCPI(*) -3.6944 20.4364(0.0004) p(*)=LCPI(*) -3.7203 11.3978(0.0224) 
p(*)=LWPI(*) -3.9841 17.7598(0.0014)    
   Sri Lanka   
Singapore   p(*)=LCPI(*) -1.8541 9.6766(0.0462) 
p(*)=LCPI(*) -0.3332 23.03796(0.0001)    
p(*)=LWPI(*) -0.3274 11.2495(0.0239) Thailand   
Turkey   p(*)=LCPI(*) -0.0925 9.3853(0.0522) 
p(*)=LCPI(*) -18.6372 8.9959(0.0612) p(*)=LWPI(*) -3.467428 17.3058(0.0017) 
 
 
cointegrating vectors , the restrictions hypothesis cannot be rejected for a considerable 
number of countries, namely, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka ,Singapore, Thailand and 
Turkey. 
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Table 4.12 (a) and (b) demonstrate the VEC model estimation and test results of 
overidentifying restrictions for the Latin American economies. As shown in 4.12(a), for the 
countries with 1 cointegrating relationship, the cointegrating coefficients are significant 
and correctly signed for Brazil, Colombia and Dominican Republic. Statistically significant 
coefficients have also been obtained for El Salvador and Honduras but the signs of these 
coefficients are not entirely correct. For the countries with 2 cointegrating vectors, the 
results are a bit discouraging as only the VEC model for Mexico validates the identifying 
restrictions. As regard to Belgium, the overidentifying restrictions are rejected. 
The overall findings for the second model are less positive as opposed to the traditional 
PPP model we estimated (model one). On the other hand, the parallel market version of 
PPP does hold for a number of economies, and the joint hypothesis indicating the long-
run strong-form PPP for parallel exchange rate as well as the informational efficiency in 
the parallel market is validated for Kenya, Nepal, Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Singapore and Turkey. 
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Table 4.12: Model 2 VECM Estimation for Latin American Economies (a) 
Countries 
JI = M + MJN + M	 + M ∗ 
Expected sign of coefficients:	M>0, M>0, M > 0, and M<0. 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients 
(standard error in parentheses) 
M M M M 
Brazil p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.2244 0.7083 -4.7818  10.4227 
(0.1959) (0.1860) (1.5751) 
*** *** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 2.7708 -1.8864  17.8880 -71.4861  
(0.8600) (0.8463) (3.1465) 
*** *** *** 
Colombia p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.8176 0.3336 -0.9064  4.0874 
(0.0938) (0.1190) (0.2448) 
*** *** *** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0.7054 0.4150 -1.0812  5.3217 
(0.1638) (0.1942) (0.3218) 
*** *** *** 
Dominican 
Republic 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.2426 0.6635 -0.4268  1.6397 
(0.1038) (0.1275) (0.1728) 
*** *** *** 
Ecuador p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.4710 0.4128 -0.0642  3.5196 
(0.1190) (0.1395) (0.2116) 
*** *** 
El 
Salvador p(*)=LCPI(*) -1.3829  1.7361 -2.2419  7.8234 
(0.6345) (0.6429) (1.1079) 
*** *** *** 
Honduras p(*)=LCPI(*) -2.7636  11.1988 -14.2379  39.3329 
(0.8077) (0.9723) (3.5139) 
*** *** *** 
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Peru p(*)=LWPI(*) 1.3715 -0.3724  -10.7555  40.4995 
(0.4297) (0.4222) (2.5000) 
*** *** 
Venezuela p(*)=LCPI(*) -0.5307  0.9192 -1.6762  11.9125 
(0.5806) (0.5976) (0.7536) 
*** 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0.8626 -0.1316  -2.6340  11.2900 
(0.9978) (1.0561) (1.3301) 
* 
 
Table 4.12: Model 2  VECM Estimation for Latin American Economies (b) 
Tests for overidentifying restrictions of Countries with 2 cointegrating vectors 
 Restrictions on cointegrating 
vectors 
 Restrictions on 
cointegrating vectors 
 = U1		0		 − 1		1		1	 − 1		0		0		0 V  = U
1		0		 − 1		1		
1	 − 1		0		0		0 V 
Countries 
 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test statistics (p-
value in brackets) 
Countries 
 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test statistics (p-
value in brackets) 
Argentina  Bolivia   
p(*)=LCPI(*) -0.906 38.1627(0.000) p(*)=LCPI(*) -3.582 43.59036(0.000) 
      
Costa Rica   Chile   
p(*)=LCPI(*) -3.8145 51.2477（0.0000） p(*)=LCPI(*) 6.2629 91.2084
（0.0000） 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 6.1528 40.6690（0.0000） p(*)=LWPI(*) 
6.5624 
49.0613
（0.0000） 
   Peru   
Mexico   p(*)=LCPI(*) 0.0443 19.9552(0.0005) 
p(*)=LCPI(*) -2.5920 11.4742（0.0217） Suriname   
p(*)=LWPI(*) 2.7109 15.5033（0.0038） p(*)=LCPI(*) 8.2377 19.3901(0.0007) 
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Table 4.13: Model 2  VECM Estimation for Western Developed Economies 
Tests for overidentifying restrictions of Countries with 2 
cointegrating vectors 
 Restrictions on cointegrating vectors 
 = U1		0		 − 1		1		1	 − 1		0		0		0 V 
Countries 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test statistics 
(p-value in brackets) 
Belgium  
p(*)=LCPI(*) 13.176 15.3744(0.0040) 
   
 
Notes for Table 4.9 to 4.13: 
p(*)=LCPI(*) indicates CPI is used for both domestic and U.S price levels while p(*)=LWPI(*) indicates CPI is 
used for both domestic and U.S price levels 
 
4.6. Discussion of Results and Resultant Policy Implications 
 
The previous econometric investigation reveals some very interesting aspects of the way 
international finance and, particularly, the exchange rates management intertwines with 
countries’ economic performance. The most striking feature extracted from this research is 
the solid existence of a long run relationship between the exchange rates of the countries 
under investigation and the price levels of those economies. In other words, the PPP 
doctrine is evident, either to its weak or its strong form case. Then, depending on the case, 
the importance or not of the parallel markets is emerged. 
Taking into account the baseline taxonomy (into regions), it is easy to infer that the parallel 
market exchange rates are quite important for the less developed economies. For most of 
the countries from the African and the South American continents, as well as from Asia, 
the role of the black market pricing of the local currencies is substantial. On top of that, it 
is important to notice the importance of the wholesale price index in the PPP modelling for 
a number of African economies which share a common characteristic. They are all 
producers and exporters of raw materials and natural resources, such as gas and oil. This 
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holds true for the Gulf countries, as well. This is a major finding, compared to previous 
work done on this area. It indicates that countries open and vulnerable to international 
trade should reconsider the way they formulate their exchange rate policies. Most of these 
economies present the so called “fear of floating”, in the sense that they usually fix their 
currencies value vis-à-vis one of the most important global currencies (in most cases, US 
dollar). In this way, they anticipate to protect the value of their exports and, on the same 
time, to avoid dangerous fluctuations in their international financial positions. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the long-run equilibrium examination underlines the role of 
parallel market rates for these economies indicates that it might be in their favour to 
alterate the following macroeconomic policies. Keeping their currencies undervalued (in 
most cases) compared to US dollar, is not a sustainable policy. It would probably be in 
their interest to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. 
A similar argument holds for the crisis-prone economies. As it is obvious from the results’ 
discussion, the parallel market rate is more useful, in order to provided clear validation of 
the PPP doctrine. This finding can be evidence of the underlined reason that these 
economies are more susceptible to abrupt macroeconomic and financial conditions. Since 
their policies are based on de jure exchange rate system and, also, the fact that they do not 
formulate their policies based on the most appropriate measures (in the examined case 
here, the parallel market rates), these economies turn out to be more vulnerable and 
succumbed to financial and currency crises episodes. Additionally, this econometric 
outcome indicates that these economies should follow less restrictive policies for their 
currencies and adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes. The past crisis episodes dictate 
the inability of fixed regimes to be sustainable in the long run. It is not by accident that 
countries that used to keep their currencies into inflexible exchange rate regimes (for 
instance, the EU countries in the past) soon abandoned such policies (most of them after 
1994). Liberalization of exchange rates seems like a fruitful policy for such type of 
economies. 
Turning now to the case of the developed economies, there is no strong evidence for the 
necessity to use parallel market rates whatsoever. As previously implied, there are a 
number of reasons for this to happen. First of all, the previously mentioned market 
liberalization and integration worked well for these economies. The openness verified the 
ability of these economies to satisfy their funding needs not only from natural sources but 
also from foreign capital inflows. Moreover, the period I examine in this thesis covers the 
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so called “Great Moderation” era. This period is characterized by steady growth path and 
reasonably low inflationary pressures for these economies. On top of these, many central 
banks adopted inflation targeting policies, which are an additional important effect on the 
ability of these monetary authorities to control inflation, growth prospects and managing 
(up to a certain extent) the value of their currencies. Thus, these active macro-financial 
policies, which do not include strong interventions into the foreign exchange market, 
contributed to the gradual elimination of the parallel exchange rate markets. At least, they 
rendered them obsolete. This is another strong argument in favour of capital mobility 
liberalization, together with the necessity to adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes. Of 
course, it is reasonable to assume that, based on the special features of each economy, a 
somehow different exchange rate system may be appropriate. In any case, the evidence is 
strongly in favour of macroeconomic policies, like those mentioned above. It is not by 
chance that this is the tendency observed in the last 2 decades in the economies around the 
world. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The thesis conducts an empirical analysis of the parallel market exchange rate behavior in 
the post Bretton-Woods era based on monthly data spanning the period January 1973 to 
December 1998 for a heterogeneous group of 56 countries across the globe. The main 
objective of the study is to examine the validity of long-run PPP across the countries under 
examination and to identify whether the market-determined parallel rates are more 
supportive of the long run PPP as opposed to the official rate. I also investigated the nexus 
between the two rates based on a parallel market version of PPP, by means of standard 
cointegration techniques. The variables of interest, as suggested by standard PPP 
formulations, include the official and parallel nominal exchange rates, the price indices of 
domestic countries and those of the United States as U.S dollar is used as the numeraire 
currency. For the price indices we employ both Consumer Price index (CPI) and Wholesale 
Price index (WPI).Besides, a binary probit model is estimated as a preliminary  
 
The empirical analysis is carried out in the following way: 
As a preliminary investigation, we follow Reinhart& Rogoff (2004) and regress a currency 
crash dummy on the 12-month parallel market premium for 37 countries across the globe 
during the period 1973 M01 to 1998 M12 based on Monthly data. We first examined the 
time series properties of the parallel market premium we constructed and preclude the 
countries with non-stationary premia for further analysis. What follows is the regression 
estimated using the Binary Probit model as the dependant variable is a binary one. Our 
findings are consistent with Reinhart& Rogoff (2004), who report 97 percent cases of 
positive coefficient and 81 percent both positive and significant, especially in the case of 
Latin American economies. On the other hand, the weakest results come from the 
developed world, while the results for the African and Asian region are, in general, 
consistent. The overall findings validate the hypothesis that the parallel market premium is 
indicative of the currency crashes hence might systematically predict official rate 
realignment in the long run. 
 
The main empirical analysis is concentrated on testing the long-run validity of PPP based 
on Johansen cointegration analysis. The monthly data is used for the nominal and official 
exchange rates, the domestic price indices (both wholesale and consumer price indices) 
during the sample period mentioned above. Two alternative models are investigated: the 
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traditional weak-form and strong form PPP framework as well as a version of PPP model 
proposed by Diamandis(2003) accountable for the presence of both official and parallel 
exchange rate markets. The econometric methodology is consistent for the examination 
using both models, i.e., the Johansen cointegration approach. 
 
The results from the traditional PPP model (denoted as model 1 alternatively) are rather 
positive as regard to the acceptance of weak-form PPP. Above all, the existence of at least 
one cointegrating vector is found for almost all the estimated VAR models with only few 
exceptions. These findings are encouraging for our further analysis as for most countries; 
the evidences of long run relationship within the variable set are supported, which enables 
us to test the PPP framework as established in the former chapter. In general, similar 
findings are obtained by using either exchange rate in terms of the determination to the 
cointegration rank. Differing results have been reported more frequently only in the Asian 
group when the magnitude of price and exchange rate vary in the sense that the results 
display a relatively clearer pattern comparing to the other groups that the parallel market 
rate and wholesale price index are more favorable in validating the weak-form PPP. The 
most positive results are reported for the Latin American economies. When it comes to the 
validity of weak-form PPP, a majority of countries in the group have received positive 
results in favour of the weak-form PPP validity, the strong-form PPP is also supported for a 
few countries. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have received positive result when the parallel 
market rate is under examination. As for Suriname and Venezuela, strong-form PPP is 
confirmed by using both exchange rates. In the Latin American group, the parallel market 
exchange rate seems to be favoring the strong-form PPP hypothesis more than the official 
exchange rate. The overall findings for the second model are less positive as opposed to the 
traditional PPP model we estimated (model one) but the parallel market version of PPP 
does hold for a few economies, and the joint of hypothesis indicating the long-run strong-
form PPP for parallel exchange rate as well as the informational efficiency in the parallel 
market is validated for Kenya, Nepal, Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Singapore 
and Turkey. 
 
To sum up, it is obvious that the weak-form PPP models receives stronger support than the 
alternative model especially for the Latin American economies .Relatively speaking, the 
alternative model fit better for the Asian group where 7 out of 14 countries have been 
reported to support the second model. The strong-form PPP is best received for African 
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economies but mostly for the parallel exchange rate solely. Also, long-run cointegrating 
relationships amongst the nominal exchange rate, the domestic price as well as the foreign 
price have been strongly supported regardless of the choice between official and parallel 
exchange rate. Although evidence has demonstrated itself that, the use of parallel exchange 
rate can improve the validity of meaningful and significant cointegrating relationships 
implied by PPP, this is true for both variants of models. Similar comparative findings have 
been obtained for the wholesale price index as opposed to the consumer price index. This 
is true for all 3 groups of economies. Our empirical analysis is consistent with the panel 
unit root based test of PPP carried out by Cerrato and Sanrantis (2007) as regard to the 
positive results regarding weak-form PPP .The purpose to identify if the parallel market 
exchange rates is more favorable in validating  PPP is positively, although not definitely, 
confirmed. 
In any case, a number of policy prescriptions can be underlined, based on the previous 
econometric analysis. First of all, it is evident the superiority of floating exchange rate 
regimes, compared to restrictive policies adopted from many crisis-prone economies. This 
is reasonable to assume, given that parallel market rate provides somehow improved 
results for the PPP validity. Then, the fact that countries rich in resources tend to fix their 
currencies value instead of letting them float, does not seem to be the wisest economic 
policy choice. Countries that desisted such restrictive policies, experienced steady growth 
rates and stable conditions for their currencies value. The lack of data until the recent 
period is an obstacle, in order to examine the PPP model validity in periods of fully fledged, 
financial meltdowns. This would be an interesting extension in the relevant economic 
literature. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figures A.1: Developed Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 1 
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Figures A.2: Developed Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 2 
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Figures A.3: Developed Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 3 
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Figures A.4: Asian Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 1 
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Figures A.5: Asian Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 2 
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Figures A.6: Asian Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 3 
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Figures A.7: Latin American Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 1 
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Figures A.8: Latin American Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 2 
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Figures A.9: Latin American Economies Official and Parallel Ex. Rates - 3 
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Table A.1: Unit Root Test for 12-m Parallel Market Premium  
－Western Developed Economies 
Countries 
leads/lags ADF-statistics MacKinnon(1996)\p-values 
Const. 
Con/Tren
d 
Constant Constant, Trend Const. Con/Trend 
BELGIUM 12 12 -2.571880* -3.989048 0.0916 0.2988 
CANADA 12 12 -2.870996** -3.135554* 0.0197 0.0849 
DENMARK 12 12 -2.571880* -3.135554 0.0955 0.2832 
FINLAND 12 12 -2.872765 -3.137183 0.1176 0.3340 
FRANCE 12 12 -2.571880 -3.135554 0.1761 0.4297 
GREMANY 12 12 -2.571880* -3.135554 0.0586 0.1935 
GREECE 12 1 -2.870996** -3.424387** 0.0358 0.0385 
IRELAND 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.424926** 0.0035 0.0135 
ITALY 12 4 -2.870996** -3.424530** 0.0411 0.0132 
NETHERLAND 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.424926** 0.0025 0.0142 
NEW ZEALAND 12 12 -2.571880* -3.135554 0.0552 0.1865 
NORWAY 4 8 -3.451491*** -3.988635*** 0.0009 0.0005 
PORTUGAL 12 6 -3.451491*** -3.988433*** 0.0057 0.0003 
SPAIN 12 12 -3.451632*** -3.135321* 0.0080 0.0563 
SWEDEN 13 4 -2.871029** -3.424530** 0.0492 0.0224 
SWITZERLAND 12 4 -2.870996** -3.988233*** 0.0419 0.0066 
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Table A.2: Unit Root Test for 12-m Parallel Market Premium – Latin America 
Countries 
leads/lags ADF-statistics MacKinnon(1996)\p-values 
Const. 
Con/Tren
d 
Constant Constant, Trend Const. Con/Trend 
ARGENTINA 10 12 -3.451920*** -3.424926** 0.0035 0.0339 
BOLIVIA 10 10 -2.870931** -3.135494* 0.0148 0.0647 
BRAZIL 14 14 -2.871061** -3.135614* 0.0407 0.0877 
CHILE 12 12 -2.571880* -3.135554* 0.0886 0.0853 
COLOMBIA 12 12 -2.571880 -3.135554 0.2898 0.6138 
COSTA RICA 12 12 -2.870996** -3.424926** 0.0018 0.0104 
DOMINICAN REP. 12 12 -2.571880* -3.135554 0.0814 0.2665 
ECUADOR 12 12 -2.571880* -3.135554 0.0755 0.1779 
EL SALVADO 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048 0.0005 0.0028 
MEXICO 4 6 -3.451491*** -3.988433*** 0.0038 0.0063 
PARAGUAY 12 7 -2.571880* -3.988534*** 0.0757 0.0041 
PERU 1 1 -3.451283*** -3.987938*** 0.0002 0.0011 
SURINAME 12 13 -3.454353** -3.136480* 0.0366 0.0725 
URAGUAY 4 7 -3.451491*** -3.424676** 0.0072 0.0144 
VENEZUELA 12 12 -2.870996** -3.135554* 0.0288 0.0771 
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Table A.3: Unit Root Test for 12-m Parallel Market Premium – Asian Econ. 
Countries 
leads/lags ADF-statistics MacKinnon(1996)\p-values 
Const. 
Con/Tren
d 
Constant Constant, Trend Const. Con/Trend 
INDIA 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048*** 0.0020 0.0053 
INDONESIA 4 6 -3.451491*** -3.988433*** 0.0026 0.0000 
IRAN 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.424926** 0.0093 0.0469 
IRAQ 4 4 -3.451491*** -3.988233*** 0.0020 0.0053 
ISRAEL 12 6 -2.571880* -3.424627** 0.0802 0.0106 
JAPAN 4 6 -3.451491*** -3.988433*** 0.0012 0.0038 
KOREA 4 6 -3.452066*** -3.989472*** 0.0000 0.0051 
KUWAIT 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048*** 0.0002 0.0017 
MALASIA 4 8 -3.451491*** -3.988635*** 0.0005 0.0000 
NEPAL 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048*** 0.0000 0.0003 
PAKISTAN 4 6 -3.451491*** -3.424627** 0.0075 0.0107 
PHILIPPINES 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.424926** 0.0047 0.0253 
SINGAPORE 8 6 -3.452991*** -3.425451** 0.0024 0.0305 
SRI LANKA 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048*** 0.0019 0.0093 
THAILAND 4 8 -3.451491*** -3.988635*** 0.0005 0.0000 
TURKEY 6 4 -3.451632*** -3.424530** 0.0062 0.0132 
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Table A.4: Unit Root Test for 12-m Parallel Market Premium– African Econ. 
Countries 
leads/lags ADF-statistics MacKinnon(1996)\p-values 
Const. Con/Trend Constant Constant, Trend Const. Con/Trend 
ALGERIA 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.424926** 0.0069 0.0339 
BENIN 12 12 -2.571880* -3.989048 0.0507 0.1618 
EGYPT 12 12 -2.870996** -3.135554* 0.0130 0.0829 
GHANA 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048*** 0.0004 0.0007 
KENYA 12 12 -2.870996** -3.135554* 0.0177 0.0737 
MOROCCO 12 6 -2.870996** -3.424627** 0.0400 0.0358 
NIGERIA 4 6 -3.451491*** -3.988433*** 0.0039 0.0019 
SOUTH AFRICA 12 12 -3.452066*** -3.989048*** 0.0014 0.0069 
UGANDA 4 13 -2.870743** -3.135584 0.0400 0.3534 
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Table A.5: Probit Model for Western Developed Economies 
 Equation: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
α β 
Country Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Greece -5.932297(2.596527) -2.284705**(0.0223) 0.097097(0.052220) 1.859374* (0.0630) 
New Zealand -3.224428(0.685896) -4.701043***(0.0000) 0.032261(0.023201) 1.390497 (0.1644) 
Portugal -3.061142(0.572213) -5.349656***(0.0000) 0.018356(0.017234) 1.065065 (0.2868) 
Spain -3.153737(0.664208) -4.748120***(0.0000) 0.031019(0.026540) 1.168795 (0.2425) 
 
Table A.6: Probit Model for Asian Economies 
 Equation: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
α β 
Country Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
India -2.847259(0.396872) -7.174242***(0.0000) 0.026661(0.015255) 1.747666* (0.0805) 
Indonesia -2.311749(0.205369) -11.25658***(0.0000) 0.007413(0.001568) 4.726803***(0.0000) 
Iran -2.410733(0.265067) -9.094807***(0.0000) -0.005619(0.009479) -0.592781 (0.5533) 
Israel -0.012200(0.010110) -1.206722  (0.2285) 0.000726(7.94E-05) 9.146644***(0.0000) 
Korea -2.922725(0.442621) -6.603221***(0.0000) 0.017143(0.015684) 1.093043 (0.2744) 
Malaysia -4.777911(3.303545) -1.446298 (0.1481) 0.054666(0.047966) 1.139691 (0.2544) 
Nepal -2.705612(0.341204) -7.929607***(0.0000) -0.011262(0.020497) -0.549455 (0.5827) 
Philippines -4.141246(1.329569) -3.114728***(0.0018) 0.033285(0.014164) 2.349985**
 (0.0188) 
Sri Lanka -2.834092(0.431417) -6.569267***(0.0000) 0.022237(0.015057) 1.476851 (0.1397) 
Thailand -2.756704(0.331449) -8.317123***(0.0000) 0.031904(0.008191) 3.895061***(0.0001) 
Turkey -2.785495(0.322680) -8.632368***(0.0000) 0.011277(0.003338) 3.378158***(0.0007) 
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Table A.7: Probit Model for Latin American Economies 
 Equation: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
α β 
Country Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Argentina -1.144925(0.095111) -12.03776***(0.0000) 0.000229(6.53E-05) 3.500405***(0.0005) 
Bolivia -1.776622(0.134094) 0.000243***(4.88E-05) 0.000243(4.88E-05) 4.987134***(0.0000) 
Brazil -1.420162(0.117796) -12.05610***(0.0000) 0.001298(0.000146) 8.897778***(0.0000) 
Chile -1.948561(0.156679) -12.43667***(0.0000) 0.002659(0.000654) 4.065303***(0.0000) 
Costa Rica -2.507664(0.251540) -9.969235***(0.0000) 0.008340(0.002489) 3.351188***(0.0008) 
Dominican 
Republic 
-3.075569(0.487479) -6.309131***(0.0000) 0.018806(0.006576) 2.859924***(0.0042) 
Ecuador -2.414266(0.240870) -10.02312***(0.0000) 0.009349(0.003035) 3.080661***(0.0021) 
El Salvador -2.684052(0.309769) -8.664690***(0.0000) 0.010199(0.003428) 2.975097***(0.0029) 
Mexico -2.301352(0.208656) -11.02939***(0.0000) 0.005816(0.001381) 4.210988***(0.0000) 
Paraguay -2.200739(0.209061) -10.52679***(0.0000) 0.003300(0.005586) 0.590801 (0.5547) 
Peru -1.543147(0.116475) -13.24875***(0.0000) 0.000462(8.74E-05) 5.291132***(0.0000) 
Suriname -2.591251(0.282861) -9.160856***(0.0000) 0.002984(0.000936) 3.188881***(0.0014) 
Uruguay -3.383675(0.610157) -5.545579***(0.0000) 0.011581(0.005271) 2.197048***(0.0280) 
Venezuela -2.303581(0.215251) -10.70185***(0.0000) 0.007219(0.002139) 3.374945***(0.0007) 
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Table A.8: Probit Model for African Economies 
 Equation: XYZ = [ + `∆\]^ + _] 
α β 
Country Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Coefficient 
(stand errors in brackets) 
Z-statistics 
(p-values in brackets) 
Algeria -2.134825 (0.194401) -10.98157***(0.0000) -0.000618(0.005665) -0.109081 (0.9131) 
Benin -0.000229(0.003182) -0.072092   (0.9426) 0.000613(0.000129) 4.758931***(0.0000) 
Egypt -2.391247(0.263211) -9.084891***(0.0000) 0.016178(0.014193) 1.139827 (0.2544) 
Ghana -1.771678(0.190483) -9.300975***(0.0000) -0.017913(0.007983) -2.243970**
 (0.0248) 
Kenya -2.539757(0.260620) -9.745040***(0.0000) 0.012228(0.003388) 3.609001***(0.0003) 
Nigeria -2.659580(0.326447) -8.147058***(0.0000) 0.006632(0.003521) 1.883318***(0.0597) 
South Africa -2.919981(0.417376) -6.996047***(0.0000) 0.024658(0.009540) 2.584790***(0.0097) 
Uganda -1.936192(0.166528) -11.62680***(0.0000) 0.001458(0.000944) 1.543995 (0.1226) 
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Table A.9: Additional Unit Root Testing for Western Developed Economies 
Unit roots 
and 
stationarity 
tests 
Series 
leads/lag
s 
ADF-statistics 
MacKinnon 
(1996)one-sided 
p-values 
leads/lag
s 
DF-GLS statistics 
Country 
 
C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T 
Belgium LBMER 8 8 -2.03683 -2.568915 0.271 0.2949 8 8 -1.330009 -2.564391 
1980M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 7 7 -6.615949*** -6.610827*** 0 0 7 12 -6.523850*** -4.156095*** 
LOER 1 1 -1.69196 -2.212355 0.4348 0.4811 1 1 -0.947426 -2.202561 
 
∆LOER 2 1 -10.40788*** -10.39735*** 0 0 2 2 -10.39079*** -10.39079*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 -1.103148 -2.012612 0.716 0.5925 12 12 -0.03592 -1.93621 
 
∆LCPI 12 12 -2.168949 -2.19389 0.2181 0.4914 12 12 -2.043711** -2.084904 
 
PMP 4 5 -4.565738*** -3.782838** 0.0002 0.0182 4 4 -4.601466*** -4.603417*** 
 
∆PMP 4 4 -15.81771*** -15.83859*** 0 0 4 4 -15.40184*** -15.86088*** 
Portugal LBMER 1 1 0.076717 -1.742366 0.9637 0.7309 1 1 1.420299 -1.014441 
1973M01-
1998 M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -9.563883*** -9.607817*** 0 0 5 5 -9.134175*** -9.157446*** 
LOER 1 1 0.161062 -1.569014 0.9699 0.8039 1 1 1.672876 -0.835247 
 
∆DLOER 2 2 -10.25427*** -10.28361*** 0 0 2 2 -9.998089*** -10.28354*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 -0.529801 -1.803595 0.8824 0.7018 12 12 0.479154 -1.30288 
 
∆DLCPI 11 11 -2.547349 -2.440261 0.105 0.3582 11 11 -2.535997** -2.55714 
 
PMP 2 2 -6.388699*** -6.432064*** 0 0 2 2 -5.955750*** -6.411783*** 
Spain LBMER 3 3 -0.856592 -1.993095 0.8014 0.6032 3 3 0.58844 -1.968855 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -11.40270*** -11.39123*** 0 0 9 7 -2.532964** -4.476782*** 
LOER 3 3 -1.391471 -2.180173 0.5873 0.4991 3 3 0.599785 -1.950619 
 
∆DLOER 1 1 -14.06460*** -14.06758*** 0 0 2 2 -10.53514*** -10.58067*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 -0.719631 -1.759835 0.8393 0.7228 12 12 0.497124 -1.69973 
 
∆DLCPI 11 11 -2.231723 -2.270096 0.1954 0.4491 11 11 -2.256770** -2.269087 
United 
LWPI 12 12 -1.09023 -1.731799 0.7211 0.7358 12 12 0.100859 -1.708564 
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States ∆lWPI 12 11 -2.700807* -4.631508*** 0.0746 0 11 11 -2.312369** -4.412244*** 
 
LCPI 5 5 -0.126322 -1.668116 0.9445 0.764 9 5 0.50336 -1.014718 
 
∆DLCPI 4 4 -4.061250*** -4.053350*** 0.0012 0.0078 4 4 -3.964117*** -3.988491*** 
 
Notes: LCPI and LWPI denote the log consumer price index and log wholesale price index respectively. 
LBMER and LOER represent the log parallel (black) market exchange rate and the log official exchange rate. 
The observation period for each country is recorded under the country name based on a commonly 
availability of all the variables under examination.. 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
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Table A.10: Additional Unit Root Testing for Asian Economies 
Unit roots 
and 
stationarity 
tests 
Series 
leads/lag
s 
ADF-statistics 
MacKinnon 
(1996)one-sided 
p-values 
leads/lag
s 
DF-GLS statistics 
Country 
 
C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T 
India LBMER 6 6 0.47524 -1.063042 0.9858 0.9327 6 6 2.484428 -1.258063 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -9.494179*** -9.553146*** 0 0 11 11 -2.597856*** -3.858771*** 
LOER 1 1 1.127677 -1.432212 0.9977 0.8506 1 1 2.996452 -0.858466 
 
∆DLOER 2 2 -11.06737*** -11.22246*** 0 0 2 2 -10.63228*** -11.23786*** 
 
LCPI 10 10 1.006922 -3.281987* 0.9967 0.0704 10 10 2.943013 -1.644024 
 
∆DLCPI 9 9 -4.863400*** -5.040654*** 0 0 11 9 -2.259069** -3.973230*** 
 
LWPI 1 1 0.303085 -3.469116** 0.9783 0.0439 1 1 5.081469 -1.794362 
 
∆lWPI 11 11 -4.344568*** -4.317143*** 0.0004 0.0032 11 10 -1.867361* -3.368531** 
 
PMP 1 1 -3.260857** -4.468086*** 0.0173 0.0018 1 1 -2.745033*** -2.883236* 
Indonesia LBMER 5 5 -2.569351 -2.009973 0.1001 0.5939 6 5 1.60133 -0.656517 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 4 4 -7.429453*** -7.643982*** 0 0 12 12 -3.570962*** -3.295310** 
LOER 6 6 -2.032463 -1.335096 0.2729 0.8779 6 6 1.360806 -0.681629 
 
∆DLOER 12 12 -4.099116*** -4.216850*** 0.0011 0.0045 12 12 -3.811251*** -3.933724*** 
 
LCPI 1 1 -0.576762 -1.407599 0.8724 0.8575 1 1 6.33703 -0.871938 
 
∆DLCPI 5 5 -5.733441*** -5.710711*** 0 0 5 5 -0.747901 -1.755554 
 
LWPI 1 1 -1.065861 -1.878621 0.73 0.6634 3 1 2.636164 -1.089912 
 
∆lWPI 4 4 -5.486705*** -5.505087*** 0 0 2 2 -7.560889*** -7.571219*** 
 
PMP 2 2 -4.301476*** -4.738906*** 0.0005 0.0007 2 2 -4.267568*** -4.336533*** 
Iran LBMER 4 4 0.759812 -1.694783 0.9933 0.7524 4 4 1.879462 -0.741752 
1973M01-
1986M12 
∆LBMER 3 3 -9.170086*** -9.342329*** 0 0 3 3 -8.651057*** -9.335128*** 
LOER 3 3 -0.595662 -1.575095 0.8686 0.8016 3 3 -0.306418 -1.426776 
 
∆DLOER 2 2 -10.62076*** -10.68945*** 0 0 2 2 -10.59038*** -10.68919*** 
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LCPI 12 12 1.812006 -0.84075 0.9998 0.96 12 12 2.078456 -0.408898 
 
∆DLCPI 11 11 -2.231597 -3.279608* 0.1954 0.071 11 11 -1.695405* -1.923211 
 
LWPI 12 12 1.372095 -0.996608 0.999 0.9421 12 12 1.405494 -0.474442 
 
∆lWPI 11 11 -2.699281* -3.371828* 0.0749 0.0565 11 11 -1.435366 -3.176099*** 
 
PMP 6 6 -2.556067 -2.81741 0.103 0.1916 6 6 -2.296902** -2.803659** 
 
∆PMP 5 5 -7.994337*** -7.990983*** 0 0 5 5 -8.002051*** -8.002898*** 
            
Iraq LBMER 6 6 1.831422 -1.104126 0.9998 0.9257 6 6 2.879961 0.20937 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -7.943649*** -8.562271*** 0 0 6 
 
-7.824391*** -8.323660*** 
LOER 1 1 -1.294174 -1.106429 0.6337 0.9258 1 1 -0.119273 -1.174502 
 
∆DLOER 12 12 -4.918490*** -4.961689*** 0 0.0003 12 12 -4.866397*** -4.885505*** 
 
LCPI 4 4 2.064899 -0.926873 0.9999 0.9475 4 4 1.468966 -0.620949 
 
∆DLCPI 3 3 -3.128124** -4.420887*** 0.0283 0.0035 3 3 -2.724743*** -4.147947*** 
 
LWPI 1 1 0.379477 -1.488886 0.9816 0.8301 1 1 1.671511 -1.375975 
 
∆lWPI 1 1 -8.882929*** -8.999408*** 0 0 6 6 -4.081450*** -5.480405*** 
 
PMP 9 9 0.25797 -0.973916 0.9758 0.9448 9 9 0.619787 -0.879158 
 
∆PMP 8 8 -9.802943*** -9.956795*** 0 0 8 8 -9.734661*** -9.950770*** 
Japan LBMER 12 12 -1.168259 -3.043918 0.6894 0.1214 12 12 -0.141135 -2.433869 
1973M01-
1986M12 
∆LBMER 12 12 -4.98855*** -4.973593*** 0 0 11 11 -3.261251*** -2.676028* 
LOER 1 1 -0.416372 -2.638069 0.9036 0.2635 1 1 0.674678 -1.780964 
 
∆DLOER 2 2 -10.87991*** -10.88624*** 0 0 2 2 -10.81015*** -10.78162*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 -1.980713 -0.972558 0.2955 0.9453 12 12 0.286801 -1.385387 
 
∆DLCPI 11 11 -2.482146 -2.977935 0.1205 0.1395 11 11 -1.146795 -1.548695 
 
LWPI 4 1 -1.507738 -0.168165 0.529 0.9936 4 4 0.248986 -1.038949 
 
∆lWPI 3 3 -5.240020*** -5.396016*** 0 0 3 3 -5.067174*** -5.125253*** 
 
PMP 6 6 -2.127155 -3.546710** 0.2341 0.0356 6 6 0.336346 -2.579411* 
 
∆PMP 5 5 -15.25965*** -15.24210*** 0 0 11 3 -1.931434* -15.55776*** 
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Korea LBMER 1 1 -2.007063 -2.475782 0.2839 0.3401 1 1 1.211905 -1.49533 
1973M01-
1998m12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -8.088644*** -8.153640*** 0 0 2 9 -7.597271*** -2.615248* 
LOER 1 1 -2.18091 -2.227216 0.2137 0.4729 1 1 1.323609 -1.09557 
 
∆DLOER 6 6 -8.766273*** -8.934180*** 0 0 6 6 -8.202438*** -7.898211*** 
 
LCPI 1 1 -3.296936** -0.69347 0.0158 0.9721 1 1 3.277141 0.072134 
 
∆DLCPI 12 12 -2.553535 -3.125824 0.1039 0.102 5 12 -2.870944*** -3.040371** 
 
LWPI 1 1 -1.803153 0.025496 0.379 0.9965 1 1 3.456146 -0.297154 
 
∆lWPI 11 11 -3.673192*** -4.050379*** 0.0048 0.0079 11 11 -2.673027*** -2.987020** 
 
PMP 9 9 -2.282428 -2.487493 0.1781 0.3343 9 9 -0.370601 -1.950845 
 
∆PMP 8 8 -9.173471*** -9.189575*** 0 0 11 9 -2.269640** -4.769046*** 
Kuwait LBMER 1 1 -4.618914*** -4.565419*** 0.0001 0.0014 1 1 -0.191826 -1.966119 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -9.246427*** -9.491612*** 0 0 6 6 -9.188103*** -9.042155*** 
LOER 2 2 -1.28654 -1.187627 0.6372 0.9111 1 1 -0.300623 -1.492434 
 
∆DLOER 1 1 -14.61550*** -14.62221*** 0 0 1 1 -14.57618*** -14.38321*** 
 
LCPI 6 6 -1.782203 -3.251539* 0.389 0.0767 6 6 0.805449 -1.89088 
 
∆DLCPI 6 6 -6.425349*** -6.460810*** 0 0 2 6 -7.769768*** -5.672824*** 
 
LWPI 12 12 -1.361379 -2.148929 0.6004 0.5148 12 12 2.352998 -0.454409 
 
∆lWPI 11 11 -4.014554*** -3.973457** 0.0017 0.0111 12 12 -1.928780* -3.247224** 
 
PMP 6 6 -3.879985*** -3.879985*** 0.0025 0.0025 6 6 -3.334108*** -3.048021** 
Nepal LBMER 1 1 -0.058288 -3.022196 0.9515 0.1277 1 1 0.477407 -1.288962 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 4 4 -8.285628*** -8.376377*** 0 0 3 3 -6.557761*** -7.461421*** 
LOER 1 1 1.627182 -1.039127 0.9996 0.9363 1 1 4.104111 -0.495652 
 
∆DLOER 6 6 -8.341679*** -8.611447*** 0 0 6 6 -7.362422*** -8.560380*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 0.766161 -2.786013 0.9934 0.2033 12 12 2.757297 -1.843632 
 
∆DLCPI 11 11 -4.705024*** -4.817083*** 0.0001 0.0005 11 11 -2.412593** -3.534448*** 
 
PMP 1 1 -4.371107*** -4.344578*** 0.0004 0.003 2 2 -1.263946 -2.347814 
Malaysia LBMER 6 6 -0.052183 1.668744 0.9523 1 2 6 -0.563278 0.084776 
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1986M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -6.418793*** -6.791397*** 0 0 12 12 0.210122 -1.781821 
LOER 1 1 -1.214736 -0.598019 0.6695 0.9784 1 1 -1.189473 -1.018194 
 
∆DLOER 6 6 -7.154934*** -7.300795*** 0 0 6 6 -7.153886*** -7.242013*** 
 
LCPI 1 1 1.820068 -2.813497 0.9998 0.193 1 1 5.684977 -0.435068 
 
∆DLCPI 11 5 -3.506246*** -6.040993*** 0.0082 0 11 11 -2.665823*** -3.563082*** 
 
LWPI 1 1 -0.319312 -3.158759* 0.9181 0.0968 1 1 1.316857 -2.651677 
 
∆lWPI 6 6 -5.464553*** -5.405870*** 0 0.0001 1 1 -4.044230*** -5.713561*** 
 
PMP 6 6 -3.444837** -3.152877* 0.0108 0.0979 4 3 -0.738346 -5.270921*** 
Pakistan LBMER 3 3 1.546856 -1.411283 0.9994 0.8568 3 3 3.347421 -1.266175 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -16.78763*** -16.94909*** 0 0 11 11 -0.666785 -1.54936 
LOER 3 3 0.500799 -2.740499 0.9867 0.2207 3 3 1.970408 -1.451185 
 
∆DLOER 2 2 -10.82944*** -10.90895*** 0 0 2 2 -10.30242*** -10.89445*** 
 
LCPI 1 1 1.998337 -2.307228 0.9999 0.4287 2 1 6.046064 -0.428072 
 
∆DLCPI 11 11 -3.910995*** -4.142219*** 0.0021 0.0058 11 11 -1.329559 -2.869524* 
 
LWPI 1 12 1.059676 -2.831639 0.9972 0.1867 12 12 1.791017 -1.56026 
 
∆lWPI 12 12 -4.501271** -4.526341*** 0.0002 0.0015 11 11 -1.074698 -2.3609 
 
PMP 1 1 -2.669182* -3.658300** 0.0802 0.0261 1 1 -2.674070*** -2.935674** 
Philippines LBMER 9 9 0.298229 -2.424636 0.9781 0.3662 9 9 2.153113 -1.60623 
1973M01-
1998mM12 
∆LBMER 8 8 -7.687490*** -7.738721*** 0 0 12 12 -1.990451** -3.622401*** 
LOER 1 1 -0.459976 -2.717435 0.8958 0.2299 3 3 1.985994 -2.780528* 
 
∆DLOER 2 2 -10.69295*** -10.68046*** 0 0 2 2 -10.27882*** -10.47772*** 
 
LCPI 5 5 0.566387 -2.540442 0.9887 0.3084 5 5 2.960992 -1.003785 
 
∆DLCPI 4 4 -6.143414*** -6.210053*** 0 0 5 5 -1.795371* -3.417363** 
 
PMP 1 1 -3.784710*** -4.183567*** 0.0033 
20.005
1 
2 2 -1.071641 -2.779773* 
Singapore LBMER 1 1 -1.261381 -1.529089 0.6482 0.8177 1 1 0.135412 -1.733381 
1974M01-
∆LBMER 7 7 -6.616198*** -6.640450*** 0 0 12 12 -2.216268** -2.403749 
116 
 
1998M12 LOER 1 1 -0.49027 -2.587906 0.8902 0.2861 1 1 0.812449 -1.751167 
 
∆DLOER 1 1 -14.56162*** -14.55229*** 0 0 1 1 -14.40406*** -14.41966*** 
 
LCPI 6 6 -1.017674 -1.796424 0.7482 0.7051 6 6 1.126379 -1.883298 
 
∆DLCPI 5 5 -4.873425*** -4.901517*** 0 0 5 5 -4.336760*** -4.618663*** 
 
LWPI 3 3 -1.717785 -1.70181 0.4212 0.7483 3 3 -0.826266 -0.887992 
 
∆lWPI 8 8 -4.482537*** -4.770760*** 0.0003 0.0006 8 2 -2.284132** -7.350839*** 
 
PMP 8 7 -2.925415** -2.363064 0.0436 0.3982 7 7 -1.859392* -2.713667* 
Sri-Lanka LBMER 3 3 -0.529661 -2.992651 0.8824 0.1353 3 3 1.678986 -2.962288** 
1976M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -12.97092*** -12.95883*** 0 0 8 2 -9.270091*** -12.56348*** 
LOER 2 2 0.568109 -2.547899 0.9888 0.3048 2 2 2.53712 -1.104057 
 
∆DLOER 1 1 -12.88968*** -12.95477*** 0 0 1 1 -12.49071*** -12.96739*** 
 
LCPI 6 6 1.024156 -4.255281*** 0.9969 0.004 6 6 1.144392 -0.421925 
 
∆DLCPI 6 6 -7.711737*** -8.217724*** 0 0 6 6 -7.562099*** -8.096793*** 
 
LWPI 1 1 -1.684683 -2.616317 0.4379 0.2734 1 1 2.938218 -1.418606 
 
∆lWPI 6 6 -6.167377*** -6.288534*** 0 0 6 6 -6.177653*** -6.243806*** 
 
PMP 1 1 -1.83745 -2.855916 0.3622 0.1781 1 1 -1.752731* -1.823155 
 
∆PMP 6 6 -8.678710*** -8.701242*** 0 0 6 6 -8.383589*** -8.541931*** 
Thailand LBMER 8 1 1.422887 -1.711953 0.9991 0.7448 1 1 0.338022 -1.465164 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -9.049510*** -9.254357*** 0 0 6 6 -8.730310*** -7.893059*** 
LOER 1 1 -0.864265 -2.429571 0.7991 0.3637 1 1 -0.279863 -2.206124 
 
∆DLOER 11 11 -6.726151*** -6.846117*** 0 0 11 11 -6.645699*** -6.788033*** 
 
LCPI 3 3 -0.638747 -1.154692 0.8588 0.9171 5 3 2.117069 -1.217841 
 
∆DLCPI 2 2 -7.392440*** -7.393327*** 0 0 2 2 -7.059191*** -7.207585*** 
 
LWPI 1 1 0.04358 -1.755156 0.961 0.725 1 1 3.202608 -1.16411 
 
∆lWPI 10 10 -4.720838*** -4.696685*** 0.0001 0.0008 10 3 -1.994854** -7.470493** 
 
PMP 11 11 -3.667958*** -3.921785** 0.0049 0.0119 10 11 -1.393025 -3.311545** 
Turkey LBMER 2 6 6.13787 0.512473 1 0.9993 2 12 8.180504 0.157104 
117 
 
1986M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 11 5 -3.711521*** -10.69380*** 0.0042 0 11 11 -2.407721*** -2.764449* 
LOER 1 1 3.862485 0.37324 1 0.9989 1 1 6.702515 0.675459 
 
∆DLOER 1 1 -13.16274*** -14.10995*** 0 0 7 1 -4.662541*** -14.13363*** 
 
LCPI 1 1 6.405835 -1.468449 1 0.8387 6 6 3.129884 0.006843 
 
∆DLCPI 5 12 -4.023591*** -3.753840** 0.0015 0.0202 12 12 -1.299785 -3.681612*** 
 
LWPI 1 1 1.591568 -2.586901 0.9995 0.287 3 1 1.862404 -0.893768 
 
∆lWPI 3 3 -6.096943*** -6.421303*** 0 0 8 3 -1.783695* -6.112913*** 
 
PMP 5 5 -4.339492*** -4.393580*** 0.0004 0.0024 5 5 -0.228877 -1.501627 
 
∆PMP 4 4 -13.98652*** -14.03900*** 0 0 8 8 -2.185258** -3.974070*** 
 
Notes:  
LCPI and LWPI denote the log consumer price index and log wholesale price index respectively. LBMER 
and LOER represent the log parallel (black) market exchange rate and the log official exchange rate. The 
observation period for each country is recorded under the country name based on a commonly availability of 
all the variables under examination.. 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
 
118 
 
Table A.11: Additional Unit Root Testing for Latin American Economies 
Unit roots 
and 
stationarity 
tests 
Series 
leads/lag
s 
ADF-statistics 
MacKinnon 
(1996)one-sided p-
values 
leads/lag
s 
DF-GLS statistics 
Country 
 
C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T 
Argentina LBMER 3 3 0.773943 -1.74559 0.9936 0.7294 3 3 3.033672 -0.684689 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -8.273709*** -8.396172*** 0 0 6 2 -3.692991*** -8.169370*** 
LOER 8 8 0.032865 -1.979968 0.9601 0.6103 8 8 1.297277 -1.17239 
 
∆LOER 7 7 -4.125284*** -4.073886*** 0.0062 0.0012 7 7 -3.169359*** -4.000760*** 
 
LCPI 8 8 -0.281247 -2.142391 0.9248 0.5203 8 8 0.837583 -1.482281 
 
∆LCPI 12 12 -3.373076** -3.382427* 0.0124 0.0549 12 12 -2.787287*** -3.332042** 
 
PMP 1 1 -4.353589*** -4.344074*** 0.0004 0.0029 4 1 -2.572694*** -4.165592*** 
 
∆PMP 3 3 -15.45053*** -15.44322*** 0 0 3 3 -15.46619*** -15.46927*** 
Bolivia LBMER 10 10 -0.410767 -1.954476 0.9045 0.6241 10 10 0.423561 -1.417261 
1973M01-
1998 
∆LBMER 12 12 -3.247383** -3.268268* 0.018 0.0728 12 12 -2.947654*** -3.260361** 
LOER 9 9 -0.472974 -1.99774 0.8934 0.6007 9 9 0.312641 -1.467583 
 
∆LOER 8 8 -3.880972*** -3.920337*** 0.0024 0.0119 8 8 -3.614976*** -3.918396*** 
 
LCPI 4 5 -0.507056 -2.087192 0.8869 0.5512 4 5 0.50755 -1.607391 
 
∆LCPI 3 3 -4.103491*** -4.096481*** 0.0011 0.0068 1 4 -1.925460* -2.984332** 
 
PMP 7 7 -4.753574*** -4.768636*** 0.0001 0.0006 7 7 -4.464936*** -4.750818*** 
 
∆PMP 8 8 -10.85425*** -10.84559*** 0 0 8 8 -10.86545*** -10.86628*** 
Brazil LBMER 4 4 1.919026 -0.746103 0.9999 0.9684 4 4 3.234659 -0.312172 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 3 3 -5.478895*** -6.086126*** 0 0 4 3 -4.123437*** -5.997544*** 
LOER 1 1 2.297937 -0.662176 1 0.9744 3 3 2.850275 -0.425521 
 
∆LOER 2 10 -5.133135*** -3.163263* 0 0.0932 2 10 -4.246156*** -3.186955** 
 
LCPI 2 2 -0.635824 -1.382706 0.8587 0.8636 1 2 0.696583 -1.24111 
 
∆LCPI 1 1 -3.640388*** -3.628828** 0.0057 0.0296 1 1 -3.388151*** -3.538914*** 
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LWPI 1 6 1.385116 -1.086382 0.999 0.9291 1 1 2.594728 -0.523298 
 
∆lWPI 6 
 
-3.642423*** -3.984882*** 0.0053 0.0097 11 6 -1.976721** -3.982772*** 
 
PMP 3 3 -3.975258*** -4.003076*** 0.0017 0.0092 3 3 -3.179855*** -3.898093*** 
Chile LBMER 2 2 -1.580538 0.083259 0.4918 0.9971 2 2 2.563297 -0.394025 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 1 1 -11.2056*** -11.35012*** 0 0 1 1 -11.17544*** -11.31134*** 
LOER 2 2 -1.412813 0.085698 0.5768 0.9971 4 2 1.96824 -0.356296 
 
∆LOER 1 1 -12.14058*** -12.14058*** 0 0 4 3 -5.984637*** -7.442939*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 -1.546757 -2.471587 0.5091 0.3422 12 12 -0.123144 -2.649009* 
 
∆LCPI 6 6 -3.443254*** -3.418870**  0.0076 0.0283 4 4 -1.9414** -2.8900** 
 
LWPI 5 5 -1.384645 -0.602613 0.5905 0.9781 5 5 1.092339 -0.923874 
 
∆lWPI 4 4 -4.811031*** -4.970335*** 0.0001 0.0003 4 4 -4.085690*** -4.401893*** 
 
PMP 6 6 -4.099550*** -4.144907*** 0.0011 0.0058 6 6 -4.024198*** -4.052959*** 
Colombia LBMER 6 6 1.047351 -1.396023 0.9971 0.8613 6 6 3.879284 -0.80822 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 5 5 -7.724991*** -7.849400*** 0 0 5 5 -4.731349*** -6.175170*** 
LOER 1 1 -0.067729 -1.290028 0.9507 0.889 1 1 5.496753 -1.292532 
 
∆LOER 6 6 -9.326761*** -9.449367*** 0 0 3 6 -8.849945*** -8.936791*** 
 
LCPI 1 1 2.874094 -1.984347 1 0.608 12 1 1.388879 -0.155651 
 
∆LCPI 11 11 -2.991580** -3.630879** 0.0364 0.0282 11 11 -2.949618*** -3.243192** 
 
LWPI 2 2 1.881915 -2.458728 0.9998 0.3487 12 2 0.624087 -0.538833 
 
∆lWPI 1 1 -9.307440*** -9.606867*** 0 0 1 12 -9.260378*** -2.768801* 
 
PMP 4 4 5.432961 3.105868 1 1 4 9 6.070835 0.809895 
 
∆PMP 8 3 -4.095975*** -8.344615*** 0.0011 0 7 7 -2.937891*** -2.581340* 
Costa Rica LBMER 1 1 0.919825 -1.581546 0.9958 0.7992 1 1 2.685825 -0.738757 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 11 11 -4.088907*** -4.169298*** 0.0011 0.0053 10 11 -3.666880*** -4.175676*** 
LOER 9 9 0.246694 -2.101428 0.9752 0.5432 9 9 1.254833 -1.258519 
 
∆LOER 8 8 -4.095077*** -4.247402*** 0.0011 0.0041 8 8 -3.700089*** -4.254816*** 
 
LCPI 6 6 1.112143 -1.770917 0.9976 0.7175 6 6 1.922617 -0.440418 
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∆LCPI 5 5 -3.368554** -3.794515** 0.0126 0.0176 5 5 -2.457746** -3.771149*** 
 
LWPI 6 6 0.209277 -2.343198 0.973 0.4092 6 6 1.310151 -1.205305 
 
∆lWPI 5 5 -3.494728*** -3.576495** 0.0085 0.0328 5 5 -2.717409*** -3.535538*** 
 
PMP 1 1 8.424705 4.350433 1 1 1 9 9.470711 0.194286 
 
∆PMP 8 8 -2.367654 -4.110598*** 0.1516 0.0065 8 8 -1.812727* -3.639650*** 
Dominican 
Republic 
LBMER 3 3 0.586973 -1.639372 0.9893 0.776 3 3 1.786956 -0.920346 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -10.98389*** -11.12624*** 0 0 5 5 -2.058935** -3.529304*** 
LOER 6 6 0.618928 -1.37681 0.9902 0.8667 6 6 1.469022 -0.698808 
 
∆LOER 6 6 -7.984666*** -8.169711*** 0 0 6 6 -7.768611*** -8.147177*** 
 
LCPI 2 2 2.358045 -1.895064 1 0.6556 2 2 4.516166 -0.12607 
 
∆LCPI 1 1 -10.23467*** -10.82407*** 0 0 3 1 -4.422855*** -10.36275*** 
 
PMP 1 1 -4.364669*** -4.439491*** 0.0004 0.0021 1 1 -3.676730*** -4.012353*** 
Ecuador LBMER 4 4 2.126524 -0.860388 0.9999 0.9581 4 4 3.434751 -0.108037 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 3 
 
-7.961960*** -8.533355*** 0 0 3 3 -6.416997** -8.156341** 
LOER 1 1 4.334295 -0.135464 1 0.9942 6 1 6.654836 0.822939 
 
∆DLOER 8 6 -4.580827*** -7.730492*** 0.0002 0 10 6 -3.038437*** -7.638230*** 
 
LCPI 6 2 3.128625 -0.763685 1 0.9669 6 6 3.324045 -0.029685 
 
∆DLCPI 5 1 -3.602532*** -10.96416*** 0.006 0 5 5 -3.237213*** -4.590784*** 
 
PMP 1 1 -3.749913*** -3.754194** 0.0037 0.0198 1 1 -3.703860*** -3.724516*** 
El Salvador LBMER 1 1 -1.065334 -2.238276 0.7306 0.4666 1 1 0.096621 -2.132222 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -7.429598*** -7.426515*** 0 0 6 6 -7.402651*** -7.444428*** 
LOER 2 2 0.216064 -1.505085 0.9734 0.8269 2 2 0.958461 -0.918519 
 
∆DLOER 1 1 -14.75701*** -14.83264*** 0 0 1 1 -14.66564*** -14.84844*** 
 
LCPI 6 2 1.682306 -2.714401 0.9996 0.2312 6 6 2.598031 -0.416044 
 
∆DLCPI 5 5 -4.639031*** -5.344138*** 0.0001 0 5 5 -3.150888*** -5.171306*** 
 
PMP 1 1 -3.267952** -3.254934* 0.017 0.0753 1 1 -2.599745*** -3.156185** 
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Honduras LBMER 3 3 0.744791 -2.012251 0.9928 0.5898 3 3 1.790902 -1.139847 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -5.066343*** -5.283793*** 0 0.0001 2 2 -4.915025*** -4.892868*** 
LOER 6 6 0.784281 -0.692418 0.9937 0.9724 6 6 1.215723 -0.618001 
 
∆DLOER 5 6 -5.834537*** -6.172537*** 0 0 5 5 -5.667451*** -6.116283*** 
 
LCPI 3 3 4.881832 0.280075 1 0.9985 3 3 6.50747 0.800939 
 
∆DLCPI 2 2 -7.845896*** -9.551047*** 0 0 11 2 -1.108091 -8.987096*** 
 
PMP 1 1 -2.110304 -3.517263** 0.241 0.0408 1 1 -1.628243* -3.290401** 
Mexico LBMER 6 6 0.825199 -1.679561 0.9944 0.7591 6 6 1.933232 -0.677857 
1981M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 5 5 -6.251220*** -6.508050*** 0 0 5 5 -5.807419*** -6.495368*** 
LOER 5 5 1.060851 -1.621996 0.9972 0.7832 5 5 2.14745 -0.562738 
 ∆DLOER 4 4 -5.790983*** -6.149044*** 0 0 4 4 -5.236007*** -6.082622*** 
 LCPI 4 4 1.175392 -2.006788 0.998 0.5957 4 4 2.140347 -0.735141 
 ∆DLCPI 3 3 -3.852341*** -4.385244*** 0.0026 0.0025 3 3 -0.767171 -1.664527 
 LWPI 1 3 -3.025680** -1.411847 0.0341 0.855 3 3 0.753335 -0.804167 
 ∆lWPI 2 12 -3.347850** -3.248951* 0.014 0.078 2 2 -3.287293*** -3.470374*** 
 PMP 1 1 -6.077522*** -6.278396*** 0 0 1 1 -5.584968*** -6.274488*** 
Peru LBMER 4 4 0.924675 -1.371014 0.9958 0.8683 4 4 1.994203 -0.62366 
1973M01-
1998mM12 
∆LBMER 3 3 -5.610551*** -5.920045*** 0 0 3 3 -5.155290*** -5.895680*** 
LOER 3 3 1.335248 -1.274369 0.9988 0.8927 3 3 2.674534 -0.398266 
 ∆DLOER 2 2 -8.426710*** -8.763107*** 0 0 3 2 -6.672188*** -8.743372*** 
 LCPI 5 5 0.373587 -1.639544 0.9817 0.776 5 5 1.256642 -0.965079 
 ∆DLCPI 4 4 -4.085410*** -4.289455*** 0.0011 0.0035 4 4 -3.730313*** -4.287602*** 
 LWPI 4 4 -1.051384 -1.1691 0.7348 0.9135 4 4 0.651975 -1.369365 
 ∆lWPI 3 3 -3.665281*** -3.727818** 0.0053 0.0225 3 3 -3.536838*** -3.603191*** 
 PMP 1 1 -5.190895*** -5.250176*** 0 0.0001 1 1 -4.817139*** -5.239425*** 
Suriname LBMER 6 6 0.537254 -1.638017 0.9878 0.7759 6 6 1.41668 -0.962372 
1973m01-
1998m12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -5.370856*** -5.527797*** 0 0 6 6 -4.677403*** -5.503917*** 
LOER 6 6 -0.439634 -1.295196 0.8995 0.8878 6 6 -0.215775 -1.304862 
 ∆DLOER 6 6 -7.691043*** -7.817318*** 0 0 6 6 -7.642143*** -7.794758*** 
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 LCPI 4 5 0.164366 -2.056392 0.9701 0.5683 5 5 1.356697 -1.246939 
 ∆DLCPI 5 3 -5.136430*** -5.193498*** 0 0.0001 4 3 -3.721125*** -5.096563*** 
 PMP 5 5 -3.887232*** -4.109377*** 0.0024 0.0067 4 5 -3.421604*** -4.103221*** 
Venezuela LBMER 3 3 2.082488 -0.781564 0.9999 0.9654 3 3 3.10267 -0.094549 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -9.268782*** -9.804134*** 0 0 2 2 -7.859700*** -8.395128*** 
LOER 1 1 2.63354 -0.003539 1 0.9962 1 1 3.920701 0.310092 
 ∆DLOER 6 6 -7.779213*** -8.492771*** 0 0 6 6 -7.101758*** -8.361661*** 
 LCPI 1 1 8.310245 3.014388 1 1 2 5 7.705786 0.25218 
 ∆DLCPI 4 1 -4.102287*** -10.20385*** 0.0011 0 4 4 -3.153679*** -5.769043*** 
 LWPI 2 2 4.453042 0.634661 1 0.9996 2 2 5.803383 0.754563 
 ∆lWPI 1 1 -7.935120*** -9.417331*** 0 0 3 1 -4.436334*** -9.320324*** 
 PMP 7 7 -3.080826** -3.146235* 0.0287 0.097 7 7 -3.070868*** -3.073312** 
Notes: LCPI and LWPI denote the log consumer price index and log wholesale price index respectively. 
LBMER and LOER represent the log parallel (black) market exchange rate and the log official exchange rate. 
The observation period for each country is recorded under the country name based on a commonly 
availability of all the variables under examination.. 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
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Table A.12: Additional Unit Root Testing for African Economies 
Unit roots 
and 
stationarity 
tests 
Series 
leads/lag
s 
ADF-statistics 
MacKinnon 
(1996)one-sided p-
values 
leads/lag
s 
DF-GLS statistics 
Country 
 
C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T C C,T 
Algeria LBMER 11 11 0.659671 -1.589814 0.9912 0.7959 11 11 2.078671 -1.132065 
1974M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 10 
 
-6.405779*** -6.566283*** 0 0 6 6 -8.678894*** -9.491608*** 
LOER 1 1 2.32887 0.429238 1 0.9991 1 1 3.683674 0.243768 
 
∆LOER 7 6 -5.604517*** -7.117665*** 0 0 7 6 5.318023*** -7.092339*** 
 
LCPI 12 12 -3.861924 -1.806839 0.9184 0.6989 12 12 0.511059 -1.667019 
 
∆LCPI 11 12 -2.440574 -2.665574 0.252 0.1317 11 11 -2.35128** -2.395465 
 
PMP 1 1 3.488836 1.387574 1 1 1 1 4.300224 0.926658 
 
∆PMP 9 7 -4.409153*** -5.545844*** 0.0003 0 9 7 -4.196499*** -5.276940*** 
Egypt LBMER 3 3 -0.661631 -1.770367 0.8536 0.7178 3 3 0.73655 -1.752212 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 2 2 -14.26850*** -14.25947*** 0 0 4 2 -7.988716*** -13.61013*** 
LOER 11 11 -0.441828 -2.095848 0.8991 0.5463 11 11 0.381412 -1.685909 
 ∆DLOER 10 10 -4.416207*** -4.477433*** 0.0003 0.0018 10 10 -4.255831*** -4.481486*** 
 LCPI 1 1 3.81319 -2.791079 1 0.2013 1 1 8.749692 0.182398 
 ∆DLCPI 12 12 -3.485798*** -4.019183*** 0.0088 0.0087 12 12 -3.183208*** -3.850726*** 
 LWPI 12 12 0.730712 -2.151126 0.9927 0.5153 12 12 1.497384 -0.773612 
 ∆lWPI 11 11 -3.020025** -3.315512*** 0.0338 0.0649 11 11 -2.482846** -2.225864 
 PMP 6 6 -2.018483 -2.346839 0.2789 0.4073 6 6 -1.926059* -1.958523 
 ∆PMP 2 2 -14.84099*** -14.84285*** 0 0 6 6 -7.776735*** -8.853289*** 
Ghana LBMER 10 10 0.181098 -1.904478 0.9712 0.6503 10 10 2.522285 -1.526497 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 9 9 -6.198259*** -6.219470*** 0 0 10 9 -1.2626 -2.952639** 
LOER 1 1 0.847059 -1.788233 0.9948 0.7093 1 1 2.647147 -0.836296 
 ∆DLOER 6 6 -8.293644*** -8.457829*** 0 0 6 6 -7.782096*** -8.449518*** 
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 LCPI 1 1 0.751482 -1.970309 0.9931 0.6154 2 2 3.911851 -0.922849 
 ∆DLCPI 1 10 -9.534197*** -4.096294*** 0 0.0069 1 1 -9.538758*** -9.534976*** 
 PMP 10 10 -4.073509*** -4.069735*** 0.0012 0.0075 10 10 -3.778610*** -3.972818*** 
Kenya LBMER 5 9 -0.344557 -2.637481 0.9152 0.2639 5 5 0.546063 -1.657375 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 4 3 -6.795267*** -6.830264*** 0 0 4 4 -6.711705*** -6.825071*** 
LOER 1 1 1.253727 -1.288415 0.9985 0.8894 1 1 2.379764 -0.461365 
 ∆DLOER 6 6 -7.211128*** -7.502308*** 0 0 6 6 -6.960915*** -7.364469*** 
 LCPI 3 3 0.802978 -2.575416 0.994 0.2919 3 3 3.455666 -1.035001 
 ∆DLCPI 2 2 -7.102045*** -7.194438*** 0 0 5 2 -2.386650** -5.815429*** 
 PMP 1 1 -4.221011*** -4.407628*** 0.0007 0.0024 1 1 -4.183275*** -4.363608*** 
Nigeria LBMER 1 1 0.589106 -2.153071 0.9893 0.5138 1 1 1.834785 -0.891855 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 6 6 -6.910741*** -7.114263*** 0 0 12 4 -1.42633 -6.292583*** 
LOER 3 3 0.988881 -1.125216 0.9965 0.9226 3 3 1.866845 -0.430625 
 ∆DLOER 2 2 -11.43319*** -11.66991*** 0 0 2 2 -11.20554*** -11.65027*** 
 LCPI 2 2 3.102932 -1.247934 1 0.8986 2 2 5.546785 0.139802 
 ∆DLCPI 1 1 -9.701803*** -10.47362*** 0 0 11 1 -1.945203** -10.37338*** 
 PMP 2 2 -1.741604 -2.34836 0.4094 0.4062 2 2 -1.361051 -2.308838 
 ∆PMP 1 1 -18.69747*** -18.68354*** 0 0 10 1 -2.317507** -17.71480*** 
Morocco LBMER 9 9 -0.673205 -1.543852 0.8508 0.8131 9 9 0.132754 -1.498287 
1973M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 8 8 -6.808471*** -6.829620*** 0 0 12 12 -3.698435*** -3.961442*** 
LOER 1 1 -1.151096 -1.543839 0.6966 0.8132 3 3 0.589622 -1.53657 
 ∆DLOER 2 2 -10.64698*** -10.64059*** 0 0 12 2 -4.243667*** -10.58496*** 
 LCPI 12 12 0.344751 -2.16661 0.9804 0.5067 12 12 1.863032 -1.064766 
 ∆DLCPI 11 11 -4.005842*** -4.073945*** 0.0015 0.0073 11 11 -1.944399** -2.954721*** 
 LWPI 10 10 -3.342484** -0.619605 0.014 0.9768 12 11 2.822177 0.162298 
 ∆lWPI 4 9 -8.720002*** -7.350906*** 0 0 12 12 -1.942621** -3.685083*** 
 PMP 4 2 -3.114789** -6.977213** 0.0262 0 4 4 -1.940875* -2.105843 
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South 
Africa 
LBMER 2 2 1.504991 -1.107192 0.9993 0.9256 2 1 1.839095 -0.800283 
1980M01-
1998M12 
∆LBMER 1 1 -18.01651*** -18.19740*** 0 0 1 12 -18.61336*** -0.264678 
LOER 1 1 1.430112 0.9991 -1.28822 0.8895 8 8 2.601462 -0.36688 
 ∆DLOER 11 11 -4.424105*** -4.853371*** 0.0003 0.0004 11 11 -3.921644*** -4.567156*** 
 LCPI 12 12 0.410782 -2.90103 0.9833 0.1631 12 12 0.393687 -1.254632 
 ∆DLCPI 2 11 -3.4511*** -3.9878*** 0 0 2 2 -2.5724*** -3.4712*** 
 LWPI 12 12 -1.657942 0.105231 0.4512 0.9972 6 6 0.775741 -0.070239 
 ∆lWPI 5 5 -3.4599*** -4.0001*** 0 0 5 5 -1.201455 -3.630365*** 
 PMP 12 12 -3.079179** -3.108117 0.0288 0.1055 12 12 -2.880337*** -2.241785 
 
Notes: LCPI and LWPI denote the log consumer price index and log wholesale price index respectively. 
LBMER and LOER represent the log parallel (black) market exchange rate and the log official exchange rate. 
The observation period for each country is recorded under the country name based on a commonly 
availability of all the variables under examination.. 
*** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level,** denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root at 5%level, *denotes rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level. 
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Table A.13: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 1– Latin American Economies 
Argentina Series: JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 52.7642 49.7201 24.2760 
 1 10.1381 9.5532 12.3209 
 2 0.0130 0.0122 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 40.8046 38.4121 24.2760 
 1 11.5961 10.9162 12.3209 
 2 0.0842 0.0792 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Bolivia Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 34.39163 27.71124 29.79707 
 1 14.58899 11.75516 15.49471 
 2 5.604942 4.516212 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 62.5716 58.23972 42.91525 
 1 22.03684 20.51121 25.87211 
 2 5.695545 5.301238 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Brazil Series: JN p p*  
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 42.1358 41.0171 29.7971 
 1 9.5215 9.2687 15.4947 
 2 1.4124 1.3749 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 49.1307 47.8028 29.7971 
 1 15.1823 14.7720 15.4947 
 2 2.2474 2.1867 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 49.3075 47.9984 29.7971 
 1 12.5144 12.1822 15.4947 
 2 1.0798 1.0512 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 58.2702 57.1350 29.7971 
 1 19.6318 19.2493 15.4947 
 2 1.1704 1.1476 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Colombia Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 30.4459 28.6894 29.7971 
 1 14.8936 14.0344 15.4947 
 2 7.0059 6.6018 3.8415 
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No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 / 0 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 45.8066 44.6168 29.7971 
 1 13.9634 13.6007 15.4947 
 2 4.8042 4.6795 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 56.45319 55.065 24.27596 
 1 9.623032 9.3864 12.3209 
 2 1.305562 1.273458 4.129906 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 42.91525 46.76226 0.0055 
 1 25.87211 19.69181 0.1514 
 2 12.51798 2.429452 0.9124 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Dominican 
Republic 
Series:	JN p p*   
b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 40.5112 29.7971 39.7322 
 1 13.6575 15.4947 13.3948 
 2 2.6549 3.8415 2.6038 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 44.5476 41.5004 29.7971 
 1 16.0428 14.9454 15.4947 
 2 4.5803 4.2670 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Ecuador Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 79.9670 78.4292 29.7971 
 1 20.4859 20.0919 15.4947 
 2 3.8546 3.7805 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 130.2004 127.6722 42.91525 
 1 25.06514 24.57844 25.87211 
 2 9.509868 9.32521 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
El Salvador Series:	JN p p*   
b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 30.8907 29.1085 24.2760 
 1 11.7598 11.0814 12.3209 
 2 1.8831 1.7744 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 76.5037 75.0134 24.2760 
 1 22.6869 22.2449 12.3209 
 2 0.8370 0.8207 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
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Honduras Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 64.15026 62.9166 29.79707 
 1 14.34762 14.0717 15.49471 
 2 0.559464 0.548705 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 51.0898 50.1495 29.79707 
 1 14.27315 14.01045 15.49471 
 2 2.498802 2.452812 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Mexico Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.13474 32.32742 29.79707 
 1 14.97834 12.69737 15.49471 
 2 4.615687 3.912791 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 45.14092 38.26667 35.19275 
 1 19.66875 16.67351 20.26184 
 2 4.733394 4.012573 9.164546 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 
Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 42.3962 41.2019 24.2760 
 1 10.8914 10.5846 12.3209 
 2 0.4157 0.4040 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.3029 37.5567 29.7971 
 1 14.7178 14.4311 15.4947 
 2 4.5475 4.4589 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Peru Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 64.9853 64.3604 29.7971 
 1 27.1751 26.9138 15.4947 
 2 2.6021 2.5771 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 32.8873 31.2804 29.7971 
 1 14.2057 13.5116 15.4947 
 2 4.3358 4.1240 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 
Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 52.6962 51.2909 29.7971 
 1 19.2621 18.7485 15.4947 
 2 1.2770 1.2430 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series: JI p p*   
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 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 30.5726 29.9770 29.7971 
 1 11.0779 10.8621 15.4947 
 2 1.7929 1.7580 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Suriname Series:	JN p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 74.47722 69.46433 29.79707 
 1 15.45525 14.41499 15.49471 
 2 1.916948 1.787923 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 39.6848 38.9015 29.7971 
 1 9.3142 9.1304 15.4947 
 2 0.0133 0.0131 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Venezuela Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 56.0452 54.9674 29.7971 
 1 
8.9863 8.8135 15.4947 
 2 0.0905 0.0887 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 57.8166 56.6903 29.7971 
 1 7.3929 7.2488 15.4947 
 2 0.2550 0.2501 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 52.8147 51.7991 29.7971 
 1 11.6498 11.4257 15.4947 
 2 1.4161 1.3888 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
p(*)=LWPI(*) Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 50.2560 49.2770 29.7971 
 1 7.7731 7.6217 15.4947 
 2 0.0028 0.0028 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Chile  Series: JN p p*  
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 60.9770 56.8728 29.7971 
 1 15.0819 14.0667 15.4947 
 2 5.2130 4.8622 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 65.9365 59.4932 24.2760 
 1 18.7035 16.8758 12.3209 
 2 1.5877 1.4326 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
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 0 41.4016 37.8188 24.2760 
 1 5.7534 5.2555 12.3209 
 2 1.1025 1.0071 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 65.8128 61.9541 24.2760 
 1 19.0242 17.9087 12.3209 
 2 1.5755 1.4831 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Costa Rica Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 52.0700 48.2062 24.2760 
 1 10.3292 9.5628 12.3209 
 2 1.8693 1.7306 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 48.7951 44.0217 29.7971 
 1 16.2732 14.6812 15.4947 
 2 4.3981 3.9678 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 51.10346 46.68105 42.91525 
 1 25.46593 23.26215 25.87211 
 2 8.396484 7.669865 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 61.51122 56.10144 42.91525 
 1 31.40266 28.64086 25.87211 
 2 10.4353 9.517537 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
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Table A.14: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 1 – African Economies 
Algeria Series: JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 41.0430 40.1697 29.7971 
 1 8.9531 8.7626 15.4947 
 2 0.7959 0.7790 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 36.8821 36.0918 29.7971 
 1 9.6560 9.4491 15.4947 
 2 0.5718 0.5596 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Egypt Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.1365 37.4031 29.7971 
 1 12.2705 12.0345 15.4947 
 2 3.3952 3.3299 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 44.66206 41.17056 42.91525 
 1 21.78777 20.08449 25.87211 
 2 7.859145 7.244749 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 68.25671 67.59402 42.91525 
 1 23.31918 23.09278 25.87211 
 2 4.451591 4.408372 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 69.86237 69.17744 42.91525 
 1 23.93703 23.70235 25.87211 
 2 9.468157 9.375332 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Kenya Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 51.6136 50.1247 29.7971 
 1 14.0566 13.6511 15.4947 
 2 1.5726 1.5272 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 54.83145 53.22401 42.91525 
 1 21.32434 20.6992 25.87211 
 2 6.665539 6.470132 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Morocco Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 72.1806 70.7925 24.2760 
 1 13.3180 13.0619 12.3209 
 2 0.0006 0.0006 4.1299 
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No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 70.9206 69.5390 24.2760 
 1 12.6025 12.3570 12.3209 
 2 0.0525 0.0515 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 58.1297 53.18249 42.91525 
 1 22.72591 20.79179 25.87211 
 2 9.360104 8.563499 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 74.1843 73.4247 24.2760 
 1 9.6271 9.5286 12.3209 
 2 0.3433 0.3398 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Nigeria Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 61.4766 60.2944 24.2760 
 1 14.1061 13.8349 12.3209 
 2 0.8893 0.8722 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.1984 37.4543 29.7971 
 1 12.9365 12.6845 15.4947 
 2 1.9353 1.8976 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
South 
Africa 
Series:	JN p p*   
b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 72.93897 67.32828 42.91525 
 1 25.81377 23.8281 25.87211 
 2 12.31155 11.36451 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 65.65065 60.51835 42.91525 
 1 23.50652 21.66888 25.87211 
 2 9.128347 8.41473 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 56.44521 50.25943 42.91525 
 1 23.75159 21.14868 25.87211 
 2 8.382462 7.463836 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 52.53345 45.87428 42.91525 
 1 23.02259 20.10423 25.87211 
 2 6.823415 5.958475 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
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Table A.15: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 1 – Developed Economies 
Belgium Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 50.2421  46.8604  29.7971  
 1 16.1649  15.0769  15.4947  
 2 7.4062  6.9077  3.8415  
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2/1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 46.4451  42.8142  29.7971  
 1 15.5635  14.3468  15.4947  
 2 6.7601  6.2317  3.8415  
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 1 
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Table A.16: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 2 – Asian Economies 
India Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 41.3777 40.5820 29.7971 
 1 15.2364 14.9434 15.4947 
 2 0.1180 0.1157 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 42.8566 40.3439 29.7971 
 1 15.1752 14.2854 15.4947 
 2 1.1435 1.0765 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 48.4839 47.5515 29.7971 
 1 13.6450 13.3826 15.4947 
 2 0.0119 0.0116 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 71.2214 69.3533 47.8561 
 1 36.0962 35.1494 29.7971 
 2 12.8119 12.4759 15.4947 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Indonesia Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 83.57885 81.97156 42.91525 
 1 24.14445 23.68013 25.87211 
 2 3.885414 3.810695 12.51798 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 36.9819 35.17497 29.79707 
 1 14.13412 13.44353 15.49471 
 2 2.633874 2.505183 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.76126 36.52503 29.79707 
 1 15.48452 14.59118 15.49471 
 2 0.518988 0.489046 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
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 0 32.9805 31.0468 24.2760 
 1 8.2038 7.7228 12.3209 
 2 2.0919 1.9692 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Iran Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 32.0736 31.0239 29.7971 
 1 11.6912 11.3086 15.4947 
 2 0.0711 0.0688 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 34.7387 33.9724 29.7971 
 1 14.4565 14.1376 15.4947 
 2 0.4673 0.4570 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 46.6457 45.1191 29.7971 
 1 6.7678 6.5463 15.4947 
 2 0.6869 0.6644 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 65.8989 65.1774 29.7971 
 1 15.8280 15.6547 15.4947 
 2 0.1677 0.1658 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Kuwait Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 54.8714 53.7515 24.2760 
 1 4.5022 4.4103 12.3209 
 2 0.0011 0.0011 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 56.0733 54.9131 24.2760 
 1 5.4285 5.3162 12.3209 
 2 0.0060 0.0058 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 87.7692 86.7243 24.2760 
 1 2.6669 2.6352 12.3209 
 2 0.0255 0.0252 4.1299 
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No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 84.1093 83.0959 24.2760 
 1 2.8596 2.8252 12.3209 
 2 0.1629 0.1609 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
korea Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 40.3330 39.5573 29.7971 
 1 10.0419 9.8487 15.4947 
 2 3.7892 3.7164 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 30.4469 28.6140 24.2760 
 1 10.1540 9.5427 12.3209 
 2 1.8086 1.6997 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 47.5358 46.1646 29.7971 
 1 15.6898 15.2372 15.4947 
 2 5.9631 5.7911 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):3/2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 33.7928 31.7585 29.7971 
 1 14.2638 13.4051 15.4947 
 2 4.4177 4.1517 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Malaysia Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 47.9461 47.0241 24.2760 
 1 11.8690 11.6408 12.3209 
 2 2.2521 2.2088 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 43.5610 42.7124 29.7971 
 1 12.1769 11.9397 15.4947 
 2 1.7898 1.7550 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
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 0 13.3893 12.8642 29.7971 
 1 3.7801 3.6318 15.4947 
 2 0.4169 0.4005 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):0 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 16.4597 15.7969 29.7971 
 1 6.1482 5.9006 15.4947 
 2 0.4720 0.4530 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):0 
Nepal Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 34.6888 34.0217 29.7971 
 1 11.8717 11.6434 15.4947 
 2 1.2094 1.1862 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 40.4542 39.4035 29.7971 
 1 17.5906 17.1337 15.4947 
 2 0.9744 0.9491 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Pakistan Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 41.7493 38.1363 29.7971 
 1 8.9347 8.1615 15.4947 
 2 0.6562 0.5994 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 61.0195 56.8455 29.7971 
 1 11.1525 10.3896 15.4947 
 2 2.2064 2.0555 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 49.7480 48.7913 29.7971 
 1 15.5569 15.2577 15.4947 
 2 0.0017 0.0017 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2/1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 62.7905 61.5673 29.7971 
 1 19.4315 19.0530 15.4947 
 2 2.3687 2.3225 3.8415 
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No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Philippines Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 55.9308 54.8552 24.2760 
 1 13.6413 13.3790 12.3209 
 2 1.8012 1.7665 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 34.2562 31.2435 29.7971 
 1 13.9989 12.7677 15.4947 
 2 5.3957 4.9211 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Singapore Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 69.8249 65.7965 29.7971 
 1 12.6217 11.8936 15.4947 
 2 3.7482 3.5319 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 28.5785 26.8406 24.2760 
 1 4.8536 4.5584 12.3209 
 2 0.3976 0.3734 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 39.8469 39.0419 29.7971 
 1 5.4608 5.3505 15.4947 
 2 1.2518 1.2265 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.0076 37.2292 29.7971 
 1 5.7675 5.6494 15.4947 
 2 1.5748 1.5426 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Sri Lanka Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 60.7916 59.6225 29.7971 
 1 24.6355 24.1617 15.4947 
 2 2.7658 2.7126 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
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 0 48.3756 47.4332 29.7971 
 1 15.5949 15.2911 15.4947 
 2 2.5812 2.5309 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 
36.7306 35.9233 29.7971 
 1 14.7972 14.4720 15.4947 
 2 1.3052 1.2765 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 28.9626 28.3166 29.7971 
 1 7.6262 7.4561 15.4947 
 2 0.6639 0.6491 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):0 
Thailand Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 
37.7046 36.9796 29.7971 
 1 13.4324 13.1740 15.4947 
 2 0.4849 0.4756 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 38.2609 37.5156 29.7971 
 1 14.3396 14.0602 15.4947 
 2 0.0867 0.0850 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 46.3140 45.4233 29.7971 
 1 10.0608 9.8673 15.4947 
 2 0.1261 0.1237 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 47.2370 46.3168 29.7971 
 1 12.2942 12.0547 15.4947 
 2 0.2978 0.2920 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Turkey Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LCPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 101.4180 100.4428 29.7971 
 1 25.3744 25.1304 15.4947 
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 2 2.7590 2.7325 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 43.5317 40.9794 29.7971 
 1 13.4619 12.6726 15.4947 
 2 0.6432 0.6055 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 Series:	JN p p*   
p(*)=LWPI(*) b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 28.2170 27.1105 29.7971 
 1 12.0460 11.5736 15.4947 
 2 0.0411 0.0395 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):0 
 Series: JI p p*   
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
 0 32.0393 30.7491 29.7971 
 1 8.5432 8.1992 15.4947 
 2 0.1528 0.1467 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
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Table A.17: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 2 – Latin American Economies 
Series: JI JN p p* 
Argentina b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 83.74918 78.72423 47.85613 
 1 32.58986 30.63447 29.79707 
 2 14.44817 13.58128 15.49471 
 3 4.864055 4.572212 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Bolivia b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 151.2124 148.2377 40.1749 
 1 75.9160 74.4225 24.2760 
 2 25.6640 25.1592 12.3209 
 3 0.0209 0.0205 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Chile b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 120.0013 115.2488 40.1749 
 1 61.3903 58.9590 24.2760 
 2 10.8216 10.3930 12.3209 
 3 3.2395 3.1112 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Chile b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 112.4828 108.0280 40.1749 
 1 41.9306 40.2700 24.2760 
 2 9.1135 8.7525 12.3209 
 3 1.0782 1.0355 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Brazil b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 87.1919 84.0498 63.8761 
 1 38.1007 36.7277 42.9153 
 2 11.1879 10.7848 25.8721 
 3 2.0793 2.0043 12.5180 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Brazil b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 65.2480 57.0920 47.8561 
 1 26.1387 22.8713 29.7971 
 2 8.5712 7.4998 15.4947 
 3 1.7563 1.5367 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Colombia b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 50.1802 44.0977 47.8561 
 1 21.9008 19.2462 29.7971 
 2 11.3779 9.9988 15.4947 
 3 3.0960 2.7207 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
 b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 60.8480 59.2034 47.8561 
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 1 28.1726 27.4112 29.7971 
 2 5.1640 5.0244 15.4947 
 3 2.0701 2.0141 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Costa Rica b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 102.8614 94.0131 47.8561 
 
1 53.4864 48.8854 29.7971 
 
2 16.1357 14.7477 15.4947 
 
3 3.9395 3.6006 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):4/2 
 
b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 68.4619 62.5727 40.1749 
 
1 31.2885 28.5970 24.2760 
 
2 10.3667 9.4750 12.3209 
 
3 1.6973 1.5513 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Dominican 
Republic 
b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
0 68.7266 65.0854 47.8561 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 1 30.1182 28.5226 29.7971 
 2 15.2170 14.4108 15.4947 
 3 5.5200 5.2275 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 2/1 
Ecuador b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 64.8801 58.8044 47.8561 
 
1 30.4207 27.5719 29.7971 
 
2 13.1147 11.8866 9.4750 
 
3 5.1161 4.6370 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
El Salvador b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 52.9950 49.4738 47.8561 
 1 31.1952 29.1224 29.7971 
 2 16.3881 15.2992 15.4947 
 3 4.8636 4.5404 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 4/1 
Honduras b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 51.6996 49.13068 47.85613 
 1 23.77935 22.59777 29.79707 
 2 8.688018 8.256315 15.49471 
 3 0.490022 0.465673 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Mexico b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 71.4266 60.1115 47.8561 
 1 36.0935 30.3757 29.7971 
 2 17.3874 14.6330 15.4947 
 3 6.9486 5.8478 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Mexico b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
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p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 67.5318 64.9468 47.8561 
 1 37.3533 35.9235 29.7971 
 2 14.2030 13.6593 15.4947 
 3 4.7418 4.5603 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Peru b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 74.2433 71.5558 40.1749 
 1 33.2531 32.0494 24.2760 
 2 11.2675 10.8597 12.3209 
 3 0.1818 0.1753 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Peru b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 60.5229 58.3320 40.1749 
 1 23.7592 22.8991 24.2760 
 2 6.6122 6.3728 12.3209 
 3 0.2294 0.2211 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Suriname b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 62.4165 60.7575 47.8561 
 1 31.2689 30.4379 29.7971 
 2 9.1135 8.8713 15.4947 
 3 0.1460 0.1422 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Venezuela b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 75.1083 73.1382 47.8561 
 1 24.3512 23.7125 29.7971 
 2 6.9931 6.8096 15.4947 
 3 0.3535 0.3443 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Venezuela b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 68.4411 66.6634 47.8561 
 1 23.3843 22.7769 29.7971 
 2 8.7786 8.5506 15.4947 
 3 0.7671 0.7471 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
  
144 
 
Table A.18: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 2 – African Economies 
Series: JI JN p p* 
Algeria b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 60.1298 58.3995 47.8561 
 1 27.8168 27.0163 29.7971 
 2 10.8313 10.5196 15.4947 
 3 0.2976 0.2890 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Egypt b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 65.5947 63.8742 47.8561 
 1 38.2427 37.2396 29.7971 
 2 14.9200 14.5287 15.4947 
 3 3.5583 3.4650 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Egypt b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 108.6238 99.6958 47.8561 
 
1 50.3461 46.2081 29.7971 
 
2 15.2474 13.9942 15.4947 
 
3 5.5230 5.0690 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Kenya b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 86.8027 82.2038 47.8561 
 1 42.5279 40.2748 29.7971 
 2 14.9460 14.1542 15.4947 
 3 0.6599 0.6249 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Morocco b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 65.8125 58.7454 47.8561 
 1 36.3695 32.4640 29.7971 
 2 17.4354 15.3632 15.4947 
 3 5.8446 5.2170 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 2 
Morocco b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 110.5812 109.0716 40.1749 
 1 44.3094 43.7045 24.2760 
 2 10.2391 10.0993 12.3209 
 3 0.1773 0.1749 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Nigeria b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 51.8428 50.4830 47.8561 
 1 24.7781 24.1281 29.7971 
 2 11.6956 11.3888 15.4947 
 3 4.8635 4.7359 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
South Africa b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 88.7346 81.7976 47.8561 
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 1 42.4554 39.1364 29.7971 
 2 15.2428 14.0512 15.4947 
 3 6.4126 5.9113 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
South Africa b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 92.8205 81.0545 63.8761 
 1 46.4265 40.5414 42.9153 
 2 21.4069 18.6933 25.8721 
 3 7.8725 6.8746 12.5180 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
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Table A.19: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 2 – Developed Economies 
Series: JI JN p p* 
Belgium b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 76.735 69.736 54.079 
 1 39.751 36.125 35.193 
 2 17.516 15.918 20.262 
 3 7.727 7.022 9.165 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
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Table A.20: Johansen Cointegration Test for model 2 – Asian Economies 
Series: JI JN p p* 
India b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 71.2214 69.3533 47.8561 
 1 36.0962 35.1494 29.7971 
 2 12.8119 12.4759 15.4947 
 3 0.2195 0.2138 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
India b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 93.4961 92.2779 47.8561 
 1 49.9732 49.3221 29.7971 
 2 12.3389 12.1781 15.4947 
 3 0.0523 0.0516 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Indonesia b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 57.6204 53.7918 47.8561 
 1 23.6212 22.0517 29.7971 
 2 10.8792 10.1563 15.4947 
 3 1.7353 1.6200 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Indonesia b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 62.4528 59.1441 40.1749 
 1 23.9635 22.6939 24.2760 
 2 9.6853 9.1721 12.3209 
 3 2.9892 2.8309 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Iran b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 48.19169 45.32527 47.85613 
 1 23.57031 22.16836 29.79707 
 2 9.787238 9.205097 15.49471 
 3 0.763872 0.718437 3.841466 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Korea b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 78.8269 77.2660 40.1749 
 1 28.8308 28.2598 24.2760 
 2 9.9732 9.7757 12.3209 
 3 1.2040 1.1802 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 1 
Korea b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 55.4169 50.8621 47.8561 
 1 24.7642 22.7288 29.7971 
 2 8.7215 8.0047 15.4947 
 3 3.7586 3.4497 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Kuwait b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 65.0786 59.5202 47.8561 
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 1 29.6190 27.0893 29.7971 
 2 14.8150 13.5496 15.4947 
 3 5.0977 4.6623 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Kuwait b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 51.3713 47.7504 40.1749 
 1 18.9793 17.6416 24.2760 
 2 3.1103 2.8911 12.3209 
 3 0.0392 0.0365 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Malaysia b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 77.0947 71.0678 63.8761 
 1 35.0830 32.3404 42.9153 
 2 9.9859 9.2052 25.8721 
 3 3.3563 3.0939 12.5180 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Malaysia 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 
b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
0 48.6450 47.3564 47.8561 
 1 16.8269 16.3811 29.7971 
 2 4.1469 4.0371 15.4947 
 3 0.2542 0.2475 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Nepal b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 57.6432 56.1312 47.8561 
 1 36.6657 35.7039 29.7971 
 2 16.5893 15.1541 15.4947 
 3 1.5470 1.5065 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Pakistan b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 82.1217 79.9676 47.8561 
 1 44.7983 43.6232 29.7971 
 2 16.8299 15.3885 15.4947 
 3 0.3554 0.3461 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Pakistan b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 73.1435 71.2250 47.8561 
 1 38.9075 37.8869 29.7971 
 2 14.6545 14.2701 15.4947 
 3 1.1479 1.1178 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Philippines b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 77.8855 75.8426 47.8561 
 1 35.1567 34.2345 29.7971 
 2 12.7575 12.4229 15.4947 
 3 4.9453 4.8155 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 2 
Singapore b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
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p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 67.3665 64.5885 47.8561 
 1 40.8957 39.2092 29.7971 
 2 15.3132 14.6818 15.4947 
 3 3.3291 3.1918 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Singapore b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 68.0194 66.1622 47.8561 
 1 34.9108 33.9576 29.7971 
 2 5.7660 5.6085 15.4947 
 3 1.6567 1.6115 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Sri Lanka b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 66.8481 64.8601 47.8561 
 1 35.1429 34.0977 29.7971 
 2 11.4111 11.0717 15.4947 
 3 1.1261 1.0926 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Sri Lanka b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 47.9236 46.4983 47.8561 
 1 24.7252 23.9898 29.7971 
 2 8.3638 8.1150 15.4947 
 3 0.7406 0.7186 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
Thailand b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 64.3376 62.6501 40.1749 
 1 29.4935 28.7199 24.2760 
 2 6.0669 5.9078 12.3209 
 3 0.0253 0.0247 4.1299 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s): 2 
Thailand b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 83.9514 81.7494 47.8561 
 1 41.6393 40.5471 29.7971 
 2 8.1456 7.9320 15.4947 
 3 0.2197 0.2139 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Turkey b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LCPI(*) 0 70.1462 66.9395 55.2458 
 1 40.2229 38.3841 35.0109 
 2 14.9190 14.2370 18.3977 
 3 0.0336 0.0321 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):2 
Turkey b: B Trace Atrace Trace95 
p(*)=LWPI(*) 0 59.1371 55.9620 47.8561 
 1 27.7408 26.2513 29.7971 
 2 7.4791 7.0775 15.4947 
 3 0.0004 0.0004 3.8415 
No.of Cointegrating eqn(s):1 
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